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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
T HIS RESEARCH ASSIGNMENT looked at the general oper-
ating and flight rules contained in 14 C.F.R. Part 91 that
identify regulatory provisions that impose upon the pilot the
duty to see and avoid other aircraft. The research focused on
three objectives. First, a section-by-section review of Part 91 was
conducted to identify specific regulations that assign a duty or
responsibility to a pilot to see and avoid other aircraft. Second,
upon identification of specific regulations, this effort looked
into the history and background behind these provisions to clar-
ify the intent, or legal purview, behind their promulgation. In
this effort, support for determining purview was sought from
historic and current documents, including historic and current
rulemaking continued in the Federal Register, Advisory Circu-
lars, Manuals, and judicial treatment arising from adjudication
of these provisions. Lastly, the research looked at systems that
have been employed, or have the possibility to be employed,
that may enhance or supplement the pilot's responsibility for
separation from other aircraft.
A complete summary of each section of this report would be a
daunting task. Instead, each section of the report provides its
own summaries and conclusions. The following provides a brief
background of the contents of this report.
A. PART 91 REGULATIONS IMPOSING DIRECT DUTY TO "SEE
AND AVOID"
A number of regulatory provisions were found to impose this
direct duty on aviators.' The history and development of these
regulations was examined to identify the specific duty each de-
mands. For example, 14 C.F.R. § 91.113 states that pilots have a
duty to be vigilant. 2 This research looked behind this term, seek-
ing answers for what constitutes vigilance. It further considered
how the term is interpreted by the FAA, or its predecessors, and
whether there are any exceptions that apply to relieve a pilot of
this duty. Other examples include 14 C.F.R. § 91.111, which pro-
hibits operations so close to other aircraft so as to create a "colli-
sion hazard."3 The questions considered here include: Is there a
precise distance that creates such a hazard? Who, or what, par-
ticular circumstances decide if a collision hazard exists? And is
I See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.3, .13, .111, .113, .123, .126-.131, .155, .185 (2014).
2 Id. § 91.113.
3 Id. § 91.111.
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this standard objective or subjective? In many cases the regula-
tions themselves do not offer any definition. In developing an-
swers to what the relevant agencies intended by these terms,
aviation policy documents and judicial decisions were review
and analyzed to address these questions and clarify the intent
behind these duties involved with seeing and avoiding other
aircraft.
B. PART 91 REGULATIONS FACILITATING "SEE AND AVOID"
RESPONSIBILITIES
In addition to regulations that directly impose a duty to see
and avoid other aircraft, regulations were also found that facili-
tate this duty.4 These provisions support the ability of aircraft to
see other aircraft and facilitate safe separation.5 As an example,
14 C.F.R. § 91.117 restricts aircraft speeds. 6 Early era aircraft op-
erated at lower speeds that allowed other aircraft to see them
with ample time to avoid collisions. 7 However, by the mid-1940s,
aircraft speeds had significantly increased, and the time from
first seeing another aircraft until possible collision was signifi-
cantly reduced.8 Accordingly, it was found that this provision re-
quired reduced airspeeds in high density airspace to facilitate
collision avoidance. 9 Similarly, 14 C.F.R. § 91.209, and its prede-
cessors, required aircraft operating at night to use position and
anti-collision lighting to facilitate seeing and avoiding conflict-
ing traffic at night.1"
C. REGULATIONS PROVIDING USAGE OF ENHANCED SYSTEMS
Part of the research focused on regulations that have em-
braced new technology that enhances or supplements the tradi-
tional concept of see and avoid for aircraft separation.1 Section
91.221 requires that certain aricraft install and utilize Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) equipment. 12 Sec-
4 See id. §§ 91.105, .117, .181, .209.
5 See e.g., id. § 91.209 (laying out regulations regarding aircraft lights).
6 Id. § 91.117.




9 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.117.
10 See id. § 91.209.
11 See id. §§ 91.221, .225.
12 See id. § 91.221; see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 120-
55C, AIR CARRIER OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND USE OF TCAS II (2011).
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tion 91.221 requires the TCAS equipment to be on and operat-
ing, but only if it is installed.13 The implementation of TCAS
equipment in the National Airspace System made a large
change to the relationship between ATC and the aircraft it con-
trolled. Historically, under 14 C.F.R. § 91.123, and its predeces-
sors, a pilot could only deviated from a clearance in an
emergency, or upon receipt of an amended clearance.14 With
the recent requirement for TCAS, the pilot is authorized to devi-
ate in response to a TCAS resolution advisory. 15 The transition
from traditional concepts to more current concepts has led to
serious problems. For example, in 2002 there was a collision in
Eastern Europe involving a Russian aircraft that was instructed
to climb by TCAS but instead descended in compliance with the
ATC's instructions. 6 This is a challenging dilemma.
Section 91.225 requires the future employment of ADS-B Out
technology for most aircraft in support of NextGen objectives."'
The FAA rules direct that full implementation will not occur un-
til January 1, 2020.18 Very little controversy and discussion were
located on ADS-B. Most research has addressed the engineering
behind this technology.1 9 This was not felt to be unusual, given
the effectiveness of this regulation is well in the future. Research
conducted at the University of North Dakota was presented,
which sought pilot comments on the ADS-B technology's colli-
sion avoidance and traffic acquisition potential.2 Overall, those
comments favored this technology for enhancing natural sight
for seeing and avoiding other aircraft.2
13 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.221.
14 Adm'r v. Moore, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4992, at *4 (2002).
15 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL § 4-4-16(b)
(2014), available at http://www.faa.gov/air-traffic/publications/atpubs/air/In-
dex.htm [hereinafter AIM].
16 GER. FED. BuREAu OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION, UBERLINGEN INVES-
TIGATION REPORT (May 2004), available at http://cfappicao.int/fsix/sr/reports/
02001351_final-report_1-.pdf.
17 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.225.
18 See id.
19 See, e.g., Pengfei Duan, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-
B) Space-Oriented Message Set Design (Aug. 2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis,
Ohio University), available at https://etd.ohiolinh.edu/!etd.sendfile?acces-
sion=ohioul 305656769&disposition=inline.pdf.
20 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ADS-B IN THE COL-
LEGIATE FLIGHT TRAINING ENVIRONMENT, No. 04-C-GA-ERAU-067 (2008).
21 See id.
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II. INTRODUCTION
Regulation of aviation is primarily in the federal domain,
under the watchful eye of the FAA. This has not always been the
case. Indeed, one of the earliest aviation-related court cases that
held a pilot liable for the operation of an aircraft came out of
the Supreme Court of New York long before anyone ever envi-
sioned regulation of aviation.22 In Guille v. Swan, the court
found a balloon operator liable for damages his balloon caused
when it descended onto the property of another, destroying gar-
den crops as it was dragged by the wind along the ground. 23 It
appears that during his landing, Guille was observed to be hang-
ing perilously outside of the car. 24 Bystanders seeing his predica-
ment, rushed onto Swan's property to assist, causing additional
crop damage. 25 In Guille, the court clearly declared that an air-
craft is not free to float around like a bird and alight anywhere
free of responsibility. 26 Thus from the outset of aviation, courts
have established that a pilot has legal responsibilities, or duties,
while operating an aircraft.
Federal regulation of aviation would not show up for another
one hundred years. Our present federal system of aviation over-
sight has its foundation in the passage of the Air Commerce Act
of 1926.27 This act grew out of an era of generally unregulated
aviation, which realized a fatality rate of one fatality per 13,500
hours.2' This was in contrast with airmail operations by the Post
Office from 1918 through 1925, which had a much lower fatality
rate of one per 463,000 hours. 29 Airmail operations by the Post
Office were enhanced by an internal Post Office policy of self-
regulation.3 ° These policies included hiring experienced pilots
who had passed a qualifications exam; requiring medical exami-
nations; performing routine aircraft and engine inspections;
and employing specialized aviation mechanics.3 Obviously, a
safer environment could be generated by merging postal policy
22 Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 381-82 (N.Y. 1822).
23 Id. at 381, 383.
24 Id at 381.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 383.
27 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
28 ANrHoNYJ. ADAMSKi & TIMOTHYJ. DOYLE, INTRODUCTION TO THE AVIATION
REGULATORY PROCESS 79 (5th ed. 2005).
29 See id.
30 See id. at 76, 79.
31 Id. at 76.
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into enforceable regulation. Congress recognized this through
the enactment of the Air Commerce Act, and federal oversight
and regulation was welcomed by the aviation industry.
3 2
While federal agencies were authorized to promulgate regula-
tion, during the early development of aviation regulations, the
agencies were not required to provide much of the rationale be-
hind their final pronouncements-at least very little found its
way into the public domain. For the researcher, locating sup-
porting rationale behind the earliest aviation regulations can be
elusive.
Fortunately, during this era of early aviation regulation, con-
temporary authors did offer insight into the legal issues guiding
regulation. One such publication is Law of the Air by Carl
Zollmann 3 Less than one year after the enactment of the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, he explored legal issues related to the
regulation of this new transportation mode: (1) historic con-
cepts of property law versus freedom of the air arising with the
development of air commerce 4 ; (2) need for centralized gov-
ernmental control35 ; (3) development of rules of the air to pre-
vent collisions3 6; and (4) rules of liability, including liability for
collisions based on negligence. 7
Zollmann recognized that technological changes generated
by the introduction of aircraft would challenge established con-
cepts of law and regulation. He further understood that an-
swers to the aviation arena of 1927 required looking at past
principles of law for guidance.39
The twentieth century will, therefore, develop the law of the air
exactly as preceding centuries have developed the law of the land
and the law of the sea. Just as the law of automobiles and rail-
roads has grown up within living memory, a similar body of law
will develop very shortly in regard to the air. In this process, old
32 NICK A. KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS: FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY
UNDER THE AIR COMMERCE ACT, 1926-1938 (1978).
33 CARL ZOLLMAN, LAW OF THE AIR (1927).
34 Id. at 1-20. Prior to the introduction of aircraft, landowners thought to own
land and air above their land to the edge of the universe. With the advent of air
commerce, if this concept remained unchecked, a pilot would technically be re-
quired to obtain landowner permission to cross every ownership along a route of
flight. Obviously, this would be an impossibility.
35 Id. at 30-62.
36 Id. at 50-52.
37 Id. at 78-79.
38 Id. at 30-62.
39 Id.
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principles of law are being probed to their foundation and new
principles will be evolved to cover situations hitherto undreamed
of.
4 0
The focus of our research is of this very nature. Specifically, to
analyze earlier principles of aviation law and regulation that de-
fine the current responsibility for pilots to see and avoid other
aircraft.
More recently, with the passage of the Federal Register Act 41
and the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946,42 federal
rulemaking and the intentions behind those rules were opened
to greater public scrutiny and understanding. The Administra-
tive Procedures Act requires that informal rulemaking provide
for public notice and comments.4" Notice is published in the
Federal Register, typically as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM).44 A time frame for written comments from the public
is then provided.45 Lastly, the final rule is published in the Fed-
eral Register.4 6 In the NPRM, the agency typically provides the
rationale behind its proposal.47 In the final rule, the agency will
generally discuss the comments that were received, and the ra-
tional for adopting its final version of the regulation.4 s These
discussions are fertile ground for identifying agency intention
behind specific regulations.
Two faculty members and three graduate research assistants
at the University of North Dakota worked on the research objec-
tives. This collective effort identified seventeen Part 91 regula-
tions that deal with assigning a legal responsibility for a pilot to
see and avoid other aircraft. These regulations are:
Part 91 Regulations Directly Imposing on Pilots "See and Avoid"
Responsibilities




40 Id. at 1.
41 Federal Register Act, Pub. L. No. 74-220, 49 Stat. 500 (1935).
42 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
43 Id. at 239.
44 Id.; OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 4
(2011), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_
rulmaking-process.pdf [hereinafter A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS].
45 See A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 44, at 5.
46 See id. at 7.
47 See id. at 4.
48 See id. at 7.
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* §§ 91.126 - 91.131
* § 91.155
* § 91.185





Part 91 Regulations Providing for Usage of Enhance Systems to Facili-
tate See and Avoid Responsibilities.
* § 91.221
* § 91.225
III. REGULATIONS IMPOSING DIRECT DUTY TO "SEE
AND AVOID"
A. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE
PILOT IN COMMAND, AND SECTION 91.123 COMPLIANCE
WITH ATC CLEARANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS
1. Introduction
14 C.F.R. § 91.3 assigns the responsibility for the conduct of
flights to the pilot in command (PIC) and authorizes deviations
from the FARs to handle emergencies.4 9 The current regulation
is set forth in Appendix B.
2. History of Section 91.3
It is probably no accident that Section 91.3 is cited at the out-
set of the General Operating and Flight Rules. The responsibili-
ties of pilot are many, but this regulation establishes up front
that the PIC is "directly responsible" and has "final authority"
over the operation of his or her aircraft.5" Recognizing that
deviation from regulations may be necessary to handle emergen-
cies, a limited authority to deviate is granted, but only to the
extent required to meet that emergency.
The first introduction of this provision can be found in the
post-World War II Civil Aeronautical Regulations (CAR). In the
1940 regulations, no equivalent to Section 91.3 existed.5 2 In the
1945 supplement, the Air Traffic Rules included Section 60.100
49 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (2014).
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See generally 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 et seq. (1940).
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entitled "Authority of the Pilot": "The pilot in command of an
aircraft shall be directly responsible for its safe operation."5
However, no emergency exception was included.54
By 1947, this section of the CAR was expanded to include lan-
guage addressing emergencies and requiring reports to the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) if requested.55 This version permitted
the PIC to deviate from the CAR for emergencies but required
reports of a deviation to be submitted to the Administrator if
requested.56 If no deviation occurred, but air traffic control
(ATC) was required to handle the situation as a priority, a re-
port was to be made without being requested.57 From 1947 until
1962, this provision remained virtually the same. Over the
years, regulatory treatment contained in the Federal Register re-
lated to this provision was generally cosmetic, mostly focusing
on the reporting requirements.59
In 1963, the Federal Aviation Agency initiated a recodification
of its regulations, changing the title from "Civil Aviation Regula-
tions" to "Federal Aviation Regulations. '60 The recodification
was to streamline and clarify the existing regulations.6 No seri-
ous substantive changes were proposed.6 2 One of those changes
53 14 C.F.R. § 60.100 (1945 & Supp 1946).
54 See id.
55 14 C.F.R. § 60.01 (1947 & Supp. 1948).
The pilot in command of the aircraft shall be directly responsible
for its operation and shall have final authority as to operation of
the aircraft. In emergency situations which require immediate deci-
sion and action the pilot may deviate from the rules prescribed in
this part to the extent required by consideration of safety. When
such emergency authority is exercised, the pilot, upon request of
the Administrator, shall file a written report of such deviation. In
an emergency situation which results in no deviation from the rules
prescribed in this part but which requires air traffic control to give
priority to an aircraft, the pilot of such aircraft shall make a report
within 48 hours of such emergency situation to the nearest regional




58 Compare id., with 14 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1962).
59 See Air Traffic Rules, 20 Fed. Reg. 2512, 2514 (Apr. 16,1955) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
60 Air Traffic and General Operating Rules, 28 Fed. Reg. 6702, 6702 (June 29,
1993) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
61 See id.
62 See id.
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created a new Section 91.3, which adopted the language used
for the current Section 91.3.63
3. Analysis of Section 91.3
Virtually all discussions accompanying the regulatory changes
focused on the report requirements for deviations. Little, if any,
rulemaking has addressed what constitutes a bona fide emer-
gency. The AIM offers some substance on this issue.64 Under
Chapter 6, Emergency Procedures, the AIM provides:
An emergency can be either a distress or urgency condition as de-
fined in the Pilot/Controller Glossary. Pilots do not hesitate to
declare an emergency when they are faced with distress condi-
tions such as fire, mechanical failure, or structural damage ...
An aircraft is in at least an urgency condition the moment the
pilot becomes doubtful about position, fuel endurance, weather,
or any other condition that could adversely affect flight safety.6"
Further, the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) has pub-
lished an Air Traffic Control Order that provides guidance for
handling emergencies in Chapter 10-1-1 of the order.6 6
The AIM and the Air Traffic Control Order distinguish be-
tween "distress" and "urgency" conditions.6 7 No litigation was
identified during this research that would indicate that a distinc-
tion between the terms has ever been in controversy or ex-
amined. Paragraph 10-1-1 (c) of the Air Traffic Control Order
provides that even if the pilot has not used the proper phrases
or if the air traffic controller is in doubt of the status, the con-
troller should treat the situation as if it were an emergency.6"
However, based on the language of provision 10-1-1, an emer-
63 Id.
64 AIM, supra note 15, at 6-1-2. The AIM is not regulatory, so a deviation from
its provisions does not constitute a violation. However, it does establish the stan-
dard of care expected of pilots. Thus a deviation may constitute negligence. See
Mgmt. Activities, Inc. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1176 (1998) (finding
the pilot's noncompliance with AIM procedures related to wake turbulence con-
stituted negligence, the court stated "information contained in the AIM, particu-
larly the section concerning the nature, behavior, and danger of wake
turbulence, is chargeable to all certificated pilots and is evidence of the standard of care
for determining whether they exercise proper wake turbulence avoidance proce-
dures") (emphasis added).
65 AIM, supra note 15, at 6-1-2(a).
66 See FED. AvIATION ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., AIR TRAFFic CONTROL ORDER
No.JO 7110.65U (2012) [hereinafter FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U]. See Appen-
dix C for an exerpt of Chapter 10-1-1.
67 See id. at 10-1-1(a)-(b); AIM, supra note 15, at 6-1-2.
68 FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66, at 10-1-1(c).
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gency determination is made by the pilot.69 This order offers no
direction to the controller to verify whether the emergency is
authentic.7 0
Unfortunately, the FAA may later look back at the incident
and find that the emergency defense under Section 91.3(b)
does not apply.71 The emergency exception does not apply
where the underlying basis for the emergency was of the pilot's
own making, such as flying into foreseeable deteriorating
weather conditions. 72
a. Emergency Must Not Be of Pilot's Own Making
In Administrator v. Austin, respondent, a Visual Flight Rules
(VFR) rated pilot, flew into an airport that was Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR) with ceilings below 1,000 feet in violation of
Section 91.105(c), now Section 91.155(c).73 Respondent did not
deny the airport's IRF status but argued that though he was
aware of deteriorating weather, he had relied on erroneous
weather reports for the airport." "It is well settled that the excul-
patory effect of Section 91.3(b) is applicable only when the IFR
weather conditions in which a pilot finds himself were unfore-
seeable and not avoidable by the exercise of sound judgment
before and during the flight."7 5 The Board concluded, "that re-
spondent cannot avail himself of the defense of an emergency
which he could have and should have avoided."76
The Federal Court of Appeals in Quinn v. Hinson also adopted
this position.77 In this case, a pilot attempting to establish radio
contact after avoiding adverse weather, inadvertently flew into
Class B airspace without authorization.78 The pilot admitted the
violation but alleged it was due to the in-flight weather emer-
gency.79 The court rejected the emergency defense because "the
69 See id. at 10-1-1(b), (d).
70 See id. at 10-1-1(c).
71 See, e.g., Adm'r v. Austin, 2 N.T.S.B. 662 (1974).
72 See id. at 663-64.
73 Id. at 662.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 663.
76 Id. at 663-64.
77 Quinn v. Hinson, No. 96-1551, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33470, at *6-7 (1st
Cir. Dec. 19, 1996).
78 Id. at *2-4.
79 Id. at *6.
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emergency was of petitioner's own making."' 0 She allowed her-
self to become disoriented because of weather, an emergency of
her own making, and flew into protected airspace."
b. Emergency Must Occur In-Flight
Section 91.3 is intended to cover in-flight emergencies that
require immediate attention. In Chritton v. National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the National Transportation Safety Board's
(NTSB) opinion that denied application of the emergency de-
fense for a pilot who flew into conditions of low visibility and
fog, hitting power lines while transporting a patient to a hospi-
tal.8 2 The court did not refute the medical emergency of the
patient but denied that the Section 91.3(b) defense applied be-
cause a previously existing medical emergency was not the in-
tended use of this emergency defense. The court stated
The Board also correctly concluded that "[Mr. Chritton's] pas-
senger's need for immediate medical attention is not the type of
emergency that is contemplated by FAR section [sic] 91.3(b) [;]
[t]he kind of emergency to which FAR Section 91.3(b) refers is
an inflight emergency that requires immediate attention... that
arises after takeoff."8 4
In this case the patient's emergency status arose before take-
off.85 The urgency of the mission, air ambulance, was not the
type of emergency contemplated by the regulations.8 6
In an unusual case, Administrator v. Mew, a pilot was not found
in violation for deviating from an assigned altitude when he re-
acted to a cry for help from a passenger who suffered hot coffee
80 Id. at *6-7; see also Adm'r v. Futyma, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4141, at *2, 3
(1994) (finding that respondent caused the problems that led to his dilemma
and eventual landing at an Air Force Base without radio contact with the tower,
the Board offered that "any resulting emergency was due solely to his own negli-
gence, and cannot serve as an excuse for his violations. It is well-established that
violations cannot be excused by an emergency of the airman's own making.").
81 Quinn, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33470, at *7,
82 Chritton v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 888 F.2d 854, 854-55 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
83 Id. at 861.
84 Id. (internal citation omitted).
85 See id. at 862; see also Adm'r v. Clark, 2 N.T.S.B. 2015, 2016 (1976). AVFR
pilot inadvertently entered unforecast IMC weather conditions and invoked Sec-
tion 91.3(b) in his defense. Id. The Board concurred, noting that "the principal
issue is whether the emergency was of the pilot's own making or whether it could
have been avoided by the exercise of sound judgment before and during the
flight." Id.
86 See Chritton, 888 F.2d at 862.
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spilled on him and thus momentarily took his attention away
from cockpit duties.8 7 In finding no violation, the Board stated:
Regardless of whether the situation suddenly confronting re-
spondent is considered the type of in flight "emergency" nor-
mally associated with Section 91.3(b), we agree with the law
judge that respondent should not be found to have violated Sec-
tions [91.123] and [91.13] in this instance. When a pilot instinc-
tively and understandably reacts to a passenger who is in extremis
and is momentarily diverted so that he exceeds his assigned alti-
tude, we do not believe that, as a matter of fundamental fairness,
he should be help accountable under the regulations. To hold
otherwise would be tantamount to applying a theory of strict lia-
bility which the Board views as inappropriate to the adjudication
of these cases. 88
c. Requests for Waiver From Regulations
If deviations can be forecast or are known prior to the flight,
the regulations provide a means of seeking pre-approval for
those deviations.89 14 C.F.R. § 91.903 provides guidance for a
waiver application for deviations of certain Part 91 regulations.90
d. Avoiding Collisions Is an Emergency Contemplated by
Section 91.3
Avoiding a collision with another aircraft is an emergency cov-
ered by Section 91.3(b).9 1 In Administrator v. Owen, the Captain
of a Boeing 727 was notified of traffic as he was climbing to an
assigned altitude of 5,000 feet.9 2 He observed the other aircraft
directly ahead with a very rapid rate of closure.93 The pilot initi-
ated a turn to avoid the other aircraft, and because he directed
his eyes outside the cockpit, he climbed to 5,600 feet-a devia-
tion from his clearance.94 The Board held that this deviation,
caused by a perceived and immediate collision threat was an
emergency under Section 91.3(b).95
87 Adm'r v. Mew, 6 N.T.S.B. 980, 980 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
88 Id. at 981.
89 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.903 (2014).
90 Id.
91 Id. § 91.3(b).
92 Adm'r v. Owen, 3 N.T.S.B. 854, 854, 855 (1977).
93 Id. at 855.
94 Id. at 855-56.
95 Id. at 856.
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e. Two-Way Radio Communications Failure
Paragraph 6-4-1 of the AIM discusses radio communications
failure.96 It provides that communication failure could consti-
tute an emergency but further states that this would depend on
the circumstances and that the pilot should continue to comply
with the FARs, specifically Section 91.185." Paragraph 6-1-1 (c)
offers further guidance on lost communications: "Unless devia-
tion is necessary under the emergency authority of 14 CFR Sec-
tion 91.3, pilots of IFR flights experiencing two-way radio
communications failure are expected to adhere to the proce-
dures prescribed under 'IFR operations, two-way radio commu-
nications failure."' 98 The AIM defines "lost communications" as
the "[1]oss of the ability to communicate by radio."9 Collec-
tively, these provisions in the AIM appear to establish that lost
radio communications do not by themselves arise to an emer-
gency; rather, other circumstances, combined with lost commu-
nications, are necessary.100
While an interesting and important issue, this discussion goes
beyond the objectives stated for this research. It is recom-
mended that future research efforts explore the emergency pro-
visions under Section 91.3(b) in greater detail.
4. Analysis of Deviations Contemplated by Section 91.123
Section 91.3 authorizes deviations from all Part 91 rules, in-
cluding Section 91.123.101 In contrast, Section 91.123 is more
narrowly tailored to authorize deviations from ATC clearances
and instructions, including in emergency situations.1 0 2 While
96 AIM, supra note 15, at 6-4-1.
97 Id. at 6-4-1(b)-(c).
98 Id. at 6-1-1(c).
99 Id. at Pilot/Controller Glossary.
100 See id. at 6-1-1 (c), Pilot/Controller Glossary. No case law specific to this
point was located. However, in Administrator v. Futyma, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-
4141 (1994), the Board stated:
[E]ven if respondent's loss of his radios could be considered a legit-
imate emergency, section 91.3 would not excuse his violations in
this case because that section only permits deviations from the reg-
ulations "to the extend required to meet th[e] emergency. ...
[R]espondent had more than enough fuel to continue flying to any
of the nearby uncontrolled airports, where he could lawfully have
landed without radios.
Futyma, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4141, at *3.
101 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (2014).
102 Id. § 91.123.
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the body of litigation on Section 91.123 is significant, a review of
the cases does not indicate a divergence from the status of what
is an acceptable emergency. The Board's decisions indicate that
an emergency must generally relate to an in-flight, urgent,
safety-related problem. 113
Originally, the deviations permitted under both regulations
were solely for "emergencies." However, that changed in 1995
for Section 91.123.104 In that year, the FAA amended Section
91.123 to authorize deviations based on a traffic alert and colli-
sion avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisory (RA, together
TCAS RA).' °5 The amended language of Section 91.123 (with
the TCAS provisions italicized) is:
(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in com-
mand may deviate from that clearance unless an amended
clearance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is
in response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolu-
tion advisoy. However, except in Class A airspace, a pilot may
cancel an IFR flight plan if the operation is being conducted
in VFR weather conditions. When a pilot is uncertain of an
ATC clearance, that pilot shall immediately request clarifica-
tion from ATC.
(c) Each pilot in command who, in an emergency, or in response
to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory,
deviates from an ATC clearance or instruction [order] shall
notify ATC of that deviation as soon as possible."0 6
1os See Adm'r v. Black, 5 N.T.S.B. 902, 903 (1986). On an air carrier flight, both
pilots directed their attention to a landing gear light's failure to go out after take-
off. Id. Their attention focused on the landing gear problem, they exceeded the
assigned altitude by 800 feet. Id. Respondent argued this problem constituted an
emergency, justifying their deviation from the clearance. Id. Consistent with the
earlier discussion of the need for urgency, the Board rejected this defense, stat-
ing "no effort to show either that the gear problem required the immediate, exclu-
sive attention of either or both pilots." Id. (emphasis added). See also Adm'r v.
Brandy, 3 N.T.S.B. 2957, 2957-58, 2959 (1980). The pilot requested certain taxi
direction, which was not granted, and taxied on his requested course anyway. Id.
at 2958. The Board noted that for a deviation from ATC instructions "a pilot
would need a safety related justification for not complying with the instructions or
clearance." Id. at 2959 (emphasis added).
104 Notification to Air Traffic Control (ATC) of Deviations From ATC Clear-
ances in Response to Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Resolution
Advisories, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,676 (Sept. 29, 1995) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
91).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 50,679.
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The FAA acknowledged that the earlier language (without ref-
erence to the TCAS RA) did not provide for a deviation except
in emergency situations. 10 7 By adding the TCAS RA provision,
the FAA codified its existing policy permitting,
pilots to deviate from an air traffic control (ATC) clearance, in
non-emergency situations, when responding to a TCAS resolu-
tion advisory (RA). The language contained in the current regu-
lations [earlier version lacking the TCAS RA provision] suggests
that deviation from an ATC clearance is authorized only in an
emergency situation. The intended effect of this action is to add
the TCAS RA as a reason to deviate from a clearance, and to
require that whenever a pilot deviates from an ATC clearance,
ATC will be advised as soon as possible. 108
TCAS, Advisory Circulars, and AIM provisions will be considered
in detail in Part 3.
B. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 CARELESS OR RECKLESS OPERATION
1. Introduction
14 C.F.R. § 91.13 prohibits persons from operating an aircraft
in the air or on the surface in a careless or reckless manner so as
to threaten persons or the property of others.10 9 The current
regulation is set forth in Appendix B.
2. Background and Analysis of Section 91.13
Section 91.13 continues a long history of legal actions that
seek to reduce intentional and unintentional injury to persons
or property. The body of law treating these careless injuries is
referred to as "tort law," and the most common form is negli-
gence.110 Negligence was stimulated by the industrial revolution
and the arrival of new forms of transportation, specifically rail-
107 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 120-55A, AIR CARRIER OPERA-
TIONAL APPROVAL AND USE OF TCAS II 2 (1993) (cancelled by Advisory circular
No. 120-55B, which was cancelled by Advisory Circular No. 120-55C, published
Mar. 18, 2013) (policy in place prior to amendment was, in looking at deviations,
that the FAA would not "initiate enforcement action solely on the basis of a TCAS
event").
108 Notification to Air Traffic Control (ATC) of Deviations From ATC Clear-
ances in Response to Traffic Control Avoidance System Resolution Advisories, 60
Fed. Reg. at 50,676.
109 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014). The FAA traditionally cites to Section 91.13
and refers to careless or reckless collectively. These two terms are not synony-
mous. Accordingly, each will be treated separately.
110 Less S. Ureindler, Development of Negligence Law in the United States, 14 N.Y.
PRAC., N.Y. LAw OF TORTS § 6:2 (2014).
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ways."' Negligence describes the conduct of an individual that
falls short of what is expected of a reasonable person.112 A rea-
sonable person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid dan-
ger or injury to others.113 When reasonable care is not exercised,
the negligent individual is considered to have breached this
duty, and consequences including damages arise.' 14 Under Sec-
tion 91.13, a violation of some FARs could be considered
negligent.115
While Section 91.13 does not use the term negligence, this
regulation section reflects that concept. It insists that pilot's duty
is to exercise the level of care of a reasonable pilot. 16 This is
shown in an early aviation case. In William Edward Angel, on take-
off from the then Los Angeles Municipal Airport, the respon-
dent collided with another aircraft." 7 The CAB initiated a
certificate action for a violation of Section 60.3301 (b) 118 The
accident occurred after Angel landed his open cockpit Waco on
111 Id.
112 Id. § 6:3.
113 Id.
114 Id.
15 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
Moreover, our move from specific to general regulation is not with-
out support in FAA regulations themselves. For example, 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13(a), which governs "Careless or Reckless Operation," sup-
plies a comprehensive standard of care to be exercised by pilots
and flight crew. It provides, "No person may operate an aircraft in a
careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another." In a case then where there is no specific provision or reg-
ulation governing air safety, § 91.13(a) provides a general descrip-
tion of the standard required for the safe operation of aircraft.
Thus, in determining the standards of care in an aviation negli-
gence action, a court must refer not only to specific regulations but
also to the overall concept that aircraft may not be operated in a
careless or reckless manner. The applicable standard of care is not
limited to a particular regulation of a specific area; it expands to
encompass the issue of whether the overall operation or conduct in
question was careless or reckless. Moreover, when a jury is deter-
mining what constitutes careless or reckless operation of an air-
craft, expert testimony on various aspects of aircraft safety may be
helpful to the jury.
Id. The court went on to apply this standard of care to the use of seat belts. Id. at
371-72.
116 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014).
117 William Edward Angel, 5 C.A.B. 10, 11 (1940).
118 Id. at 12; see also 14 C.F.R. § 60.3301(b) (1938). "A take-off shall not be
commenced until there is no risk of collision with other aircraft during such take-
off." Id.
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a grass area of the airport.119 On takeoff he struck another bi-
plane, killing the one occupant. 120 The court found that the ob-
ject of this aviation provision was
to prohibit the reckless operation of aircraft and to impose upon
pilots the duty of exercising the care required by the circum-
stances in ascertaining whether or not there is risk of collision
with other aircraft before commencing a take-off. So interpreted
it is a violation of this section only if a pilot fails to maintain this
standard of care.12 1
In rejecting the pilot's defense that he had been given a green
light authorizing take-off, the court rationalized that "there still
rested upon him a duty to observe the entire area he proposed
to traverse before beginning his take-off." Consequently, the
court found "that respondent was negligent in failing to observe
the entire path of this proposed take-off before attempting such
take-off.1 122 At the time of this case, there was no comparable
Section 91.13; however, pilots were still prohibited from negli-
gent aircraft operations and held to a duty to avoid other
aircraft.
The earliest civil aviation regulation covering careless or reck-
less operation is found in the 1945 supplement to the Civil Avia-
tion Regulations.1 21 Under Section 60.101, entitled "Careless or
Reckless Operation," it states, "[n] o person shall operate an air-
craft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life
or property of another. '" 124
In 1947, the CAB had, in its revised Part 60 of Air Traffic
Rules, adopted this same language, but went further and added
a note with clarifying examples for pilots.1 25 Draft Release No.
46-5, circulated to the aviation community by the CAB, offered
that this rule:
[S]hould be careful observed, and is one of the most important
regulations pertaining to flight. Interpretation of this rule should
recognize that every flight of aircraft necessarily incurs some risk
to persons or property on the surface. This risk is the one inher-
ent in normal flying operations, and it is the pilot's responsibility
119 William Edward Angel, 5 C.A.B. at 11.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 12.
122 Id. at 13.
123 14 C.F.R. § 60.101 (1945 & Supp. 1946).
124 Id.
125 Air Traffic Rules, 12 Fed. Reg. 5547, 5548 (Aug. 16, 1947) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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not to increase that risk beyond that degree to persons or prop-
erty in the air or on the surface. 126
Section 60.102 was adopted and incorporated with much of
the above language. The final note to this section stated:
NOTE: Examples of aircraft operation which may endanger the
lives or property of others are:
(a) Any person who "buzzes", [sic] dives on, or flies in close
proximity to a farm, home, any structure, vehicle, vessel,
or group of persons on the ground. In rural districts the
flight of aircraft at low altitude often causes injury to live-
stock. A pilot who engages in careless or reckless flying
and who does not own the aircraft which he is flying un-
duly endangers the aircraft, the property of another.
(b) The operation of aircraft at an insufficient altitude endan-
gers persons or property on the surface or passengers
within the aircraft. Such a flight may also constitute a vio-
lation of § 60.107 [Minimum Safe Altitudes].
(c) Lack of vigilance by the pilot to observe and avoid other
air traffic. In this respect, the pilot must clear his position
prior to starting any maneuver, either on the ground or in
flight.
(d) Passing other aircraft too closely.
(e) An operation conducted above a cloud layer in accor-
dance with VFR minimums which results in the pilot be-
coming involved in instrument flight, unless the pilot
possesses a valid instrument rating, the aircraft is properly
equipped for instrument flight, and all IFR requirements
are observed. 12
7
In 1957, the "careless or reckless" provision was again re-
vised. 28 This amendment focused on issues related to the flight-
testing of aircraft. 29 This revision amended paragraph (c),
above, to include additional language focused on flight-testing,
which compromised the pilot's duty to be vigilant and scan for
other aircraft:
Lack of vigilance by the pilot to observe and avoid other air traf-
fic. This includes failure of the pilot to clear his position prior to
starting any maneuver, either on the ground or in flight; and
special flight activities which require such preoccupation by the
126 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BD., CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS DRAFT RELEASE No. 46-5
§ 60.102 (1946) [hereinafter CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS DRAFT RELEASE No. 46-5].
127 Air Traffic Rules, 12 Fed. Reg. at 5548.
128 Pilot Vigilance and Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. 2575, 2576
(Apr. 16, 1957) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60) (emphasis added).
129 See id.
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pilot with cockpit duties as would prevent adequate vigilance
outside the cockpit for the purpose of collision avoidance without
compensation for such reduced degree of vigilance by the use of a compe-
tent observer in the aircraft, a chase aircraft, or other equivalent
arrangements.
130
This addition incorporated both flight and ground opera-
tions."3 ' Also, by incorporating the phrase "or other equivalent
arrangements,"' 3 2 it appears to include the use of specialized
technology to assist the pilot in his duty to observe and avoid
other aircraft in instances where the pilot is otherwise unable
serve in this capacity.
In 1967, the Federal Aviation Agency acknowledged that the
careless or reckless provision used the term "operate," which
meant the use of an aircraft for purposes of "air navigation."'11 3
This definition fell short of covering incidents where the use of
an aircraft was not incidental to flight. Specifically, the FAA
cited leaving an aircraft with rotors or propellers turning and
hand propping.' These created dangers to the airport environ-
ment and were felt to be unacceptable events that needed to be
included in the coverage of careless or reckless.' 35 Accordingly,
in 1966, the Agency proposed the addition of Section 91.10.16
The new provision read:
No person may operate an aircraft other than for the purpose of
air navigation, on any part of the surface of an airport used by
aircraft for the air commerce (including areas used by those air-
craft for receiving or discharging persons or cargo), in a careless
or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another.'
37
In 1989, with an extensive recodification of Part 91, the FAA
recodified amended Section 91.9 as Section 91.13(a), and Sec-




133 See Careless or Reckless Ground Use of Aircraft Not Incident to Flight, 31
Fed. Reg. 13,352, 13,353 (Oct. 14, 1966) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (ex-




137 Careless or Reckless Ground Operation of Aircraft, 32 Fed. Reg. 9640, 9641
(July 4, 1967) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
138 See Revision of General Operating and Flight Rules, Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg.
34,283, 4,293 (1989) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
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3. Careless Standard
a. Breadth of Section 91.13(a)
At the outset, Section 91.13(a) is without doubt the most cited
violation by the FAA and its predecessors. Even using the simple
measurement provided by the NTSB's Case Decision Database,
sinceJanuary 1, 1992, 386 cases cited to Section 91.13.139 In con-
trast, during that same period only 154 cases cited to Section
91.7 (airworthiness); twenty-eight cited a violation of Section
91.111 (operating near other aircraft); and nine cited Section
91.113 (right-of-way). 14 0
A primary reason for this is that Section 91.13 casts a broad
net. That is, it often serves as a derivative violation for the vari-
ous operational violations. As an example, in Administrator v.
Seyb, the respondent was charged with violations of Section
91.123 (deviation from a clearance) and Section 91.129 (land-
ing at airport with control tower without receiving a clear-
ance) .141 The respondent admitted the operational violation but
denied that his actions were careless. 142 The Board held careless
operation was established by virtue of finding an underlying op-
erational violation. 143
The Administrator'consistently includes a "careless or reckless"
charge (i.e., a § 91.13 (a) charge) in her complaints charging vio-
lation of operational regulations. This is sometimes termed a
"residual" or "derivative" carelessness violation. Under the Ad-
ministrator's interpretation of her regulations, a charge of care-
lessness or recklessness under § 91.13(a) is proven when an
operational violation has been charged and proven. 144
If, however, an operational violation is not found, most often
neither is careless or reckless violation. Examples of operational
violations subject to Section 91.13's reach that are related to the
duty to see and avoid other aircraft are discussed later.
Section 91.13 is not limited to being a residual charge; it is
occasionally cited as a stand-alone, independent violation. 14 5
139 Case Decision Database, NAT'L TRANsp. SAFETY BoARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/
legal/o_n o/query.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (enter "91.13" in the FAR/
Regulation search box to review cases referring to Section 91.13) [hereinafter
N. T.S.B. Case Decision Database].
140 Id.
141 Adm'r v. Seyb, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5024, at *1 (2003).
142 Id.
143 Id. at *2.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Adm'r v. Jennings, 2 N.T.S.B. 715 (1974).
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When charged as a violation independent of an operational reg-
ulation, it has "to be independently proven by a showing of ac-
tual or potential endangerment." '146 An example of this is
Administrator v. Jennings.'47 In this case, Jennings landed gear
up. 4 ' Though no regulations specifically prohibit gear up land-
ings, he was charged with violating Section 91.9 (now Section
91.13(a)).' 4 9 He alleged he had moved the toggle switch to
lower the gear, however, due to the dimmed nature of the land-
ing gear indicator lights when the navigation lights were on, he
could not confirm the gear lights.150 The toggle switch had
"three positions: up, down, and neutral. '151 The court believed
that Jennings only moved the switch to neutral, not down.
1 2
The court was also critical of Jennings for not turning the navi-
gation lights off for a brief period to confirm the down light
illumination.153 In other words, his duty included more than just
glancing at the gear position lights.' 54 Post-incident testing of
the gear system indicated no problems. 55 The Board held that
Jennings had a duty to lower the gear and confirm it was
down. 156 Jenning's omissions were thus held to be careless, in
violation of Section 91.13(a). 5
Whether a pilot's specific actions constitute a careless or reck-
less act may depend on the sophistication, or lack of sophistica-
tion, of the aircraft he or she is operating. In Administrator v.
Grzybowski, the respondent, after starting his engine, realized he
had left the chocks in place.158 Instead of shutting down the en-
gine, his passenger went out to remove the nose wheel chock
while the propeller was turning. 59 The passenger's attempt to
remove the chock was unsuccessful, and she was struck by the
propeller and killed. 60 Removal of the chocks under these cir-
146 See Seyb, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5024, at *5.
147 SeeJennings, 2 N.T.S.B. at 715.
148 Id. at 715-16.
149 Id. at 716-17.
150 Id. at 715-16.





156 Id. at 716-17.
157 Id. at 717.
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cumstances was found to be extremely careless.16' The respon-
dent argued in defense that being near a propeller is not
uncommon as some aircraft require hand propping with chocks
in place. 162 The Board rejected this argument stating, "we think
a pilot's duty of care may fairly be linked to the level of safety
the equipment he is operating affords him, and that duty is not
lowered because other, less-advanced equipment may not pro-
vide the same safeguards. ' 16 The nature and complexity of the
aircraft obviously plays a role in determining the standard of
care to be followed.
These stand alone cases alleging a violation of Section
91.13(a) are generally fewer in number than derivative type
cases. Of the 386 total cases adjudicating violations of careless-
ness or recklessness, only twenty-four indicate they were inde-
pendent of operational violations. 164
b. Actual or Potential Endangerment?
Does endangerment have to generate an actual threat or can
a potential threat be enough to trigger a violation? While the
language of the regulation does not treat this issue, decisions on
appeal clearly side with potential endangerment-proof of ac-
tual endangerment is not required. All that is required is proof
of a potential for injury or property damage; an actual injury is
not required. 165
c. Does Section 91.13(a) Apply to Non-Pilots?
Exemplifying the breadth of this regulation, the FAA has in
fact charged an occupant of an aircraft, who was not the PIC
with violating Section 91.13(a)166 In Administrator v. Thomas, the
161 Id.
162 Id. at *2.
163 Id.
164 But see Adm'r v. Szabo, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4265, at *2 (1994), affd 76
F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 1996). Where the operational violation has been dismissed, a
careless charge could still survive. See id. In this case, an airman was alleged to
have landed on a short runway occupied by another aircraft, in violation of Sec-
tion 91.65(a) [now Section 91.111(a)]. Id. at *1. The Board found insufficient
evidence of a collision hazard but did find sufficient evidence of carelessness. Id.
at *2. While originally derivative to Section 91.111 (a), sufficient proof survived to
support an independent careless violation. Id.
165 See Adm'r v. Lorenz, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5205, at *1 (2006) (finding that
landing gear up generates the potential of injury or property damage in violation
of Section 91.13(a)).
166 Adm'r v. Thomas, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4309, at *1 (1995).
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non-PIC occupant in the right seat of a single pilot aircraft was
charged with violating Section 91.13(a).16v The facts established
that the aircraft narrowly missed a gear-up landing, damaging
the propeller tips and antenna. 168 The respondent was the
owner of the aircraft and held a pilot certificate. 169 However, he
was not the PIC.170 The Board acknowledged that his ownership
"created no special duty equivalent to that of PIC.'171 However,
the Board did find him careless based on his conduct during the
flight.'7 2 He had played an active role during the flight, includ-
ing using the radios, working flaps and propeller, calling out
altitudes, and accepting a higher approach speed from ATC,
even over the objection of the PIC. 7 ' The court likened these
actions to functions normally expected of a second pilot, even
though this aircraft did not require such. 174 Therefore, the re-
spondent's participation in the cockpit duties resulted in the
court finding him to be a participating pilot in the operations.175
While [respondent] may fortuitously have been the one to notice
that the gear was not down, his actions as well as [the PIC's],
contributed to that situation. And, respondent's holding a pilot
certificate may affect the sanction (i.e., it may affect the duty of
care to which he is bound), but one need not be a pilot to violate§ 91.13(a). 171
d. Application of Section 91.13(b) for Other Than Air
Navigation
As stated earlier, this provision was added in 1967 to cover
instances of carelessness or recklessness when actual flight is not
intended. 177 For the vast majority of Section 91.13 cases, flight
was the intended objective.17 The NTSB decision database
shows only five cases associated with Section 91.13(b) since
1992, out of the 386 careless or reckless decisions, that relate to





171 Id. at *2.
172 Id. at *3.
173 Id. at *2.
174 Id. at *3.
175 Id.
176 Id. (emphasis added).
177 See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Adm'r v. Greybauski, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4045, at *1 (1993).
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in which actual flight was not contemplated.179 In Administrator
v. Gianelli, a company pilot for Colgan Air repositioned an air-
craft on the airport without any intent for flight.' The evidence
showed he failed to use a checklist for this ground taxi purpose
and also failed to turn on the hydraulic system."' Without hy-
draulics the aircraft experienced a loss of breaking and steering,
causing it to hit another aircraft."i 2 His omission was careless
under Section 91.13(b).18 3
In Administrator v. Murphy, a pilot landed at an airport, taxied
to a ramp area, and left the aircraft unattended and running.18 4
Later that same pilot returned to the aircraft and entered the
cockpit-the aircraft was still running.'8 5 Some time later, an
FAA inspector who noticed the engine was running went up to
the aircraft and found the pilot asleep in the front seat. 18 6 The
pilot told the inspector he did not want to shut the engine down
since it would not restart because of a faulty starter.'87 The pilot
neither chocked nor tied down his aircraft.'88 The FAA inspec-
tor believed a reasonable pilot under these circumstances would
have considered doing both. 18 9 The Board found the pilot's ac-
tions "created an unnecessary risk of injury to persons or dam-
age to other aircraft on the ramp," in violation of Section
91.13(b) 190
In another ground taxi case, Administrator v. Taylor, an airman
had parked his aircraft at an airport, planning to stay only a
brief time.1 However, he ended up going with a co-worker to a
local bar and grill.'9 2 Later, around 1:30 a.m., he decided to
walk back to the airport and reposition his aircraft. 9 ' Reposi-
tioning did not go well.' 94 The aircraft ended up in a ditch be-
179 See N. T.S.B. Case Decision Database, supra note 139.
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tween the taxiway and ramp.19 5 A blood alcohol concentration
of .10 no doubt compromised his taxiing ability. 196 He acknowl-
edged that he knew he could not fly while drunk but argued
that no regulations prohibited taxiing while drunk.197 Finding
his argument without merit, the court found he was in violation
of Section 91.13(b).198
4. Reckless Standards
Traditionally, the FAA packages "careless or reckless" as one
violation. However, these terms are not synonymous. Careless is
most often likened to negligence, that is, one knew or should
have known better. Generally, carelessness reflects inadvertent
conduct. Recklessness, on the other hand, is usually reserved for
more serious violations of Section 91.13(a), and often for viola-
tions that were intentional.
In Ferguson v. National Transportation Safety Board, omissions by
an airman were found to be reckless. 199 In that case respondent,
an airline pilot, was operating at night on a leg from Denver,
Colorado, to Sheridan, Wyoming.20 During the flight, he was
given a clearance for a direct flight that took him over Buffalo,
Wyoming. 201 Both pilots mistook Buffalo for Sheridan and
landed at the wrong airport.0 2 The court noted that Ferguson:
(1) did not familiarize himself with navigational charts for the
airports; (2) allowed the first officer to make the landing against
company policy; (3) did not use navigational aids to identify the
airport; and (4) did not note that visual indications showed him
landing at the wrong airport.203 In finding conduct of this na-
ture reckless, the court affirmed an earlier Board decision that
interpreted reckless to mean "conduct that demonstrates a gross
disregard for safety when coupled with the creation of actual
danger to life and property .... A gross disregard for safety oc-
curs when a person engages in conduct that show[s] a disregard
for foreseeable consequences. 2 4
195 Id.
196 See id.
197 Id. at *3.
198 Id.
199 Ferguson v. NTSB, 678 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1982).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 824-25.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 829 (quoting Adm'r v. Understein, N.T.S.B. Order EA-1644 (1981)).
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In Administrator v. Reese, an airman's conduct was found to be
reckless when he continued a flight knowing an important safety
system was compromised.20 5 During this flight, the oxygen masks
aboard the Boeing 737 deployed. 20 6 The respondent, as captain,
descended to 10,000 feet to check the oxygen system.20 7 Because
the masks deployed, the oxygen in them was depleted. 20 8 Know-
ing this, the respondent continued the flight, climbing to Flight
Level 410 without the passengers having access to supplemental
oxygen. 209 The Board affirmed a finding of recklessness stating,
"[r]espondent knowingly and unnecessarily exposed eighty-
eight passengers and three cabin crewmembers to the signifi-
cant likelihood of sudden, serious brain injury or death in the
event the aircraft experienced another pressurization
problem."21 0
Operations that cause injury to persons on the ground may
also constitute recklessness. In Administrator v. Evanko, a PIC was
found reckless for operating his aircraft in close proximity to a
person known to be near his aircraft.21 1 A pilot, observing the
erratic traffic pattern maneuvers of respondent's aircraft, left
her aircraft and confronted respondent who had just landed
and was in his aircraft at the run-up area, engine running.212
Words were exchanged and respondent intentionally acceler-
ated his aircraft with the other pilot hanging onto the airplane's
door by her arm.21 3 She was injured in this exchange. 1
Generating a jet blast that endangers other aircraft has also
been found to be reckless. In Administrator v. LangFord, a PIC of a
Learjet intentionally used excess thrust, creating a jet blast that
caused considerable turbulence for a C-172 known to be behind
him.21 5 The amount of thrust was sufficient to leave a seventy-
five foot skid mark as the Learjet skidded with its brakes
locked.21 6 The key to this case was the deliberate creation of un-
205 Adm'r v. Reese, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4896, at *2 (2001).




210 Id. at *2.
21] Adm'r v. Evanko, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4221, at *1 (1994).
212 Id.
213 Id. at *2.
214 Id.
215 Adm'r v. Langford, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5673, at *1 (2013).
216 Id. at *3.
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necessary jet blast and the fact that the location of the Cessna
was known to the PIC of the Leaijet. 217
Finally, in Administrator v. Krueger, the Board found a pilot's
act of flying close to another aircraft reckless. 218 The court held
"that [recklessness] is comparable to a' finding of gross negli-
gence. ' 219 It further stated that "[r]espondent's behavior here
was so egregiously insensitive to safety concerns, with no mitigat-
ing factors even being offered, that it warrants a recklessness
finding. "220
5. Application of Section 91.13 to Regulations Related to the Duty
to "See and Avoid" Other Aircraft
Because the FAA routinely includes violations of Section 91.13
with other operational violations, compiling a complete list of
all combinations is not easy to accomplish. "FAR section 91.13's
prohibition against the creation of careless or reckless endan-
germents is generic because it would be impossible for the Ad-
ministrator to attempt to list by regulation every unsafe practice
that an airman should avoid. ' 22 Accordingly, selected examples
are offered below, showing regulations that impose a duty on
pilots to be vigilant to see and avoid other aircraft and that con-
stitute a violation of Section 91.13 when they are not complied
with.
a. Section 91.111
The Board found that because the respondent had come
within fifty to one hundred feet horizontally and within one
hundred feet vertically of another aircraft, a violation of Section
91.111 (a) (operating near other aircraft) should be sustained . 222
Because the respondent failed to meet his duty to see and avoid
other aircraft, pursuant to Section 91.111, a violation of Section
91.13(a) also occurred. 223
217 Id. at *2, 3.
218 Adm'r v. Krueger, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4281, at *1-2 (1994).
219 Id. at *1.
220 Id.
221 See Adm'r v. Taylor, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5003, *3 (2002).
222 See Adm'r v. Arellano, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4292, at *1 (1994).
223 Id.
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b. Section 91.113
An emergency medical helicopter en route to pick up a pa-
tient was confronted by respondent's aircraft, which approached
the helicopter within a few hundred feet and eventually passed
over the helicopter within one hundred to two hundred feet.224
The Board found respondent's conduct grossly negligent and
egregiously insensitive to safety. 22
c. Section 91.155
In Administrator v. Simmons, the respondent was charged with a
violation of Section 91.155(a) because he departed an airport
and failed to maintain VFR cloud clearances while in class E air-
space. 226 He entered IMC conditions only a few minutes after
takeoff.227 The court found that it was foreseeable he would
enter IMC before obtaining appropriate ATC clearance. 22 The
administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Board uniformly charac-
terized this as "intentional, reckless and deliberate behavior" and
prohibited the application of the Aviation Safety Reporting
Program.229
6. Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) and Advisory Circulars
The AIM and Advisory Circulars are used to determine how a
pilot is to meet his or her duty of care (i.e., the standards that
guide a pilot in properly operating in the national airspace sys-
tem under the FARs) and are often cited as the standard of ex-
pected conduct by the courts.23 °
The [Aeronautical] Information Manual (AIM) is an FAA publi-
cation whose purpose is to instruct pilots about basic flight infor-
mation, air traffic control procedures, and general instructional
information. Pilots must study and know the appropriate provi-
sions of the AIM and FAA Advisory Circulars (ACs) pertaining to
224 See Krueger, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4281, at *1.
225 Id.
226 Adm'r v. Simmons, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5275, at *1 (2007).
227 Id. at *4.
228 Id. at *5.
229 See id. at *4 (emphasis added); see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIR-
cutAR No. 00-46D, AVIATION SAFErY REPORTING PROGRAM (1997) (emphasis
added).
230 See, e.g., Adm'r v. Langford, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5673, at *1 n.5 (2013);
Adm'r v. Greybowski, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4046, at *2 n.5 (1993).
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their flying activities. These documents are evidence of the stan-
dard of care among all pilots. 231
Given the extensive nature of the topics covered by these pub-
lications, it is not feasible to list all the duties that, if not met,
would constitute careless or reckless operation of an aircraft. If a
complete listing is sought, perhaps a future research effort
could look into this daunting assignment.
C. 14 C.F.R. § 91.111 OPERATING NEAR OTHER AIRCRAFT
As stated in Section 91.111, not every close-quarters situation
creates a risk of collision because of aircraft proximity alone.232
For example, two aircraft in an arranged close formation are not
considered to automatically present a collision hazard to each
other.
Section 91.111 is not only related to the right-of-way rules in
Section 91.113 but also applies whether or not the aircraft are
meeting. 233 However, Section 91.113 is usually first violated by
not avoiding the "risk" of a collision when thereafter a "collision
hazard" is created under Section 91.111 (at least for uninten-
tional violations). In other words, if a collision hazard exists, the
aircraft is not well clear.234
The earliest aviation regulations in the United States were the
Air Commerce Regulations promulgated by the Department of
Commerce, Aeronautics Branch, pursuant to the Air Commerce
Act of 1926, which took effect in March 1927.235 Section 74, enti-
tled "Flying Rules" states, "300 feet [is] the minimum distance
within which aircraft, other than military aircraft of the United
States engaged in military maneuvers and commercial aircraft
engaged in local industrial operations, may come within proxim-
ity of each other in flight. ' 236 By 1945, Civil Air Regulations Sec-
tion 60.103(d), in regard to proximity, stated "[a] ircraft shall be
231 Mgmt. Activities, Inc. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1175 (1998),
affd in part 166 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1998).
232 14 C.F.R. § 91.111 (2013).
233 See Adm'r v. Krueger, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4281, at *1 (1994).
234 See, e.g., Bennett v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 1995).
235 See KOMONS, supra note 32, at 96.
236 AERONAUTICS BRANCH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INFO. BULL. No. 7, AIR
COMMERCE REGULATIONS § 74(c) (1928) (entitled "Give-Way Duties") [hereinaf-
ter AIR COMMERCE REGULATIONS]. This fixed minimum proximity was set forth
within the section on right-of-way rules. Under Section 74(b) (entitled "Giving-
Way Order"), "[a]ircraft required to give way shall keep a safe distance, having
regard to the circumstances of the case. Three hundred feet will be considered a
minimum safe distance." Id. § 74(b). Accordingly, less than three hundred feet
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flown at least 500 feet apart except by prearrangement of the
pilots in command of the aircraft. 2 7
The FAA referenced the proximity rule in its Civil Air Regula-
tions Draft Release No. 46-5, dated October 1, 1946, which was
"circulated to the aviation industry for comment. '238 In the re-
marks section of the document, which proposed changes to
Civil Air Regulation Section 60.105, referencing proximity of air-
craft, it stated, "[e]xisting regulations provide for 500 feet mini-
mum proximity of aircraft. While 500 feet may be a safe distance
between two small aircraft it may not be sufficient separation for
large aircraft. The 500-foot factor has, therefore been
deleted."23 9
In 1947, following consideration of public comments, Civil Air
Regulation Section 60.105, entitled "Proximity of aircraft," was
changed to read:
No person shall operate an aircraft in such proximity to other
aircraft as to create a collision hazard. No person shall operate
an aircraft in formation flight when passengers are carried for
hire. No aircraft shall be operated in formation flight except by
prearrangement between the pilots in command of such
aircraft. 2°
The 1947 amendment is, in substance, the current version of the
"Operating Near Other Aircraft" aviation regulation now lo-
cated at Section 91.111.241
Switching from a fixed minimum distance to the variable stan-
dard of creating a "collision hazard" caused interpretation
problems for airmen and the courts. In Bennett v. National Trans-
portation Safety Board, Bennett, the captain of a Citation jet, was
issued a "clearance to take off and fly due south on the runway
heading pending further instructions. 242 While the copilot ac-
knowledged that clearance over the radio, "Bennett also heard
the clearance and took off as authorized. '2 3 At the same time
that the Citation was issued clearance for takeoff, a Cessna 172
"had just completed a touch-and-go landing exercise on a paral-
violated the regulation on its face; however, if circumstances dictated, a "safe
distance" could require more than three hundred feet of clearance.
237 14 C.F.R. § 60.103(d) (1945 & Supp. 1946).
238 CIvL AIR REGULATIONS DRAFt RELEASE No. 46-5, supra note 126.
239 Id.
240 14 C.F.R. § 60.105 (1947 & Supp. 1948).
241 Compare id., with 14 C.F.R. § 91.111 (2014).
242 Bennett v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir. 1995).
243 Id.
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lel runway and was also climbing southbound. '244 As Bennett's
plane took off and climbed, "the [ATC controller] asked the Ci-
tation if it observed the smaller Cessna 172 ahead and to the
right.245 The copilot acknowledged visual contact with the
Cessna and pointed it out to Bennett. 246 The Citation was in-
structed to wait until the Cessna made a right turn to crosswind
before executing its own right turn on its desired course. 47 The
copilot acknowledged immediately with the Citation's call sign,
but Bennett did not hear the exchange due to radio trouble. 48
The copilot then simply told Bennett that they had been cleared
to execute the right turn.249 Bennett then turned without wait-
ing for the Cessna to change course, which resulted in charges
of a violation of Section 91.111 being brought.250 Captain Ben-
nett asserted that "§ 91.111(a) does not establish a 'sufficiently
specific objective standard prescribing or proscribing a pilot's
behavior' so that a pilot may properly be held accountable for
its violation. '25 1 The court held that:
In what amounts to a deprivation-of-due-process claim, Bennett
complains that Reg. § 91.111(a) fails to put pilots on notice of
the conduct that it proscribes when it refers only to operation of
an aircraft "so close to another aircraft as to create a collision
hazard."... [The] FAA has authority to suspend a pilot's certifi-
cate under a similarly nonspecific statutory prohibition (Section
1429(a) coupled with Section 1301(4)) whenever the pilot cre-
ates a hazard to safety:
The potential for pilot conduct to endanger safety in interstate, over-
seas, or foreign air commerce is all that is necessary to support
the FAA's order of suspension....
Doe v. C.A.B. teaches that those sought to be covered by FAA
Regulations must be "informed with reasonable certainty and ex-
plicitness" of the standards by which their conduct will be
judged. For that purpose the test is whether the Regulation "delineated
its reach in words of common understanding." In that respect "'no
more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded'
and it is not 'unfair to require that one who deliberately goes
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the








251 Id. at 1135 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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§ 91.111(a) plainly puts pilots on notice of the kind of conduct
covered.25
2
Accordingly, if a pilot operates an aircraft so close to another
aircraft as to create a "collision hazard," he or she has violated
Section 91.111 (a).253 In interpreting what constitutes a collision
hazard, courts and administrative decisions have turned on the
particular facts of each case. 254 These decisions may objectively
weigh only the proximity of the aircraft, or they may also weigh
the testimony of the intruded upon aircraft's crewmembers as to
whether they feared a midair collision and whether either air-
craft's crew felt compelled to execute evasive maneuvers. 255 Most
often, the courts examine both the objective and the subjective
components in determining if a collision hazard existed. 56
In the case of Joseph B. Kuhn, respondent Joseph B. Kuhn was
the pilot in command of an Eastern Air Lines DC-4 that collided
with a Universal Airline DC-3 on December 19, 1946, near Aber-
deen, Maryland. 257 The faster VFR DC-4 overtook and collided
with the IFR DC-3 that was ahead on the same airway, at the
same altitude.2 58 The crewmembers or passengers were not seri-
ously injured in the accident, but the planes were extensively
damaged. 259 The CAB held:
Respondent has excepted to the examiner's finding that he oper-
ated his aircraft within 500 feet of the Universal DC-3 without
prior arrangement therefor, contrary to section 60.103 (d) [sic]
of the Civil Air Regulations then in effect. This exception is
based on the contention that this provision applies only where
such operation is intentional and not where the pilot is unaware
of the proximity of the other aircraft. Inasmuch as we have al-
ready established a policy consistent with the examiner's finding
on this issue [that the regulation covers both intentional and un-
intentional], respondent's exception is not sustained.26 °
252 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
253 See id.
254 See, e.g., id. at 1135, 39.
255 See, e.g., id. at 1133-34.
256 See generally id. (showing court considered particular facts of the case and
the Cessna's reactions to the other aircraft's nearness).
257 Joseph B. Kuhn, 13 C.A.B. 139, 139 (1949).
258 Id. at 140.
259 Id. at 139. Cases of the aviation civil authorities having a surviving
crewmember to charge with a violation following a midair collision are relatively
rare.
260 Id. at 141.
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In Joseph B. Kuhn, the focal point of argument was Captain
Kuhn's duty of vigilance for failing to see the other aircraft until
just prior to impact, thereby violating the right-of-way rule relat-
ing to overtaking aircraft.261 It becomes apparent then that if the
right-of-way rule is violated to such an extent that the "bubble"
of safety surrounding each aircraft is also violated, a violation of
both Section 91.113 and Section 91.111 (a) is possible. Certainly,
an actual collision, as in Joseph B. Kuhn, is tantamount to a per se
violation of Section 91.111 (a).2 62
Since 1947, and still under the current Section 91.111, the
violating pilot has not been required to be within a certain dis-
tance or "proximity," as illustrated by the case involving Robert
H. Willbanks.263 Captain Willbanks, the PIC of a Pacific South-
west Airlines Boeing 727, was alleged to have created a collision
hazard by operating too close to a Cessna 172, which was also on
an approach for landing at Long Beach, California, even though
the closest proximity between the aircraft was five hundred feet
or greater. 264 The Board held:
... [R] espondent's aircraft passed some 500' above the Cessna at
a lateral distance to its left of approximately 1,000'. . . . [T]he
pilot of the Cessna initiated what he believed to be a necessary
evasive turn to the right to avoid either a collision with the over-
261 Id. at 141, 142, 144.
262 See id. at 144; see alsoJanka v. NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding a midair collision while flying in a properly planned and briefed forma-
tion was a violation of Section 91.111(a)). The Janka court stated:
Janka and Newman also challenge the interpretation of FAR
91.65(a) [now Section 91.111] adopted by the Board. They con-
tend that because they were engaged in formation flight in accor-
dance with FAR 91.65(b) [now Section 91.111], they cannot be
charged with creating a collision hazard under FAR 91.65(a)....
Janka and Newman cite no authority for the proposition that
when flying in formation, pilots are free from the obligation to
avoid a collision hazard. The Board has previously held that forma-
tion flight allowed by section 91.65(b) and a section 91.65(a) viola-
tion are not mutually exclusive events. In Administrator v. Thompson,
the Board affirmed the ALJ's finding of a 91.65(a) violation, even
though the parties were flying in an arranged formation flight.
This interpretation of section 91.65(a) is reasonable. An agree-
ment to fly in formation should not relieve pilots of the responsibil-
ity to avoid a collision hazard. The Board's determination that
Newman and Janka violated FAR 91.65(a) is affirmed.
Id. at 1151-52 (internal citations omitted).
263 See Adm'r v. Willbanks, 3 N.T.S.B. 3632 (1981).
264 Id. at 3632-33.
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taking PSA aircraft or any wake turbulence its passage might
create ....
... While the respondent was entitled, as the law judge recog-
nized, to cancel his IFR flight plan, decline Stage II sequencing,
and make a landing under visual flight rules VFR, his abandon-
ment of ATC assistance in this instance must be viewed in the
context of his decision to bring his aircraft into position for an
approach to the airport by utilizing a descending left turn. That
maneuver all but eliminated his ability to sight known traffic, be-
low and to his right, and to avoid it by a spatial margin which would
have not created a substantial risk of collision or have compelled an exper-
ienced pilot to abort an approach out of concern for that possibility
as well as the danger wake turbulence from respondent's jet
posed for his smaller aircraft. Even if we were to accept respon-
dent's testimony that he had the Cessna in sight and believed it
to be no problem, respondent's conscious choice to pass as
closely as he did to the Cessna would demonstrate a serious lack
of care in that it is extremely doubtful that he could have avoided
a collision had the Cessna unexpectedly changed its heading to-
ward respondent's flight path....
Respondent's contention that a 500' vertical separation was safe, be-
cause sections 91.109 and 91.121 permit cruising altitudes based
on such a separation for VFR and IFR traffic, is not persuasive.
Those provisions merely specify the proper cruising level for
flights on various magnetic compass headings. They do not pur-
port to address what distance reflects a safe separation, vertical or
otherwise, when one aircraft is in the vicinity of another, nor can
they be reasonably read to relieve a pilot of his duty, under sec-
tion 91.65(a) [now § 91.111], not to operate his "aircraft so close
to another as to create a collision hazard." In short, we cannot con-
clude that the cruising level requirements set forth in these sections estab-
lished any basis for finding a 500' vertical separation for landing
aircraft to be safe or adequate.265
265 Id. at 3633-34 (emphasis added). In cases where there is not an immediate
collision hazard actionable under Section 91.111 (a), but safe separation has been
violated, the Administrator may use Section 91.13 [formally Section 91.9] "Care-
less or Reckless Operation," as the enforcement mechanism. See Adm'r v. Whita-
ker, 1 N.T.S.B. 1983 (1972). In Whitaker, respondent departed VFR to pick up an
IFR clearance in the air but entered instrument meteorological conditions prior
to receiving the clearance. Id. at 1984. A converging IFR aircraft had to be turned
immediately, and the ATC controller stated that separation was lost, with only
one mile between the two aircraft. Id. Respondent argued that no "endanger-
ment" was created. Id. at 1987. However, the Board held that "[w]henever a pi-
lot's careless operation results in his aircraft and another plane passing within a
mile laterally, and within 1,000 feet vertically, of each other under actual IFR
conditions, an endangerment has been created." Id. Furthermore, it is not neces-
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As seen in AIM 7-6-3, the primary purpose of reporting "near"
midair collisions is to enhance safety; however, subparagraph 7-
6 -3 (g) states, "[w] hen the investigation reveals a violation of an
FAA regulation, enforcement action will be pursued. '266 The
definition of a reportable near miss uses both the objective (five
hundred feet) and subjective (belief that a collision hazard ex-
isted) standards that are seen in many Section 91.111 enforce-
ment actions.267
A violation of Section 91.111 (a) may be involuntary, usually as
a follow-on to violating the right-of-way rules, or it may be inten-
tional. Intentional violations are normally in the form of "buzz-
ing" another aircraft. 68 In Stern v. Butterfield, Stern's red and
white Pitts Special was observed performing aerobatics within
the Addison, Texas, Class B airspace and executing rolls 1,100
feet above the runway at Air Park airport.269 A flight instructor
testified that while he was giving flight instruction in the vicinity
of Air Park, a red Pitts Special aircraft came out of a vertical dive
and passed within three hundred feet of his aircraft so that it
was necessary to seize control of the aircraft from his student.270
Mr. Stern was charged with violating Section 91.111(a), among
other regulations.2 71 The court affirmed the emergency revoca-
tion of Mr. Stern's airman certificates. 27 2
In the case Administrator v. Hayes, respondent was found in
violation of Section 91.65(a) [now Section 91.111(a)] by flying
his aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision
hazard.273 The pilot of the other airplane testified that on re-
spondent's second pass, respondent flew within one hundred
feet of his plane, and on the third pass, he saw respondent shake
his fist as he went by.2 74 The passenger corroborated his testi-
275mony.  The court noted that the respondent should not have
sary for the violating pilot even to see the other aircraft. See Adm'r v. Blane,
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4112, at *2, 6 (1994).
266 AIM, supra note 15, at 7-6-3(g). See Appendix C for complete version of
AIM 7-6-3.
267 Id. at 7-6-3(b)-(c). The subjective component allows for reports in situa-
tions where the nearest proximity was in excess of five hundred feet.
2-68 See Adm'r v. Hayes, 3 N.T.S.B. 1528, 1528, 1529 (1978).
269 Stern v. Butterfield, 529 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
270 Id.
271 Id. at 408.
272 Id. at 412.
273 Hayes, 3 N.T.S.B. at 1528.
274 Id. at 1529.
275 Id.
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resorted to buzzing and intimidating an aircraft that he consid-
ered to be an intruder on his private hunting grounds.2 6 There
are numerous cases of intentional violations of Section 91.111,
including cases where aircraft spontaneously join with and fly
formation on unwilling participants. 277
D. 14 C.F.R. § 91.113 RIGHT-OF-WAY RULES: EXCEPT WATER
OPERATIONS
14 C.F.R. § 91.113 sets forth the rules regarding aircraft right-
of-way.278 In accordance with Section 91.113(b), each pilot must
maintain "vigilance" in order to "see and avoid" other traffic. 79
Once seen, the pilot without the right-of-way must avoid in a
manner that is "well clear" of the other aircraft.2 0 The general
requirements in paragraph (b) of this regulation may be viewed
as a three step process, with each step being a prerequisite to
the next: (1) be vigilant (look); (2) see (detect target); and (3)
avoid (maneuver if required to remain "well clear") .281 The first
two are tightly intertwined-one cannot see if he or she is not
looking.
Following step two of the process (visually acquiring another
aircraft), the pilot determines if there is any risk of collision.
This determination is based upon projected paths, altitudes and
distance. If the projected paths merge and the distance/time to
the target are of concern, a risk of collision exists. After a deter-
mination that a risk of collision exists, step three of the process
is to avoid the other aircraft. Section 91.113 sets forth the rules
each pilot must follow during the avoidance maneuvering.2 2 Ac-
cordingly, the rules are triggered the moment it is determined
that a risk of collision exists. 213 The right-of-way rules provide
predictability in each pilot's actions when maneuvering to avoid
276 Id.
277 See Specht v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d 905, 916 (8th Cir. 1958) (hold-
ing "[t]he pilot who can control his plane but cannot control himself is not a safe
pilot").
278 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.113 (2014).
279 Id. § 91.113(b).
280 Id.
281 See id.
282 Id. § 91.113(d)-(e). See Appendix B for Section 91.113 in its entirety.
283 To determine fault in litigation, the determination of a risk of collision is
made by objective standards. For example, if a pilot of a ship is not vigilant and
fails to see and perceive a risk of collision, he still bears fault. See Ocean Marine,
Ltd. v. U.S. Lines Co., 300 F.2d 496, 499 (2d Cir. 1962).
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a collision. Therefore, each pilot is expected know and apply
them in meeting situations.
1. Vigilance
The word "[v]igilant" is defined as "[w]atchful and cautious;
on the alert; attentive to discover and avoid danger. ' 284 The
courts and the NTSB, an administrative body which adjudicates
pilot enforcement actions brought by the FAA, have both deter-
mined that the pilot has a legal "duty" under Section 91.113(b)
to maintain "vigilance. '285 The NTSB Opinion and Order in Ad-
ministrator v. Tamargo gives the test for determining a violation
of Section 91.113(b) (then numbered Section 91.67(a)): "To
prove a violation of the see and avoid provisions of Section
91.67(a), the Administrator must show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that respondent failed to maintain vigilance so as
to see and avoid other aircraft. 28 6
It is possible for two aircraft to collide midair and a court still
find that neither PIC violated the duty to keep a lookout. In
Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that neither pilot involved in a midair
collision (one departing Addison, Texas, and one arriving at
Love Field, Dallas, Texas) breached his duty to maintain
vigilance.287
Without more, the fact that two airplanes collide in mid-air in
visual meteorological conditions is not evidence of negligence on
the part of both pilots or of negligence on the part of one, but
not the other, pilot. The duty imposed upon pilots by the regulation is
a duty to exercise vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft; it is not
an absolute duty to see and avoid. The degree of care required is
that degree of care that would be exercised by reasonably pru-
dent pilot[s].288
In Steering Committee v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit followed Transco Leasing Corp. in holding
that the standard of care necessary to meet the duty to maintain
vigilance is whether the pilot in question acted at or above the
level of conduct of a reasonable pilot.2 9 The Steering Committee
284 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
285 See, e.g., Adm'r v. Tamargo, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4087 (1994).
286 Id. at *2.
287 Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435, 1439, 1447 (5th Cir.
1990).
288 Id. at 1447 (emphasis added).
289 Steering Comm. v. United States, 6 F.3d 572, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1997).
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opinion involves the midair collision of an Aeromexicojet and a
single engine Piper aircraft over Cerritos, California, on August
31, 1986.290 The case is quoted extensively, in relevant parts
herein, due to its thorough discussion of the standard of care
regarding the vigilance requirement:
II. Standard of Care for Pilots Under 14 C.F.R.
[§ 91.113(b)]
We must first decide whether the district court examined the
conduct of Aeromexico's pilots using the appropriate standard
of care under § 91.67(a) [now § 91.113(b)] ....
. . . § 91.67(a) requires pilots to exercise vigilance so as to see
and avoid other aircraft. The real question is what constitutes
"vigilance." The parties advance three different possibilities: (1)
"Vigilance" requires a pilot to see and avoid other aircraft unless
to do so would be physically impossible, (2) "Vigilance" requires a
pilot to see and avoid other aircraft unless to do so would be more
than unreasonable, and (3) "Vigilance" requires a pilot to see and
avoid other aircraft unless to do so would be unreasonable...
A.
The United States initially argues that a pilot is not vigilant if
his plane collides with another aircraft unless to see and avoid
the aircraft would be physically impossible.... In support of its
argument, the government cites United States v. Miller. In Miller,
the pilot of a Beechcraft was preparing to land when he collided
with a Cessna that was practicing "touch and go" landings....
One of the issues in Miller was whether the Beechcraft pilot,
Miller, failed to yield the right-of-way....
Although the "physical impossibility" standard does not im-
pose strict liability on pilots, it comes close. If we equated "vigi-
lance" with the "physical impossibility" rule, a pilot would be per
se liable anytime a collision occurred under Visual Flight Rule
conditions, regardless of other circumstances. We have rejected
in a slightly different context the argument that "the pilot is al-
ways negligent when an air crash occurs." . . .
... We therefore draw upon the holding and reasoning of Foss
and upon the persuasive authority of Transco Leasing in rejecting
the "physical impossibility" standard.
B.
Alternatively, the government asserts that the term "vigilance"
under § 91.67(a) requires something more than reasonable care,
or an elevated degree of reasonableness. It cites a series of cases
290 Id. at 574.
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that place a demanding standard upon pilots under various fed-
eral aviation regulations and common law standards.
Most on point is Rudelson v. United States, which involved a mid-
air collision between a Piper and a dual-controlled Cessna,
piloted by a flight instructor and his student. The court acknowl-
edged that "[t]he Cessna pilots' upward vision may have been
partially obstructed by the plane's high wing configuration" and
that the student, in particular, "may have found it especially diffi-
cult to see the Piper as it approached from the right." Neverthe-
less, the court held that "none of these circumstances excused
[the student's] duty to see and avoid other aircraft." Citing the
district court's statement that "blind spots can be compensated
for by head movement and aircraft movement," the court upheld
the finding that the student pilot was negligent because he vio-
lated § 91.67(a).
Mattschei v. United States is also applicable. In that case, a
Cessna and a Cherokee collided in midair under Visual Flight
Rule conditions while each pilot communicated with different air
traffic controllers on separate radio channels. The district court
held that the Cessna pilot was 20% negligent for "his failure to
see and avoid other traffic," despite the fact that the Cherokee
aircraft approached from above and behind the Cessna. Because
the parties appear not to have appealed the issue of the Cessna
pilot's liability, however, Mattschei, while persuasive, is not direct
circuit court authority on the standard of care question.
Rudelson and, to a lesser degree, Mattschei illustrate that pilots
are held to a high standard of care. The doctrinal question, how-
ever, is how best to frame the standard. Do we adopt the govern-
ment's position and label "vigilance" as an elevated standard of
care demanding more than "reasonableness," or do we find that
"vigilance" requires the care of a reasonably prudent pilot and
that high standards are demanded of such a pilot?
... Because we wish to avoid muddying the waters by introduc-
ing some amorphous concept requiring pilots to be "more than
reasonable," we decline to interpret "vigilance" as denoting an
elevated standard of care.
Instead, we hold that "vigilance" denotes the care that a rea-
sonably prudent pilot would exercise under the circumstances.
We find support for this holding in our own decisions, and in the
decision of another circuit. Cases such as Rudelson and Mattschei,
then, serve to illustrate the exacting requirements of the reasona-
bly prudent pilot. We emphasize that in the hazardous situation
of approaching a busy airport, such a reasonably prudent pilot
obviously must be especially careful to see and avoid other air-
craft. It is in that sense of "reasonableness" that we construe the
2015]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
regulation's use of the term "vigilance" in this case. Thus al-
though we reject the bright line "physical impossibility" rule used
in Miller, we adopt that court's articulation of reasonable care as
requiring the pilot to search "thoroughly and diligently" for
other aircraft. Accordingly, the reasonably prudent pilot need
not be super-human in seeing and avoiding other aircraft, but he
or she must scan the sky with such frequency and respond with
such precision as is possible. We hold that the district court did
not err in defining "vigilance" in terms of the reasonably prudent
pilot under § 91.67(a) as long as "reasonableness" is construed in
accordance with this opinion.
IV. Whether the Aeromexico Pilots Breached their Standard
of Care
The district court found "that without a warning from the air
traffic controller, the crew of [Aeromexico Flight 498] may have
failed to see [the Piper] without any negligence on their part."...
... [T] here was a great deal of expert evidence that a reasona-
bly vigilant crew would not have seen the Piper until it was too
late to do anything about it. The point at which the unwarned
Aeromexico crew, scanning the sky, was more likely than not to
have seen the approaching airplane was placed by various ex-
perts as just under 12 seconds, 6 seconds, "the last few seconds,"
and "the last moments prior to collision." There was also testi-
mony placing between 8 and 12.5 seconds the amount of time
required to take evasive action.
On the strength of this evidence, the district court found that
the Aeromexico crew "was diligent and professional at all relevant
times." In context, there is little doubt that the "diligence" in
question was that of being reasonably vigilant....
... [W] e cannot say that its finding that the crew was diligent
and professional at all relevant times was clearly erroneous in
light of all of the evidence.291
The case of Nakajima v. United States, in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit, involved a midair collision be-
tween an airplane and a helicopter piloted by Mr. Nakajima at
the Opa Locka airport, Florida.292 The airplane was conducting
touch and go traffic patterns to the north of runway 9 left, and
the helicopter was working traffic patterns on the south using a
helipad area adjacent to runway 9 right.29 3 On turning to final
approach the airplane apparently overshot south of correct
alignment for 9 left and, while descending, hit the helicopter
291 Id. at 576-80 (internal citations omitted).
292 Nakajima v. United States, 965 F.2d 987, 988 (11th Cir. 1992).
293 Id.
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"from above and from the rear on the helicopter's blind [left]
side. '294 Mr. Nakajima died in the crash.295 The court held that
vigilance does not demand the impossible, and in this case, it
was physically impossible for pilot Nakajima to see the airplane
unexpectedly entering his flight pattern, as it was approaching
from behind and above. 29 6
[T] here was no reason for Keiji Nakajima to take extraordinary
measures to search for an unknown and unexpected hazard. We
do not interpret the rule to require a pilot under these circum-
stances to keep a lookout to anticipate another aircraft coming
toward his aircraft from behind and above, when the ability to
see the oncoming aircraft in a blind spot is an utter impossibility.
While the general rule imposes on pilots an independent obliga-
tion to operate their aircraft safely and make necessary observa-
tions to avoid other aircraft, extraordinary maneuvers by
Nakajima would not have brought the Cessna into view as it ap-
proached the helicopter. Thus, the duty to scan within or beyond
the normal range has no application here.2 97
It appears that even under the demanding standard created by
Miller, Mr. Nakajima did not breach his duty of vigilance.29
2. The Reasonably Prudent Pilot and the Duty of Vigilance
The degree of care required in maintaining vigilance is the
degree of care that would be exercised by a reasonably prudent
pilot. In Rodriquez v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit determined that this standard of care included
not only following the law and regulations but also the good
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 989.
297 Id.
298 See id.; see also Bernard v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 614 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (5th
Cir. 1980) (finding no lack of diligence where a student pilot on his first solo
flight at an uncontrolled airport collided with an airplane ahead on final ap-
proach). The Bernard court, discussing the duty of the first aircraft on final ap-
proach, held that there was no evidence that
a pilot in such circumstances, engaged in the mechanics of landing,
would or should anticipate the possibility that in violation of the
"rules of the road" for aircraft another plane might be coming
down on him from behind and above, and therefore would or
should keep a lookout, or even glance, to the rear rather than
devote his full attention to the front and below, where his descend-
ing plane is headed.
Id. at 1078.
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operating practices put forth by the FAA in the form of the non-
regulatory AIM and Advisory Circulars.299
The duties of pilots and air traffic controllers are prescribed
by federal law pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1557. Under 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(g), 1348(c), the Admin-
istrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is author-
ized to promulgate air traffic rules and regulations. The
Administrator has exercised this authority by promulgating the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's) and by establishing the
procedures to be followed by air traffic controllers. The FAR's
have the force and effect of law. The FAR's in turn require pilots to
know and follow the Airman's Information Manual prepared by the
FAA and FAA Advisory Circulars.3 °°
The pertinent parts of AIM chapters four and eight and the
Advisory Circular on vision and collision avoidance are set forth
in Appendix C. As can be seen, there is a large amount of infor-
mation given to pilots regarding this subject. Many courts have
adopted the FAA informational knowledge and recommended
the operational procedures as the standard against which to
compare a particular pilot's actions relating to a midair colli-
sion 1.3 0 A reasonably prudent pilot would have known and com-
plied with these guidelines. 2
In Rodriquez, the court found that the pilots of an aircraft en-
tering the traffic pattern at Caldwell Airport, New Jersey,
breached their duty of maintaining vigilance when they collided
with an aircraft nearly directly in front of them on the down-
wind leg:
There was evidence at trial that to comply with the duty to see
and avoid, pilots should visually scan an area 60 degrees to the
left and right of center and 10 degrees up and down from the
flight path.... Based on the district court's findings as to the
positions of the aircraft, 21U was within this field of vision of 98V
[the overtaking aircraft] at all times after 98V reported overhead
at 1321:30. The government's visibility expert, James Harris, testi-
fied that were the pilots of 98V vigilantly scanning, the
9 See Rodriquez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1982).
300 Id. at 739 (emphasis added); see also Associated Aviation Underwriters v.
United States, 462 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Tex. 1978). In 1987, the title of the
AIM publication was the Airman's Information Manual.
301 See, e.g., Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178,
1180-81 (5th Cir. 1975).
302 See id.; Associated Aviation Undewriters, 462 F. Supp. at 680; Rodriquez, 823
F.2d at 739.
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probability of their detecting 21U within 10 seconds of the colli-
sion was 100 percent .... No direct testimony introduced by
plaintiffs countered this conclusion.3"'
In short, the government introduced evidence that if the pilots
of 98V were adequately performing their duty to scan, under the
VFR conditions existing at the time of the collision and with the
aircraft positions as determined by the district court, they should
have observed 21U. Had they done so, of course they would have
been under the obligation to avoid the collision. There is no evi-
dence other than speculation as to the activities of the pilots of
98V to counter this evidence. 0 4
Accordingly, the court found that the pilots of 98V had
breached their duty to maintain vigilance.30 5 The evidence
showed that had they looked, they would have seen.30 6 In other
words, a reasonably prudent pilot would have seen the aircraft,
and so should the pilots of 98V.
The duty of vigilance also encompasses situations where ob-
structions due to the construction of the aircraft or the flight
attitude make observing more difficult as stated in the AIM:
8-1-8 j. Visual Obstructions in the Cockpit.
1. Pilots need to move their heads to see around blind spots
caused by fixed aircraft structures, such as doorposts,
wings, etc. It will be necessary at times to maneuver the
aircraft; e.g., lift a wing, to facilitate seeing.
2. Pilots must ensure curtains and other cockpit objects; e.g.,
maps on glare shield, are removed and stowed during
flight.30
7
In an early 1950 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, the court affirmed a CAB decision to sus-
pend the airmen certificate of an Eastern Airlines captain for
failure to maintain a proper lookout and colliding with an air-
craft he was overtaking. 3° The captain argued the DC-3 he was
overtaking was obscured by a windshield post that created a
blind spot.3 0 9 The court refused to accept that a visual deficiency
excuses a pilot from his duty to maintain a proper lookout.310
303 Rodriquez, 823 F.2d at 742-43 (citations omitted).
304 Id. at 743-44 (emphasis added).
305 See id.
306 See id.
307 AIM, supra note 15, at 8-1-8(0).
308 See Kuhn v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 183 F.2d 839, 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
309 Id. at 843.
310 See id. at 843-44.
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He was expected to move his head or body to cope with an ob-
struction, or at least put his copilot on a heightened lookout. 11
His duty of vigilance was not excused by this aircraft design
limitation. 12
In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in
the In re N500L Cases that, "the mere fact that a pilot may experi-
ence temporary loss of visibility due to a blind spot when look-
ing out his window is no excuse for failing to follow Federal
Aviation Regulations. ' 31 3 The court stated that all a pilot need
do in that situation is bank slightly.3 14 Moreover, "[a] pilot has a
continuing duty to be aware of danger when, with his own eyes,
he can perceive the danger. 31
5
The duty of vigilance has also arisen in the context of a flight-
testing accident. During flight- testing, pilots can be preoccu-
pied with cockpit duties, which require his eyes to be in the
cockpit.3 16 The result is a compromise of the ability to "observe
and avoid" other aircraft. 17 Here, the duty of vigilance to see
and avoid other aircraft is not excused by the nature of the
flight operations.1 Instead, the regulation provides that care-
less or reckless operation of an aircraft may be found when pilot
duties inside the cockpit preclude looking outside, unless the op-
eration compensates for this reduced vigilance by use of an on-
board observer, a chase aircraft, or another equivalent arrange-
ment. 9 Clearly, a duty of vigilance is expected of any aircraft
pilot, whether or not the pilot is performing test related duties
inside the cockpit and not looking outside. If the pilot can not
meet this duty, an alternative arrangement is required to com-
pensate for the compromised duty of vigilance. 2 °
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 In re N500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 32 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Miller v. United
States, 303 F.2d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 1962)).
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 See Pilot Vigilance and Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. at
2575-76 (Apr. 16, 1957) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60); Pilot Vigilance and
Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. 781, 781-82 (Feb. 8, 1957) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
317 Pilot Vigilance and Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. at 2575-76;
see also Pilot Vigilance and Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. at 781-82.
318 See Pilot Vigilance and Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. at
2575-76; Pilot Vigilance and Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. at
781-82.
319 Pilot Vigilance and Restrictions on Flight Testing, 22 Fed. Reg. at 2576.
320 See id.
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3. Well Clear
"When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-
way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass
over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.''3 21 In context, for
the rules of the right-of-way to be executed, the pilot must have
already maintained vigilance to have seen another aircraft and
then recognized a risk of collision. 22 The remaining require-
ment is to avoid the other aircraft by a margin of "well clear. 3 23
The act of maintaining well clear during the interaction with the
other aircraft is a purposeful decision-an intentional act, at
least on the part of the "give-way" aircraft.324
Perhaps it is easiest to define "well clear" by what it is not and
what it certainly is. It is not being so close to another aircraft so
as to collide or create an immediate collision hazard.325 It cer-
321 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (2014) (emphasis added). The regulation does not
address clearance requirements when passing behind another aircraft, perhaps
assuming that there is no risk of collision in such situations and therefore the
aircraft are already "well clear." Rule 16 of the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea states, "Every vessel which is directed to keep out of
the way of another vessel [by the right-of-way rules] shall, so far as possible, take
early and substantial action to keep well clear." Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea r. 16, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459,
1050 U.N.T.S. 16 (emphasis added) [hereinafter COLREGS].
322 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (2014).
323 Roland E. Weibel et al., Establishing a Risk-Based Separation Standard of Un-
manned Aircraft Self Separation, ATM SEMINAR 1 (June 11-14, 2011), www.atmsemi-
nar.org/seminarContent/seminar9/papers/64-weibel-Final-Paper-4-12-11 .pdf.
One sense and avoid function is self separation, which requires that
aircraft remain "well clear." ... The ability to perform the function
of sense and avoid has been defined ... as the performance of two
separate functions: self separation and collisions avoidance. Self
separation is the ability to remain "well clear" of other aircraft, typi-
cally through gentle, right-of-way compliant maneuvers. Collision
avoidance is a function executed to prevent an imminent collision,
and is typically more aggressive .... U.S. Federal Aviation Regula-
tions require that pilots pass well clear of other aircraft when en-
counters occur in airspace. The term is used without a more
detailed definition. Well clear is a separation standard with a sub-
jective definition .... Subjectivity was likely intentional, to allow
pilot judgment in implementation.
Id.
324 See id. at 1-2.
325 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.111 (2014). "Operating near other aircraft" is discussed
separately. However, in the Air Commerce Regulations of 1928, Section 74(B) it
is stated, "[a] ircraft required to give way shall keep a safe distance, having regard to
the circumstances of the case. Three hundred feet will be considered a minimum safe
distance." AIR COMMERCE REGULATIONS, supra note 236, § 74(B) (emphasis ad-
ded). Accordingly, a clearance of less than three hundred feet violated the regu-
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tainly is an avoidance maneuver in a meeting situation that com-
pletely removes any risk of collision.
How far away must an aircraft be in order to be considered
well clear? In the law, the answer is probably "a reasonable dis-
tance" under the circumstances. The distance may vary based
upon the closure rate (as shown in Appendix 1 to AC 90-48C)
and other factors, including the degree to which heading and/
or altitude were changed in the initial response to the determi-
nation of a risk.326
The use of the term "well clear" was used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1897 case of The Umbria, a maritime case concern-
ing a collision of two ships off the coast of Long Island, New
York in 1888.327 The Umbria, a British Cunard steamship, was en
route from New York to Liverpool at full speed in a fog when
she hit the Iberia, a French steamship inbound to New York
City. 28 The Iberia was running slow because of the fog and was
cut in half by the Umbria.29 The Court stated:
[T] he Umbria was gravely in fault in the matter of speed is too
clear for serious argument. She was within twelve miles of one of
the most frequented harbors in the world, in the track of vessels
bound into and out of this harbor, and was running at a speed of
from sixteen to nineteen knots an hour through an intermittent
or variable fog, which was sometimes so dense that vessels could
not see each other more than one or two lengths off.330
We certainly do not wish to be understood as holding that it is
necessary for a steamer to stop the moment she hears a whistle
ahead of her in a fog, though it be directly ahead. Under such
circumstances she may proceed at a reduced rate of speed. But if
the whistle be repeated two or three times, and appear to be
drawing nearer, the authorities generally hold that, if the fog be
dense, prudent navigation requires that she shall stop her en-
gines and drift ahead, until the approaching steamer comes in
lation on its face, however, if circumstances required, a "safe distance" may
require more than three hundred feet clearance to be well clear. See id.
326 For example, the give-way aircraft in an overtaking situation alters course to
the right and also climbs one thousand feet above the other aircraft. The well
clear distance may be less than if a heading change alone was used, but the com-
bination of the heading and altitude change has effectively eliminated the risk of
collision.
327 See generally The Umbria, 17 S. Ct. 610 (1897).
328 Id. at 611.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 612.
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sight, or her whistles indicate that the two vessels are well clear of
each other.3 31
The FAA referenced the maritime rules of right-of-way in its
Civil Air Regulations Draft Release No. 46-5, dated October 1,
1946, in the remarks section of that document which proposed
changes, inter alia, in the right-of-way rules, Civil Air Regulation
60.104(c) .332 "When two aircraft are approaching head-on, or
approximately so, each shall alter its course to the right." '
In discussing Section 60.104(c), the draft states in the remarks
section, "[h]azardous situations, sometimes requiring quick ac-
tion, will be avoided by this universally accepted rule which ap-
plies to all vehicles whether in the air, on land or sea. '33 4 Concerning
one aircraft overtaking another, the draft states in Section
60.104(d):
An aircraft which is being overtaken has the right-of-way, and the
overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending, or in horizon-
tal flight, shall keep out of the way of the other aircraft by alter-
ing its course to the right, and no subsequent change in the
relative position of the two aircraft shall absolve the overtaking
aircraft from this obligation until it is entirely passed and
clear.3 3 5
In the remarks to Section 60.104(d) the draft states:
Passing on the right [and not on either side as with the maritime
rules] is required because the pilot in command in side-by-side,
dual-control aircraft is seated on the left side and better vision of
the overtaken aircraft is thus afforded. Furthermore, in narrow
traffic lanes [airways], passing on the left of the overtaken air-
craft would place the overtaking aircraft in the path of on-com-
ing traffic.33
AIM 8-1-8:
e. Collision Course Targets. Any aircraft that appears to have no
relative motion and stays in one scan quadrant is likely to be on a
331 Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
332 CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS DRAFT RELEASE No. 46-5, supra note 126,
§ 60.104(c).
333 Id. § 60.104(c). It should be noted that with head-on situations neither air-
craft has the "right-of-way" in that both aircraft are required to "give-way" to the
other. Neither can continue on its present course.
334 Id. (emphasis added).
335 Id. § 60.104(d).
336 Id.
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collision course. Also, if a target shows no lateral or vertical mo-
tion, but increases in size, take evasive action. 7
AIM 8-1-8:
c. Taking Appropriate Action. Pilots should be familiar with
rules on right-of-way, so if an aircraft is on an obvious collision
course, one can take immediate evasive action, preferably in
compliance with applicable Federal Aviation Regulations.3
"Risk of collision" as defined in maritime law, says the "Risk of
collision can, when circumstances permit, be ascertained by
carefully watching the compass bearing of an approaching ves-
sel. If the bearing does not appreciably change, such risk should
be deemed to exist." '339 The current Rule 7 of the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), Risk
of Collision, states:
(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the
prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk
of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to
exist. 
3 4 0
(d) In determining if risk of collision exists the following consid-
erations shalP4I be among those taken into account:
337 AIM, supra note 15, at 8-1-8e. "The time-honored method for determining
the spatial component of risk of collision is the constant bearing-decreasing
range (CBDR) test .... [but] the CBDR test provides no guidance for determin-
ing the range at which a CBDR contact first presents a risk of collision that will
trigger the [right-of-way] rules." See CRAIG H. ALLEN, FARwELL's RULES OF THE
NAUTICAL ROAD 215 (8th ed. 2005) [hereinafter FARWELL'S RULES OF THE NAUTI-
CAL ROAD]. The AIM at 8-1-8e uses CBDR coupled with a perceived increase in
target size to indicate that immediate avoidance action is required. See AIM, supra
note 15, at 8-1-8e. These AIM sections seem to refer to an immediate danger of
collision and not early maneuvers to avoid the risk of collision. The risk of a
potential collision should normally be ascertainable prior to the "target blossom"
effect, but certainly avoidance maneuvers would be called for at that point.
338 AIM, supra note 15, at 8-1-8c.
339 33 U.S.C. § 101 (1925).
3- COLREGS, supra note 321, r. 7 (emphasis added).
341 In addition to the projected closest point of approach (CPA), other consid-
erations include the initial distance between vessels: "In the courts of the United
Kingdom and other countries risk of collision has not been held to apply at long
distances . . . ." CocKcRoFT & LAMEIJER, A GUIDE TO THE COLLISION AVOIDANCE
RULES 26 (7th ed. 2012); see also The Wenona, 86 U.S. 41, 52 (1873) (holding the
right-of-way rules do not apply to vessels, "while they are yet so distant from each
other that measures of precaution have not become necessary to avoid a
collision").
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(i) Such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an
approaching vessel does not appreciably change.342
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in The Victory, regarding ascer-
taining a risk of collision:
It depends on their presumable courses. If at any time two ves-
sels, not end on, are seen, keeping the courses to be expected
with regard to them respectively, to be likely to arrive at the same
point at or nearly at the same moment, they are vessels crossing so as to
involve risk of collision.... The question, therefore, always turns on
the reasonable inference to be drawn as to a vessel's future
343course from her position at a particular moment ....
If there is any doubt, a risk of collision will be deemed to ex-
ist.34 4 Preferably, the risk of collision may be ascertained well in
advance of the ten seconds to impact minimum needed for a
pilot to react with any sort of avoidance maneuver.
Once it is established that a "risk" of collision exists, each air-
craft must avoid the other in accordance with the right-of-way
rules to remove that risk.3 45 It is the risk of collision, not only the
collision itself which must be avoided.346
In Maritime & Mercantile Int'l v. United States, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York examined maritime
right-of-way rules and determined that the duty of compliance
starts when there is a "mere risk" of collision, long before get-
ting so close as to create an immediate danger of collision:
Because this [right-of-way] rule focuses on the mere risk of col-
lision, it is not limited to situations involving imminent collision.
As the Second Circuit has observed:
Since the rules are designed to prevent the risk of collision as
well as collision itself, it is not necessary for a collision to be imminent
or even probable before the obligation imposed by them accrues. The
courts have expressed this concept in various ways. Said Judge
Addison Brown: 'There is danger or risk of collision whenever it
is not clearly safe to go on.' While Judge Learned Hand put it
thus: 'Risk of collision' does not mean certainty of collision; but
only that prudence demands that the navigators shall watch each
other's navigation, and be prepared to do whatever safety may
342 COLREGS, supra note 321, r. 7 (emphasis added); see also Mar. & Mercan-
tile Int'l v. U.S., No. 02-CV-1446, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19792, at *81 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2007).
343 The Victory, 168 U.S. 410, 421 (1897).
34 C.G. Willis, Inc. v. The Spica, 6 F.3d 193, 196 (4th Cir. 1993).
345 See Mar. & Mercantile Int'l, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19792, at *81-82.
346 See id. at *82.
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demand." In short, a situation may involve risk of collision before
there is actual danger ....
... (" 'Risk of collision' means mere chance, peril, hazard or dan-
ger of collision."). Under this Rule, as Judge Learned Hand em-
phasized, "it must always be remembered that it is the risk of
collision, not the collision itself, that masters must avoid." 47
If the right-of-way rules (remain vigilant, see, avoid) are carried
out correctly the risk of collision is eliminated. If there is no risk
of collision because their projected paths no longer cross or be-
cause they are now at substantially different altitudes, the air-
craft are certainly "well clear."
Air traffic controllers inform a pilot that the risk of collision
with another aircraft has passed by transmitting, "traffic no
longer a factor. '3 48 This phrase is defined in the AIM 4-4-14 Vis-
ual Separation as follows: "Traffic is no longer a factor when
during approach phase the other aircraft is in the landing phase
of flight or executes a missed approach; and during departure
or en route, when the other aircraft turns away or is on a diverging
course."349
The harder question is whether the risk must be completely
eliminated (reduced to zero) under all circumstances. Must a
pilot anticipate and compensate for the risk that the other air-
craft will not comply with 91.113? For example, a particular pi-
lot's avoidance maneuver for traffic approaching head-on is to
alter the aircraft's course to the right in an amount reasonably
calculated to reduce the risk of collision to zero, assuming that
the other aircraft also complies with the regulation by turning
right. However, there is always a probability that the other pilot
is not vigilant and does not see, or worse, makes a mistake in
applying the rules. In any event, if he turns to the aircraft to the
left, it drastically increases the risk of collision. Put another way,
the situation goes from being well clear with no risk of collision,
if the other pilot complies with the rules, to one where there is
now a risk of collision, which may require new maneuvering to
avoid. The issue is whether this "new" risk of collision is just an
expansion of the hazards that should have been considered in
the original calculation of the risk of collision.
-7 Id. at *81-82 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
34 See AIM, supra note 15, at 44-14.
349 Id. (emphasis added).
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Generally, it appears that it is not required for a pilot to factor
in the risk of non-compliance by another aircraft.35 However,
there is support in maritime case law that the risk of meeting a
non-complying vessel is foreseeable, on the theories that to err is
human and lawbreaking is not uncommon.35 ' In The Philadel-
phia, the court stated regarding the risk of collision:
[B]y departure from the rules of navigation, whether from want
of good seamanship, accident, mistake, misapprehension of sig-
nals, or otherwise, a collision might be brought about. It is true
that... each man has a right to assume that the other will obey the law.
But this does not justfy either in shutting his eyes to what the other may
actually do, or in omitting to do what he can to avoid an accident made
imminent by the acts of the other.... [I]t is well known that departure
from the law not only may, but does, take place, and often. Risk of colli-
sion may be said to begin the moment the two vessels have ap-
proached each other.., that a collision might be brought about
by any such departure [from the rules], and continues up to the
moment when they have so far progressed that no such result
can ensue.
3 5 2
In Acaia Vera Navigation Co. v. Kezia, the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that one vessel, which mistakenly believed
it was approaching head-on to another and turned right, caused
the collision. 53 Since there was no risk of collision, the rule for
head-on passage did not apply:
From the moment the ... Blue Cloud and the ... Omina com-
menced navigating with respect to each other, each remained in
its original relative position with respect to the boundaries of the
designated fairway. The courses of the several vessels were such
350 See The Hortensia, 12 F. Cas. 532, 536 (D. Me. 1877) (stating that the over-
taking vessel is charged with the duty of keeping clear of overtaken vessel but has
right to assume the other vessel will obey the rules of navigation). However,
COLREGS 13 and 16 state that an overtaking vessel has a duty to maintain such a
distance from the overtaken vessel so as to allow the overtaken vessel to conduct
reasonably predictable adjustments. See COLREGS, supra note 321, rs. 13, 16.
351 See The Philadelphia, 199 F. 299, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
352 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting The Milwaukee, 17 F. Cas. 427, 433 (E.D.
Mich. 1871)). With the closure rates of aircraft and the slim probability of surviv-
ing a midair collision, the pessimistic view of human nature of The Milwaukee
court may be more on point today than when it was written. Laurence J. Peter is
quoted as saying, "A pessimist is a man who looks both ways when he's crossing a
one-way street." See The Associated Press, Today in History, SOUTHEAST MISSOUR]AN
(Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.semissourian.com/story/1991462.html.
s3 Acaia Vera Nav. Co. v. Kezia, 78 F.3d 211, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1996).
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that if each had held its own course and speed, the vessels would
have passed well clear of each other and without incident.3" 4
If one starts to avoid another aircraft by remaining well clear
based upon the assumption that the other will comply with the
rules, the risk may suddenly enlarge when it becomes apparent
that the other aircraft is non-compliant. 5 The Supreme Court
of Virginia in Mackey v. Miller, stated that, "a pilot has a right to
assume that another pilot will obey air traffic regulations until
he realizes, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have real-
ized, that the other pilot is not going to do so." '356 Accordingly,
the duty to remain vigilant to new or increasing risk remains
throughout the process of executing the right-of-way rules. 57
In Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's deci-
sion that, "an air traffic controller has the right to rely upon the
assumption that a pilot knows and will abide by the applicable
Federal Aviation Regulations.3 1
5 8
4. Duty to See the Invisible-The Duty to "Visualize and Avoid"
Wake turbulence is an air disturbance caused by the move-
ment of an aircraft's wings through the air creating two counter-
rotating cylindrical vortices trailing from the wing tips. 3 59 Once
wake turbulence is created, the vortices drift downward and
move according to wind direction and velocity. 360 A "heavy air-
craft ' 36 1 (and some others with a propensity for vortex genera-
354 Id. at 217.
355 See Mackey v. Miller, 273 S.E.2d 550, 553 (Va. 1981).
356 Id. (citing Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 111 (7th
Cir. 1974); Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 486 (W.D. Wash. 1975)).
357 See id. Apart from the aspect of legal fault, self interest also dictates that a
compliant aircraft, to the extent possible, allow for non-compliant conduct when
it is encountered. Violation of the rules may later result in an enforcement action
against the rule violator. However, a collision is only likely to allow the innocent
pilot's relations to bring a wrongful death action in court.
358 Colo. Flying Acad., Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 878 (10th Cir. 1984).
In this midair collision, plaintiffs asserted that the ATC controller should have
advised the Colorado Flying Academy pilot that another aircraft was in dangerous
proximity. Id. at 877-79. No liability on the part of the U.S. government was
found. Id. at 880-81.
359 See Wake Tubulence, VATUSA TRAINING RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.
vatusa.net/training/tiki-index.php?page=waketurbulence (last visited Oct. 10,
2014).
3- See id.
361 A "heavy aircraft" is an aircraft weighing more than 300,000 pounds. See id.
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tion), creates a dangerous amount of wake turbulence which
may cause an encountering aircraft to lose control. 62
Although U.S. regulations pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 91.113
right-of-way rules do not specifically state that wake avoidance
must be considered when determining the requirement to pass
"well clear" of another aircraft, the international regulations are
clear on this subject.3 6 3 The International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) counterpart to 14 C.F.R. § 91.113 states specifi-
cally that wake turbulence is to be included in the computation
of determining a safe passing."' "An aircraft that is obliged by
the following rules to keep out of the way of another shall avoid
passing over, under or in front of the other, unless it passes well
clear and takes into account the effect of aircraft wake turbulence.365
U.S. courts have consistently found that the "avoid" require-
ments of Section 91.113 apply not only to collision risk, but to
avoiding wake turbulence as well. 366 In re N-500L Cases arose out
of a 1978 crash in San Juan, Puerto Rico.3 6 7 N-500L, a twin-pro-
peller aircraft (Beech D18), was on approach for landing in vis-
ual conditions at San Juan International Airport when it was
overtaken by an Eastern Airlines L-1011 heavy jet which was also
in the process of landing. 6 8 It was stipulated that the wake tur-
bulence generated by the L-1011 caused the N-500L to crash,
killing all six individuals aboard and causing substantial injury to
the individuals and property on the ground.3 69 The court states:
When a pilot is operating under VFR, or clear weather, condi-
tions, he has the responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft. 14
C.F.R. §§ 91.67(a) [now 91.113 (b)], 91.659a). This responsibility
362 See id.
363 See INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ANNEX 2 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CIVIL AVIATION: RULES OF THE AIR § 3.2.2.1 (10th ed. 2005).
364 See id.
365 Id. (emphasis added). The United States has not filed a "difference" to the
international requirement of taking wake turbulence into consideration when
determining a safe passing distance. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AERONAUTICAL IN-
FORMATION PUBLICATION (Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION
PUBLICATION].
366 See Adm'r v. Willbanks, 3 N.T.S.B. 3632, 3632-34 (1981) (finding the re-
spondent Boeing 737 pilot in violation of Section 91.67 (now Section 91.113) by
flying too close to a Cessna 172, and "with the aircraft thus positioned, the pilot
of the Cessna initiated what he believed to be a necessary evasive turn to the right
to avoid either a collision with the overtaking PSA aircraft or any wake turbulence
its passage might create.").
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extends beyond observing and staying away from other traffic; it requires
vigilance with regard to wake turbulence as well. Pilots are instructed
that 'the flight disciplines necessary to assure vortex avoidance
during VFR operations must be exercised by the pilot. Vortex visu-
alization and avoidance procedures should be exercised by the pilot using
the same degree of concern as in collision avoidance.
This is so regardless of whether a clearance has been given by the
controller, because the pilot generally is in the best position to
see other aircraft around him and to visualize their vortex
trails.37 °
The court reiterated that the AIM and Advisory Circulars are
evidence of the standard of care among all pilots, and it is as-
sumed that all pilots have read and know their provisions. 7 1 Ad-
visory Circular AC 90-23, dealing with wake turbulence
avoidance, and the AIM fall into this category.3 72 The In re N-
500L court continued:
The AIM also contains information on wake turbulence and rec-
ommends procedures for avoiding it. Pilots are advised that air
traffic controllers will warn a VFR aircraft of a wake turbulence
hazard from a nearby plane but they are reminded, "WHETHER
OR NOT A WARNING HAS BEEN GIVEN, HOWEVER, THE PI-
LOT IS EXPECTED TO ADJUST HIS OPERATIONS AND
FLIGHT PATH AS NECESSARY TO PRECLUDE SERIOUS
WAKE ENCOUNTER."... Because the vortices drift behind and
below the generating aircraft, pilots are advised to stay at or
above the flight path of the generating plane, altering their
course as necessary to avoid the area below and behind the
plane.
"Acceptance of both traffic information and instructions to fol-
low another aircraft is pilot acknowledgment that he sees the
other aircraft and will maneuver his aircraft as necessary to avoid
it or maintain in-trial separation. The pilot also accepts responsibility
for wake turbulence avoidance separation under these conditions."
Under the prevailing clear weather conditions, Cannon [the pi-
lot of N500L] was in the best position to visualize and avoid the
wake turbulence generated by the L-1011 after the overtaking.
He, therefore, had a duty to do so.17
370 Id. at 28, 29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
371 Id. at 28.
372 See id.
373 Id. at 28, 29, 30 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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In Scruggs v. United States, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the pilot Scruggs was the
sole proximate cause of damage to his airplane in a near miss
incident with four F-16's during which he encountered wake tur-
bulence strong enough to blow the door open and bend the
wing struts of his Maule (MX-7-180) aircraft17 4 The military air-
craft were operating on a published IFR Military Training Route
(MTR), of which Mr. Scruggs should have been aware . 75 As in
the N-500L cases, the court determined that a pilot has a duty to
avoid both a collision and wake turbulence, stating, "A pilot has
a duty to remain vigilant throughout the flight; a pilot has a duty
to observe, to recognize, and to avoid dangerous conditions
which confront him or her. '3 76 Furthermore the court stated:
Under VFR weather condition flight rules, the pilot has a duty to
"see and avoid." That duty also requires that the pilot exercise
the same degree of caution to visualize and avoid wake turbu-
lence encounters with other aircraft.
Nonparticipating aircraft are not prohibited from flying within
an MTR; however, extreme vigilance should be exercised when
conducting flight through or near these routes. . . Thomas
Scruggs failed to operate his aircraft as a reasonably prudent pi-
lot would have under the circumstances insofar as he (1) failed
to obtain NOTAMs prior to departure in an effort to determine
whether there would be military aircraft along his anticipated
route; (2) failed to properly plan his flight and chose a route of
flight (including altitude) that would place him within the con-
fines of IR-34; and (3) engaged in a see and avoid procedure that
was ineffective.377
In Dyer v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the crash of a light airplane which was landing
on a runway two minutes following the approach and landing of
a large U.S. Coast Guard helicopter (HH-3) was the fault of the
airplane pilot, Mr. Franklin, even though he knew of the wake
turbulence threat and took preventive action by ensuring a spac-
ing of two minutes.3 78 The court stated:
374 See Scruggs v. United States, 959 F. Supp. 1537, 1541-43, 1547 (S.D. Fla.
1997).
375 See id. at 1546-47.
376 Id. at 1545 (citing Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1971)).
377 Id. at 1545, 1547.
378 Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 1987).
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It is undisputed that Franklin had a duty to be, and actually was,
familiar with information regarding wake turbulence avoidance
published in the Airman's Information Manual and in the FAA
advisory circulars. He prolonged his approach in an attempt to
avoid the wake left by the helicopter, but tragically, those mea-
sures were insufficient to prevent the accident.
We conclude that the primary duty was on Franklin to under-
stand and safely avoid the hazards left by the helicopter's wake.
He breached this duty by following too closely on the heels of the
helicopter landing, in a position behind the helicopter's touch-
down point on the runway, which placed him in an area endan-
gered by the existing turbulence on the runway. Judging how
long wake turbulence takes to dissipate is difficult, but the pri-
mary responsibility for such avoidance is on the pilot-not on an
aircraft that landed safely on a runway after it clearly had the
right-of-way to land. 79
5. Air Traffic Control and "See and Avoid"
14 C.F.R. § 91.3 Responsibility and Authority of the Pilot in
Command.
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible
for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that
aircraft.
(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the
pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to
the extent required to meet that emergency.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under
paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the
Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to
the Administrator.38 °
Under this regulation, the pilot is directly responsible for the
operation of the aircraft, to include avoiding collisions. 81 How-
ever, the responsibility for collision avoidance is also placed
upon the U.S. government ATC system, which was set up by
Congress to, inter alia, prevent aircraft collisions.38 2
379 Id. (citations omitted).
380 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (2014).
381 See id.
382 In January 1955, a TWA flight collided with a DC-3 near Cincinnati, Ohio.
See Flight Safety Found., Accident Description, AvIATION SAFETry NETWORK, http://
aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19550112-0 (last updated Oct. 11,
2014). In June 1956, a United Airlines flight collided with a TWA flight over the
Grand Canyon, resulting in 128 deaths; the largest loss of life in an aviation acci-
dent at the time. See Grand Canyon Collision, DONEY & AssocIATES PLC, http://
www.doney.net/aroundaz/grandcanyoncrash.htm (last updated Aug. 14, 2014).
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As of 1955, there were no en route long-range radars in oper-
13ation. In 1956, President Eisenhower appointed Edward P.
Curtis to head an implementation appraisal of the earlier Har-
ding report, which studied the dramatic increase in airline traf-
fic since the end of World War II and the pending introduction
of higher speed jet aircraft:
From that commission came a proposal to create a new Federal
aviation agency that would replace the Civil Aeronautics Admin-
istration and the Civil Aeronautics Board to consolidate air oper-
ations, modernize the airways and to make and enforce safety
rules.
Out of that study came the "positive control" '384 of high altitude
traffic, as he called it, in which the pilot guides his plane along
fixed routes dictated by ground-control centers and makes peri-
odic position reports."8 5
The Civil Aeronautics Board stated that the probable cause of the accident was
that, "the pilots did not see each other in time." CML AERONAUTICS BD., FILE No.
1-0090, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT (1957). This high profile accident took
place in uncontrolled airspace and raised public concern about airline safety. See
Grand Canyon Collision, supra. There were two additional midair collisions, one
near Las Vegas, Nevada involving a United Airlines Flight 736 and a U.S. Air
Force F-100 under military control collided on V-8 airway in April 1958, where
forty-nine died. See generally United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.
1964.) The second accident involved Capital Airlines over Brunswick, Maryland a
month later. See Flight Safety Foundation, Accident Description, supra. The day after
the Brunswick collision, Senator Mike Monroney and Representative Oren Harris
introduced the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. See STUART ROCHESTER, FED. AVIA-
TION ADMIN., TAKEOFF AT MID-CENTURY, FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY IN THE
EISENHOWER YEARS 204-06 (1976). Monroney had been crafting the bill with gov-
ernment and industry experts, but he was afraid that in the furor over the recent
crashes "hasty and ill-considered bills might be advanced by understandably an-
gry and impatient legislators." Id. at 205. "When the second midair collision
shocked the country, we changed from a dry-run to an all-out effort to get the bill
passed." Id. Citing "recent midair collisions of aircraft occasioning tragic losses of
human life," President Eisenhower announced the White House's support of the
legislation. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D.
Ga. 1980). The Act was passed by Congress and was signed into law on August 23,
1958. See ROCHESTER, supra, at 211-14.
383 ANNE MILLBROOKE, AVIATION HISTORY 8-20 (1999).
384 The original "positive control area" (PCA) above 18,000 feet MSL is cur-
rently styled "Class A" airspace and is restricted to Instrument Flight Rules only,
with ATC sequencing and separation provided to each aircraft. See 14 C.F.R.
§§ 71.33, 91.167-.193 (2014).
385 Edward P. Curtis, Eisenhower Aviation Aide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/15/obituaries/edward-p-curtis-eisenhower-
aviation-aide.html.
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In 1957, the air traffic control radar beacon system (ATCRBS)
entered service for operational testing.38 6 The Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 at Title I, Section 307 stated:
(a) Use of Airspace-The Administrator is authorized and di-
rected to develop plans for and formulate policy with respect
to the use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regu-
lation, or order ... to insure the safety of aircraft....
(b) Air Navigation Facilities-The Administrator is authorized,
within the limits of available appropriations made by the
Congress . . . (4) to provide necessary facilities and person-
nel for the regulation and protection of air traffic.
(c) Air Traffic Rules-The Administrator is further authorized
and directed to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations
governing the flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protec-
tion, and identification of aircraft, for the protection of per-
sons and property on the ground, and for the efficient
utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as to
safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of colli-
sion between aircraft, between aircraft and land or water ve-
hicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects. 87
Currently the law defines the ATC system as:
"[A] ir traffic control system" means the combination of elements
used to safely and efficiently monitor, direct, control, and guide
aircraft in the United States and United States-assigned airspace,
including:
(a) allocated electromagnetic spectrum and physical, real,
personal, and intellectual property assets making up facili-
ties, equipment, and systems employed to detect, track,
and guide aircraft movement;
(b) laws, regulations, orders, directives, agreements, and
licenses;
(c) published procedures that explain required actions, activi-
ties, and techniques used to ensure adequate aircraft sepa-
ration; and
386 ANNE MILLBROOKE, supra note 383, at 8-20. "The air traffic control system
of the future, unlike our present system, is designed to provide for the separation
of all aircraft at all times regardless of weather. This is known as positive control.
There is no element of aviation which has advocated or is ready to advocate posi-
tive control today of all airspace. To do so with the 'men, money, and machines'
now available would instantly ground 85 percent of traffic." CVIL AERONAUTICS
BD., ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1958).
387 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 307, 72 Stat. 737, 749-50
(1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958)).
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(d) trained personnel with specific technical capabilities to
satisfy the operational, engineering, management, and
planning requirements for air traffic control.3"'
In accordance with paragraph (c) above, the ATC controllers'
manual states, "[t]he primary purpose of the ATC system is to
prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to
provide a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic, and to
provide support for National Security and Homeland De-
fense."3"' In order to "direct, control and guide aircraft" ATC
issues a "clearance" to an aircraft.3 90 The Pilot/Controller Glos-
sary defines "air traffic clearance" as:
[A]n authorization by air traffic control for the purpose of
preventing collision between known aircraft, for an aircraft to
proceed under specified traffic conditions within controlled air-
space. The pilot-in-command of an aircraft may not deviate from
the provisions of a visual flight rules (VFR) or instrument flight
rules (IFR) air traffic clearance except in an emergency or unless
an amended clearance has been obtained. Additionally, the pilot
may request a different clearance from that which has been is-
sued by air traffic control (ATC) if information available to the
pilot makes another course of action more practicable or if air-
craft equipment limitations or company procedures forbid com-
pliance with the clearance issued. Pilots may also request
clarification or amendment, as appropriate, any time a clearance
is not fully understood, or considered unacceptable because of
safety of flight. Controllers should, in such instances and to the
extent of operational practicality and safety, honor the pilot's re-
quest. 14 C.F.R. Part 91.3(a) states: "The pilot in command of an
aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to,
the operation of that aircraft." THE PILOT IS RESPONSIBLE
TO REQUEST AN AMENDED CLEARANCE if ATC issues a
clearance that would cause a pilot to deviate from a rule or regu-
lation, or in the pilot's opinion, would place the aircraft in
jeopardy3 91
Once a clearance, or authorization to proceed under specified
conditions, is issued and the pilot accepts it, the pilot must com-
ply with the ATC instructions in all areas where air traffic control
is exerted or authorized unless a deviation falls within the excep-
tions set forth below in 91.123.92 Courts often struggle with de-
388 49 U.S.C § 40102(a)(47) (2012).
389 FAA No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
3- See AIM, supra note 15, at Pilot/Controller Glossary.
391 Id.
392 See id.; Adm'r v. Hayes, 1 N.T.S.B. 1050, 1052-53 (1971).
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fining a "clearance" versus an "instruction." An instruction is an
order issued by ATC pursuant to its mandate at law to "direct"
and "control" aircraft to prevent collisions. 93 An instruction
may be viewed as the ongoing dynamic process of the pilot com-
plying with any existing, new or changing "specified conditions"
of his clearance.394 In Administrator v. Hayes, the Board provides
some clarification.
We find no ambiguity in the tower's statement to respondent to
"taxi into position and hold." To "taxi into position" is obviously
a clearance permitting the respondent, if he chooses, to go onto
the runway. It is well understood by pilots that a clearance is an
authorization by the tower to proceed. It is not an order to do so.
However, the statement "hold" is an instruction, i.e., an order, which
cannot be disobeyed, except that section 91.3(b) permits a pilot in
an emergency requiring immediate action to deviate from such
instruction. However, this proceeding involves no emergency.
Obviously then, respondent, in taking off without an ATC clear-
ance at an airport with an operating tower, violated section
91.87(h), whose language is succinct and could not be more defi-
nite. Moreover, we are not persuaded by respondent's efforts to
indicate confusion as to what constitutes a clearance in contradis-
tinction to an order. Furthermore the fact that the FAA proposed
rulemaking to define these terms is irrelevant, since such regula-
tion was never adopted.396
The Board also found that Mr. Hayes, as the pilot-in-command,
could not ignore ATC:
The respondent hides behind the words "final authority" in sec-
tion 91.3 concerning a pilot's responsibility. Once again, this is
merely a simple common sense description, particularly as it ap-
plies to a pilot's authority as against that of an air traffic control-
ler's. If a pilot's authority were "final" per se, there would be no
reason for, use for, or enforcement of Federal Aviation Regula-
tions pertaining to his actions. The regulations, we repeat, gov-
ern a pilot's conduct, and where he is issued instructions by a
controller, he violates the regulations if he does not obey them.
However, the regulations provide for the extreme situations of
emergencies. If a pilot disobeys a controller's instructions which
involve an emergency, although the pilot has technically violated
393 See Hayes, 1 N.T.S.B. at 1052-53.
394 See id.
395 Id.
396 Id. (emphasis added).
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the regulations, his plea of "emergency," if accepted, will exoner-
ate him.
3 97
Section 91.123 Compliance with ATC Clearances and
Instructions. 98
(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in com-
mand may deviate from that clearance unless an amended
clearance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation
is in response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system
resolution advisory. However, except in Class A airspace, a
pilot may cancel an IFR flight plan if the operation is being
conducted in VFR weather conditions. When a pilot is uncer-
tain of an ATC clearance, that pilot shall immediately re-
quest clarification from ATC.
(b) Except in an emergency, no person may operate an aircraft
contrary to an ATC instruction in an area in which air traffic
control is exercised. 9
397 Id.
398 In Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 1008 (1965), affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965 (1967), a wake turbulence
case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, commented on Civil Air
Regulations Draft Release No. 60-1 (Aug. 26 1960), an exhibit in that case:
[W]hich, however, contains on the front page thereof a boxed-in
informatory note reading as follows:
"CAR Draft Release #60-1. These definitions of Air Traffic Con-
trol instructions and clearances were never adopted as part of CAR-
60. Page 3 indicates the Agency's feeling of distinction which must
be made between the two terms 'instructions' and 'clearances."'
If the government relies upon this exhibit as purported proof that air traffic con-
trol clearances are mere authorizations and not mandatory instructions that
under existing regulations and practices all pilots should have known it, the
Court finds that this is not so. For instance, the same release contains on page 6
thereof the following admission:
Since this amendment is a clarification and restatement of the ex-
isting regulatory situation, it could be adopted without notice and
opportunity for comments. However, since the present practice
may have misled some pilots as to the obligatory nature of an air
traffic control instruction, the Agency is publishing this amend-
ment as a proposal for comment, so that all pilots may be informed,
and to provide them an opportunity to submit any comments they
may care to make concerning it.
[M]oreover, the entire document makes it clear that the Federal Avia-
tion Agency itself recognizes that, even in relation to air traffic control
clearances, there can sometimes be instances where the controllers must
issue mandatoiy "instructions."
See id. (emphasis added).
3- See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (2014) (discussing pilot authority and emergency ac-
tions). ATC normally does not question the pilot's decision regarding classifying
an in-flight situation as an emergency, and will assist in any way possible. How-
ever, after the aircraft is down safe the FAA will examine the facts to determine if
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(c) Each pilot in command who, in an emergency, or in re-
sponse to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system reso-
lution advisory, deviates from an ATC clearance or
instruction shall notify ATC of that deviation as soon as
possible.
(d) Each pilot in command who (though not deviating from a
rule of this subpart) is given priority by ATC in an emer-
gency, shall submit a detailed report of that emergency
within 48 hours to the manager of that ATC facility, if re-
quested by ATC.
(e) Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, no person operating an
aircraft may operate that aircraft according to any clearance
or instruction that has been issued to the pilot of another
aircraft for radar air traffic control purposes.4 ° °
The courts have generally held that both the pilot and the
controller have independent, separate but concurrent ongoing
duties to prevent collisions. "Pilot responsibilities are in the Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations . . . and the air traffic controller's are
in FAA Order 7110.65 .... Additional and supplemental infor-
mation for pilots can be found in the current [AIM] .... -401 "In
order to maintain a safe and efficient air traffic system, it is nec-
essary that every party fulfill their responsibilities to the ful-
lest. '40 2 "The responsibilities of the pilot and the controller
intentionally overlap in many areas providing a degree of redun-
dancy. Should one or the other fail in any manner, this overlap-
ping responsibility is expected to compensate, in many cases, for
failures that may affect safety. ' 40 3 Pilots must maintain vigilance
and controllers must diligently comply with their duties as given
in the law, regulations and their manual.40 4 These duties are for
the common purpose of avoiding midair collisions.0 5 If either
breach their individual duty, a mishap may result.40 6
The Tenth Circuit stated in Yates v. United States:
the "emergency" was of the nature contemplated under the regulations. For ex-
ample, if the "emergency" was self-imposed, it will not excuse any deviations from
the regulations and enforcement action may be pursued.
400 14 C.F.R. § 91.123.
401 AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION PUBLICATION, supra note 365, at 42.1.1.
402 Id. at 42.1.4.
403 Id. at 42.1.5.
404 See id. at 42.1.1-42.1.5.
405 See id.
406 SeeYates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 882-83 (10th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
added).
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The relationship between the air controller and the pilot of a
plane which is landing or taking off creates a duty of care on the
part of the controller. The government argues that plaintiff had no
right to rely on instructions which the air controller gave him, and it was
up to him to form his own judgment. We fail to see the controller's direc-
tions and warnings as being merely advisory. It is true that the regula-
tions state that a pilot is directly responsible for and is the final
authority as to the operation of the aircraft, and they also say that
in an emergency the pilot may deviate from the regulations to
the extent required to meet the emergency. He must, however,
when he has deviated, send a written report of the deviat[ion], to
the administrator upon request. What appears to be a conflict
can be reconciled. A pilot has a choice before he commits him-
self to a landing, but after the commitment he is not free to change his
course and thereafter he is controlled by the controller. Along this same
line we note that 49 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (5) declares that it is unlaw-
ful for any person to operate aircraft in air commerce in viola-
tion of any other rule, regulation, or certificate of the
Administrator. This supports our view that what appears to be a
conflict between the regulation declaring that the pilot is in com-
mand of the aircraft and the regulations giving traffic control au-
thority to the government controllers are consistent after all.
This becomes clear in light of considering that if the pilot could
depart from the control of the tower at any time the control of
the airfield traffic would soon become a shambles. We cannot,
therefore, accept the view that the controllers with the complex
equipment which they employ are there merely to give advice.
The recognition of these functions as legal obligations gives rise to an
attendant duty to peform these functions with reasonable care.
At bar the pilot Yates was peculiarly susceptible to the control of
the controllers since he was piloting a light plane in between
heavy jets. Once he received and followed the controller's in-
structions with respect to landing he was not free to disregard the
directions given and exercise independent initiative. For all practi-
cal purposes, he was in complete control of the tower. The hazardous
traffic pattern, the direction which enhanced the danger and the





a. Controlled Airspace. A generic term that covers the differ-
ent classification of airspace (Class A, Class B, Class C, Class
D, and Class E airspace) and defined dimensions within
which air traffic control service is provided to IFR flights
407 Id. (emphasis added).
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and to VFR flights in accordance with the airspace
classification.
3-3-1. General [Uncontrolled Airspace]4 °.
Class G airspace (uncontrolled) is that portion of airspace that
has not been designated as Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, or
Class E airspace.
3-3-2. VFR Requirements
Rules governing VFR flight have been adopted to assist the pilot
in meeting the responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft. Min-
imum flight visibility and distance from clouds required for VFR
flight are contained in 14 C.F.R. Section 91.155.409
As shown above in the extracted relevant paragraphs from the
AIM all classes of airspace, except Class G, are "controlled" by
ATC to some extent, and by which ATC may offer specific ser-
vices to pilots.410 For example, control towers in Class D airspace
offer sequencing"' only for VFR aircraft, but may offer both se-
quencing and separation for IFR aircraft.412 AIM 3-2-5e, discuss-
ing Class D airspace states, "no separation services are provided
to VFR aircraft." 413 The VFR pilot in Class D airspace must there-
fore achieve proper separation ("spacing") 414 on his own. The
AIM at Chapter 4, Air Traffic Control, states:
4-1-2. Control Towers
408 "Uncontrolled" airspace can be defined as the airspace where no air traffic
control services are provided. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIR TRAFFIC ORDER No.
JO 7400.2K (2014). However, this airspace is still "governed" in its entry and us-
age by the other applicable federal regulations. For example, to fly an airplane
VFR in uncontrolled airspace at 1,200 or less above the surface in the daytime,
weather conditions must allow for the pilot to maintain a flight visibility of at least
one statute mile and remain clear of any clouds, in order to see and avoid other
traffic. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (2014).
409 AIM, supra note 15, at 3-2-1, 3-3-1, 3-3-2.
410 See id.
411 "Sequencing" is not defined in the AIM, ATC manual, or the Pilot/Control-
ler Glossary indicating that its meaning in aviation traffic control usage does not
differ from the common usage. "Sequence" is defined in Webster's Dictionary as,
"the act of following." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1989). To accomplish this,
controllers use the terminology: Make Right Traffic, Enter Left/Right Base, Fol-
low, Extend Downwind, Make Short Approach, Go Around, etc.
412 See AIM, supra note 15, at 3-2-5.
413 Id.
414 "Separation" is defined in the "Pilot/Controller Glossary" (contained in
both the AIM and the ATC Manual) as "the spacing of aircraft to achieve their
safe and orderly movement in flight and while landing and taking off." Id. at
Pilot/Controller Glossary. Separation "minima" is defined as "[t]he minimum
longitudinal, lateral, or vertical distances aircraft are spaced through the applica-
tion of air traffic control procedures." Id. Separation is defined in terms of spac-
ing. See id. The ATC manual, at 1-2-li, defines "approved separation" as
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Towers have been established to provide for a safe, orderly and
expeditious flow of traffic on and in the vicinity of an airport.
When the responsibility has been so delegated, towers also pro-
vide for the separation of IFR aircraft in the terminal areas.415
Chapter 3 "Airport Traffic Control-Terminal" of the ATC man-
ual states:
3-1-1. PROVIDE SERVICE
Provide airport traffic control service based only upon observed
or known traffic and airport conditions.
NOTE-
When operating in accordance with CFRs, it is the responsibility
of the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft. However, due to
the limited space around terminal locations, traffic information can
aid pilots in avoiding collision between aircraft operating within
Class B, Class C, or Class D surface areas and the terminal radar
service areas, and transiting aircraft operating in proximity to ter-
minal locations.416
However, the sequencing and spacing of aircraft are interde-
pendent.417 The ATC manual further states:
3-8-1. SEQUENCE/SPACING APPLICATION
Establish the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft by re-
quiring them to adjust flight or ground operation, as necessary,
to achieve proper spacing.418
The AIM comments upon the tower controller's responsibilities
by stating in relevant part at paragraph 4-3-5:
ATC service is based upon observed or known traffic and airport
conditions. Controllers establish the sequence of arriving and de-
parting aircraft by requiring them to adjust flight as necessary to
achieve proper spacing. These adjustments can only be based on
observed traffic, accurate pilot reports, and anticipated aircraft
maneuvers. Pilots are expected to cooperate so as to preclude
disrupting traffic flows or creating conflicting patterns. The pilot-
in-command of an aircraft is directly responsible for and is the
final authority as to the operation of the aircraft. On occasion it
may be necessary for pilots to maneuver their aircraft to maintain
spacing with the traffic they have been sequenced to follow. The
"separation in accordance with the applicable minima in this order." FAA ORDER
No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66, at 1-2-1i. (emphasis added).
415 See AIM, supra note 15, at 4-1-2.
416 FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66, at 3-1-1 (emphasis added).
417 See id. at 3-8-1.
418 Id.
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controller can anticipate minor maneuvering such as shallow "S"
turns.
4 1 9
In the Class D VFR tower example, the controller has a spe-
cific duty to sequence observed or known arriving and departing
aircraft by directing them to adjust flight as necessary to achieve
proper spacing.4 20 This is an affirmative duty on the part of the
controller, requires diligence in observing (vigilance) and actu-
ally "knowing" if they should have known.42 1 The pilot brings
with him to the Class D airspace the duty to maintain vigilance
in order to see and avoid a collision.422 The controller's se-
quencing directives must allow for proper spacing (separation);
it is the pilot's duty to comply with the sequencing instructions
and to ensure that proper separation is attained and main-
tained.4 2- The following cases discuss these concurrent duties.
In United States v. Miller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in 1962 discussed these duties concerning plain-
tiffs' claims that the tower controller breached his duty to an
inbound aircraft, by failing to advise of possibly conflicting traf-
fic already operating in the pattern. 42
4
[T]he safe operation of aircraft under VFR weather conditions
rests with the pilot. Under such conditions he is obligated to ob-
serve and avoid other traffic, even if he is flying with a traffic
clearance.
The CAA has recognized that with increasing density of traffic,
increasing speed, and increasingly complex aircraft which re-
quire more attention inside the cockpit, safe operation is facili-
tated by providing assistance from ground personnel. Such
assistance is provided by the towers. The duties of tower opera-
tors are delineated in great detail in the manuals provided for
the use of those personnel. Some of these duties overlap with the
duties which other regulations placed on pilots. It may be this
overlap which has led some to believe that if these duties are im-
posed on the tower operators, the rules governing the duties of
419 AIM, supra note 15, at 4-3-5 (emphasis added).
420 See id.
421 See id.; FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66, at 3-1-1.
422 See FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66, at 3-1-1.
423 See AIM, supra note 15, at 4-3-5.
424 United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1962). The court
never reached the issue of whether or not the controller breached his duty be-
cause, at the time, the law was such that if pilot Miller was contributorily negli-
gent he could not recover from defendant U.S. government. See id. at 706, 711;
BLACK'S LAw DIcTioNARY (9th ed. 2009). Miller was found to be negligent. Miller,
303 F.2d at 711.
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pilots under similar circumstances are only applicable where
there is no tower.
The rules governing the duties of pilots, however, make it clear
that none of those duties are rendered inapplicable merely be-
cause a clearance from a tower has been received. It is stated and
reiterated that the function of tower personnel is merely to assist
the pilot in the performance of the duties imposed, not relieve
him of those duties.
The optimum of safety is sought to be achieved by imposing con-
current duties on the pilots and tower personnel. In any given
case, one, both, or neither could be guilty of a breach of the
duties imposed. This view is implicit in the decision of the court
in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co. The ultimate result
reached in that case recognized that both the Government and
the airline had concurrently breached their duties, and each was
held liable.
We conclude that Miller was not excused by reason of the control
tower operation from his duty, under the VFR weather condi-
tions prevailing at the time of the collision, to give way to the
Cessna which was in the favored position, or from doing
whatever was necessary to clear the area in which the Cessna was
flying.4 2
5
In 1979, the Ninth Circuit in Rudelson v. United States, again
faced the issue of claimed controller negligence relating to a
midair collision.42 6 The court found that both pilots had
breached their duty to maintain vigilance and the controller
had also breached his duty to scan the traffic pattern and warn
the pilots; all were proximate causes of the midair collision.42 7
The court discussed the duty of reasonable care air traffic con-
trollers owed to pilots, including concurrent duties breached
concurrently:
The government contends that because the FAA operations man-
ual did not expressly order the air traffic controllers to monitor
the position of a trainer aircraft while its student pilot practiced
take-offs and landings, the controllers were under no legal duty
to perform such monitoring. The argument is without merit. It is
well settled that air traffic controllers' duties are not limited to
425 Id. (citations omitted).
426 See generally Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979). By
1979, California had adopted the comparative negligence doctrine allowing re-
covery based on a percentage of fault, even if the plaintiff himself had some de-
gree of fault. See id. at 1331, 1333, n.1. This did away with the contributory
negligence bar to recovery as experienced by Miller in 1962. See Miller, 303 F.2d at
706, 711.
427 Id. at 1329-31.
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the tasks prescribed by FAA manuals. Under especially danger-
ous conditions, controllers must take steps beyond those set forth
in the manuals if such steps are necessary to ensure the safety of
pilots and passengers. The law of California is in accord. A per-
son is not necessarily free from negligence just because he "'may
have literally complied with safety statutes or rules. The circum-
stances may require (him) to do more.'
The question before us is whether, notwithstanding the FAA
manual's silence, considerations of safety necessitated closer
monitoring of the trainer's position, at least while it was in the
vicinity of the entry corridor. We answer in the affirmative. The
traffic controllers knew that although the student (Rudelson)
and his instructor (DuVal) were under a duty to see and avoid
other aircraft, their attention would probably be distracted from
time to time by the teaching exercises. The controllers were also
aware that planes occasionally stray into the entry corridor unan-
nounced and that the entry corridor is the spot in the traffic pat-
tern where mid-air collisions are most likely to occur. We hold
that, given the dangerous realities of this situation, the traffic
controllers owed the occupants of the trainer, as well as the pilots
of nearby aircraft, a duty to monitor the trainer's position while it
was in the vicinity of the entry corridor. The controllers also
owed a concomitant duty to transmit warnings by radio or light
beam if the planes appeared to be heading on a collision course.
.... With only a quarter turn of his head, the local controller
could easily have scanned the entire traffic pattern. By ignoring
the dangerous entry corridor area for almost two minutes at a
time when the local controller and others knew or should have
known that a trainer aircraft was in the vicinity, the FAA tower
personnel acted unreasonably and breached their duty of due
care.
428
Even when separation is provided by ATC, "visual" separation
is an approved separation method for controllers, assuming that
certain criteria are met.4 29 The AIM explains to pilots:
4-4-14. Visual Separation
a. Visual separation is a means employed by ATC to separate
aircraft in terminal areas and en route airspace in the NAS.
There are two methods employed to effect this separation:
428 Id. at 1329 (citations omitted); see also Steering Comm. v. United States, 6
F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the U.S. government was apportioned 50% fault
in the Aeromexico midair collision over Cerritos, California. The Aeromexico
flight was receiving air traffic control services from a Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) facility on its approach to Los Angeles International Airport).
429 See AIM, supra note 15, at 4-4-14.
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2. The tower controller sees the aircraft involved and issues
instructions, as necessary, to ensure that the aircraft
avoid each other.
3. A pilot sees the other aircraft involved and upon instruc-
tions from the controller provides separation by maneu-
vering the aircraft to avoid it. When pilots accept
responsibility to maintain visual separation, they must
maintain constant visual surveillance and not pass the
other aircraft until it is no longer a factor.
NOTE-
Traffic is no longer a factor when during approach phase the other air-
craft is in the landing phase offlight or executes a missed approach; and
during departure or en route, when the other aircraft turns away or is on
a diverging course.
b. A pilot's acceptance of instructions to follow another air-
craft or provide visual separation from it is an acknowledg-
ment that the pilot will maneuver the aircraft as necessary
to avoid the other aircraft or to maintain in-trail separation.
In operations conducted behind heavy jet aircraft, it is also
an acknowledgment that the pilot accepts the responsibility
for wake turbulence separation.
NOTE-
When a pilot has been told to follow another aircraft or to provide visual
separation from it, the pilot should promptly notify the controller if visual
contact with the other aircraft is lost or cannot be maintained or if the
pilot cannot accept the responsibility for the separation for any reason.
c. Scanning the sky for other aircraft is a key factor in collision
avoidance. Pilots and copilots (or the right seat passenger)
should continuously scan to cover all areas of the sky visible
from the cockpit. Pilots must develop an effective scanning
technique which maximizes one's visual capabilities. Spot-
ting a potential collision threat increases directly as more
time is spent looking outside the aircraft. One must use
timesharing techniques to effectively scan the surrounding
airspace while monitoring instruments as well.
d. Since the eye can focus only on a narrow viewing area, ef-
fective scanning is accomplished with a series of short, regu-
larly spaced eye movements that bring successive areas of
the sky into the central visual field. Each movement should
not exceed ten degrees, and each area should be observed
for at least one second to enable collision detection. Al-
though many pilots seem to prefer the method of horizon-
tal back-and-forth scanning every pilot should develop a
scanning pattern that is not only comfortable but assures
optimum effectiveness. Pilots should remember, however,
that they have a regulatory responsibility (14 C.F.R.
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§ 91.113(a)) to see and avoid other aircraft when weather
conditions permit.4"'
As an example, the ATC manual provides for visual separation
of en route traffic:
7-2-1. VISUAL SEPARATION
Aircraft may be separated by visual means, as provided in this
paragraph, when other approved separation is assured before
and after the application of visual separation. To ensure that
other separation will exist, consider aircraft performance, wake
turbulence, closure rate, routes of flight, and known weather
conditions. Reported weather conditions must allow the aircraft
to remain within sight until other separation exists.
c. EN ROUTE. Visual separation may be used up to but not
including FL 180 when the following conditions are met:
1. Direct communication is maintained with one of the air-
craft involved and there is an ability to communicate
with the other.
2. A pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain
visual separation from it as follows:
(a) Tell the pilot about the other aircraft including posi-
tion, direction and unless it is obvious, the other air-
craft's intentions.
(b) Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the
other aircraft is in sight.
(c) Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from
that aircraft.
(d) Advise the pilot if the radar targets appear likely to
converge.
(e) If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the
other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation
is being applied.
(f) Advise the pilots if either aircraft is a heavy.
(g) Traffic advisories and wake turbulence cautionary
advisories must be issued in accordance with para 2-
1-20, Wake Turbulence Cautionary Advisories, and
para 2-1-21, Traffic Advisories.
(h) If the pilot advises he/she has the traffic in sight and
will maintain visual separation from it (the pilot
must use that entire phrase), the controller need
only "approve" the operation instead of restating the
instructions.431
430 AIM, supra note 15, at 4-4-14.
431 FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66, at 7-2-1.
126
"SEE AND AVOID" RULES
A "first priority" of each ATC controller is to warn an aircraft
that it is in dangerous proximity to another aircraft.4 2 The ATC
manual states:
2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY
a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety
alerts as required in this order. Good judgment must be
used in prioritizing all other provisions of this order based
on the requirements of the situation at hand.433
2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT
Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in
a position/altitude that, in your judgment, places it in unsafe
proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pi-
lot informs you action is being taken to resolve the situation, you
may discontinue the issuance of further alerts. Do not assume
that because someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that
the unsafe situation has been observed and the safety alert is-
sued; inform the appropriate controller.
NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-
2, Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recog-
nizes a situation of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, ob-
stacles, or other aircraft. Conditions, such as workload, traffic
volume, the quality/limitations of the radar system, and the availa-
ble lead time to react are factors in determining whether it is reason-
able for the controller to observe and recognize such situations.
While a controller cannot see immediately the development
of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a
safety alert when the situation is recognized.434
In cases where the controller's duty to maintain vigilance and
issue a safety alert are evaluated, the factors determining
whether his or her actions were "reasonable" are examined. In
the case of In re Greenwood Air Crash, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana, held that a safety alert should
have been issued, even though the controller had communica-
tion with only one of the aircraft (which was on departure from
the non-tower airport) for approximately twenty seconds prior
to impact because he had handled the other accident aircraft
and knew that aircraft was inbound to the same airport.435
432 See id. at 2-1-2.
433 Id.
434 Id. at 2-1-6 (emphasis added).
435 In re Greenwood Air Crash, 924 F. Supp. 1518, 1533-34 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
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The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that, if Fritz
had exercised reasonable care to observe and recognize that the
aircraft were on a collision course, he could have issued a safety
alert to the pilots in time for them to see the other aircraft and to
take action necessary to avoid the collision.
Fritz's failure to become aware of the unsafe proximity of the
aircraft under these circumstances was negligent. Specifically, he
knew the Saratoga intended to land at Greenwood and less than
45 seconds later he was in radio contact with an aircraft stating
that it was taking off from Greenwood. Both aircraft appeared on
Fritz's scope which showed the aircraft were on a potential colli-
sion course. The court finds that Fritz's inattention to his radar
scope was such that he was unaware of the unsafe proximity of
the Saratoga and MU-2 and his resulting failure to issue a warn-
ing or safety alert to Mullen was a breach of his primary duty to
prevent a collision between aircraft. The United States, through
its agent, Fritz, was negligent in failing to remain vigilant, to ob-
serve and recognize that the two aircraft were in unsafe proximity
to one another and on a collision course and to issue a safety
alert or warning to Mullen in time for them to see and take ac-
tion to avoid the collision.4" 6
In Air Service v. United States, the court held that the controller
had not breached his duty to issue a safety alert when an IFR
departure (in visual weather conditions) collided with an in-
bound VFR aircraft approximately three miles east of the air-
port.4 3 7 The VFR aircraft had entered the Class D airspace
without contacting the control tower.43 There was voluminous
testimony as to what could have been seen by the tower control-
ler even assuming he was vigilantly scanning.4 39
The air traffic controller did not breach any duty owed to Pilot
Mohan.
Plaintiffs allegations of a mere possibility and Beck's [the intrud-
ing aircraft] intervening cause of the collision [do not establish
such a breach].
At trial, plaintiffs conceded through expert witness Rudich that
the sole shortcoming alleged against the government was its em-
ployee's not seeing Beck's unannounced and unexpected entry,
and the failure to tell Mohan [the departing IFR aircraft] about
that sudden entry.
436 Id.
437 Air Serv., Inc. v. United States, No. GC81-245-LS-P, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12176, at *9, *41-42 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 31, 1983).
438 Id. at *8.
439 Id. at *41-42.
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The probabilities of the local controller in this case being able to
detect Beck's incoming aircraft at the minimum time and dis-
tance to issue effective traffic information was exhaustively ana-
lyzed, and the expert scientific analysis was unrebutted. Given
plaintiffs' own witnesses' various testimony regarding course,
speed, and collision location, the probabilities ranged between
the remotes of only 3 to perhaps 11%. Conversely, the likelihood
that such visual detection would not have been made is therefore
extremely high, from 89 to 97%. It is upon these narrow possibili-
ties of what perhaps might have occurred which plaintiffs based
their case; it is not based on nor does it proceed from allegations
of certainties or even more-likely-than-nots. Plaintiffs have there-
fore failed to meet their burden. Any remote chance that the air
traffic controller could or may have set in operation actions that
could have caused Pilot Mohan to evade Beck's aircraft and avoid
the head-on collision arises from conjectures and mere possibili-
ties, does not constitute negligence, and is not a proximate cause
of the head-on collision.44 °
E. 14 C.F.R. § 91.126 OPERATION ON OR IN VICINITY OF AN
AIRPORT IN CiAss G AIRSPACE
1. Introduction
This section is focused on procedures for operations at Class
G Airspace airports, including direction of turns, flap settings,
and communications. Actually unrelated to procedures, but in-
cluded in this provision, helicopters and powered parachutes
are told they must avoid the flow of fixed wing aircraft.44' Sec-
tion 91.126 is as follows:
§ 91.126 Operating on or in the vicinity of an airport in Class G
airspace.
(a) General. Unless otherwise authorized or required, each
person operating an aircraft on or in the vicinity of an air-
port in a Class G airspace area must comply with the re-
quirements of this section.
(b) Direction of turns. When approaching to land at an air-
port without an operating control tower in Class G
airspace-
(1) Each pilot of an airplane must make all turns of that
airplane to the left unless the airport displays ap-
proved light signals or visual markings indicating that
440 Id. (citing Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins, 186 So. 625 (Miss. 1939); Pargas of
Taylorsville, Inc. v. Craft, 249 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1971)).
441 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.126 (2014).
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turns should be made to the right, in which case the
pilot must make all turns to the right; and
(2) Each pilot of a helicopter or a powered parachute must avoid
the flow of fixed-wing aircraft.
(c) Flap settings. Except when necessary for training or certifi-
cation, the pilot in command of a civil turbojet-powered
aircraft must use, as a final flap setting, the minimum cer-
tificated landing flap setting set forth in the approved per-
formance information in the Airplane Flight Manual for
the applicable conditions. However, each pilot in com-
mand has the final authority and responsibility for the safe
operation of the pilot's airplane, and may use a different
flap setting for that airplane if the pilot determines that it
is necessary in the interest of safety.
(d) Communications with control towers. Unless otherwise au-
thorized or required by ATC, no person may operate an
aircraft to, from, through, or on an airport having an op-
erational control tower unless two-way radio communica-
tions are maintained between that aircraft and the control
tower. Communications must be established prior to 4
nautical miles from the airport, up to and including 2,500
feet AGL. However, if the aircraft radio fails in flight, the
pilot in command may operate that aircraft and land if
weather conditions are at or above basic VFR weather
minimums, visual contact with the tower is maintained,
and a clearance to land is received. If the aircraft radio
fails while in flight under IFR, the pilot must comply with
§ 91.185.442
2. Discussion
Section 91.126(b) (2) was first introduced in a 1960 Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking.443 Under what was then Section 60.18(b)
entitled "Controlled Airports," the following was proposed:
(6) Helicopter entry. Pilots of helicopters operating to a controlled
airport who have landed at or taken off from such airport within
the preceding 30 days shall conform to the helicopter traffic pat-
tern procedures established by the Federal Aviation Agency for
that airport. Other helicopters, unless the VFR distance-from-
cloud criteria requires otherwise, and where terrain and obsta-
cles permit, shall be flown so as to enter the airport traffic area
below 1,000 feet but not less than 800 feet above the surface.
44-2 Id. (emphasis added).
443 See Airport Traffic Area Rules, 25 Fed. Reg. 9868 (proposed Oct. 7, 1960)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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After entry an altitude between 1,000 and 800 feet shall be main-
tained as long as practicable and the approach to land shall be made
in a manner which avoids the flow of fixed-wing aircraft.444
For uncontrolled airports, helicopters were also directed to
avoid fixed wing aircraft:
(c) Uncontrolled airports...
(1) Approaching to land. When approaching for landing,
fixed-wing aircraft shall be flown so that all turns shall
be made to the left unless the airport displays light
signals or standard visual marking which have mean-
ings approved by the Administrator and which indi-
cate that all turns are to be made to the right. When
approaching for landing, helicopters shall be flown in a man-
ner which avoids the flow of fixed-wing aircraft.445
Following up on the NPRM, the final rule adopted this treat-
ment of helicopters at controlled and uncontrolled airports,
stating clearly that "helicopters shall be flown in a manner which
avoids the flow of fixed wing aircraft."4 4
6
Currently, the Code of Federal Regulations incorporates this
same treatment of helicopters under Sections 91.126, 91.127,
91.129, 91.130, and 91.131. 447 As the latter four sections merely
adopt the provisions of Section 91.126 by reference, the follow-
ing discussion will refer only to Section 91.126, though it applies
to all sections.
During the research on this provision, one central document
emerged that discusses elements of Section 91.126(b)(2). 44s
This legal opinion of the Chief Counsel's Office was asked by
the helicopter community to clarify what is now Section
91.126(b) (2) .44 The first question asked was whether a helicop-
ter can enter the traffic pattern in front of a fixed-wing air-
4 Id. at 9870 (emphasis added).
445 Id. (emphasis added).
446 Operation at Airports, 26 Fed. Reg. 9069, 9070 (Sept. 27, 1961) (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
447 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.126-.127, 91.129-.131 (2014). Sections 91.127(a) and
91.129(a) require that operations in Class E and D airspace, respectively, shall
comply with section 91.126, which includes helicopters avoiding fixed-wing air-
craft. Section 91.130(a) provides that operations in class C airspace must be con-
ducted in compliance with section 91.129, which also provides for helicopter
avoidance of fixed-wing aircraft. Id.




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
craft.45 ° The answer was no; it "shall not enter the traffic flow
utilized by fixed-wing aircraft."451 It is obligated to follow the
fixed-wing traffic, unless the helicopter is on "final approach. 452
A reading of this clearly supports the duty of a helicopter pilot
to avoid fixed-wing aircraft while entering, or in the traffic pat-
tern, unless on "short final." '453 This opinion offered that equal-
ity under the right-of-way regulation applies "to all situations,
other than when a helicopter and fixed-wing airplane are 'ap-
proaching to land' on 'short final.' 45 4
FAA Advisory Circular No. 90-66A provides pilots with recom-
mended traffic patterns and practices for operating at uncon-
trolled airports.455 It also offers information to the aviation
community on rotorcraft operations.5 6 It points out the heli-
copter pilot's duty is to avoid the flow of fixed-wing aircraft.4 57 It
also states that helicopters fly slower and approach at steeper
angles; operate at lower pattern altitudes closer to the airport
with turns to the right; and practice autorotations (engine out
emergency) with steeper angles of approach and a high rate of
descent (1,500-2,000 feet per minute).458
The AIM also provides guidance to pilots in airport opera-
tions in chapter four.4 59 However, in reviewing discussions re-
garding controlled and uncontrolled airports, no discussion of
helicopters or their duty to avoid fixed-wing aircraft was found.
A review of judicial decisions found no violations involving heli-
copters, or a failure to avoid fixed wing traffic under Section
91.126(b) (2).
Section 91.126(b) (2), and its predecessors, was adopted with-
out significant comment. Further, since adoption, it also ap-





454 Id. at 2.
455 FED. AVIATION ADMIN, ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 90-66A, RECOMMENDED STAN-
DARD TRAFFIC PATTERNS AND PRACTICES FOR AERONAUTICAL OPERATIONS OF AIR-
PORTS WITHOUT OPERATING CONTROL TowERs § 9(a) (1993) [hereinafter




459 AIM, supra note 15, at 4-3-1.
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regulation.460 Some discussion in advisory circulars exists, but it
evidences little discussion. The 1989 Assistant Chief Counsel's
opinion provides some substance to interpreting this provision,
and Advisory Circular No. 90-66A offers some rational for the
disparity in treatment of helicopters, at least while entering and
operating in an airport traffic pattern.4 61 During these times, an
enhanced responsibility to avoid other aircraft is apportioned to
helicopter pilots. 4 62 Looking ahead, the rationale behind provi-
sions like Section 91.126 may redefine the traditional see and
avoid concept to a future new category or type of aircraft.
F. 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 BAsic VFR WEATHER MINIMUMS
1. Introduction
14 C.F.R. § 91.155 sets out weather minimums for VFR opera-
tions in the various classes of airspace that comprise the Na-
tional Airspace System (NAS).463 It also sets out weather
minimums for takeoffs and landings at airports in class B, C, D,
or E airspace.464
2. Background and Analysis of Section 91.155
VFR weather minimums were established very early in regula-
tion to ensure pilots have sufficient cloud clearance and visibility
to permit aircraft operators to see and avoid other aircraft.
Though the 1927 regulations were silent on this issue,465 by
1937, VFR weather minimums had been firmly adopted.466
Under Section 60.44 entitled "Weather Minimums," day flight in
460 See Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1064-67 (9th Cir. 1987) (focusing
on what constituted a "flow" of fixed wing traffic, which must be avoided by heli-
copter operations in the landing pattern, the Court of Appeals upheld the dis-
trict court's finding of pilot negligence for landing a fixed wing airplane too
closely behind a larger military helicopter, causing an accident. Plaintiffs claim
the accident was the result of wake turbulence and that the helicopter negligently
used a left hand traffic pattern causing the turbulence. The appellate court up-
held the district court's decision that at the time of the approach and landing,
the airplane was not in the "flow" of traffic, instead it was some distance from the
airport and did not appear to be landing. To be in the flow, the airplane must be
present.).
461 See ADviSORY CiRcuLAR No. 90-66A, supra note 455, at § 9(a).
462 See id.
463 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (2014).
464 See id.
465 AERONAUTICS BRANCH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AIR COMMERCE REGULA-
TIONS, app. III (1932); see also AIR COMMERCE REGULATIONS, supra note 236.
466 See Air Traffic Rules, 2 Fed. Reg. 2181 (Oct. 14, 1937) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 60).
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control zones required one thousand feet and a visability of
three miles, and night required 1,500 feet and a visibility of five
miles.467 They were further divided into two areas, flights within
control zones and flights outside control zones.468 Cloud clear-
ances were also set at three hundred feet vertically (five hun-
dred feet in precipitation) and two thousand feet horizontal.469
However, no cloud clearance was designated for operations
above clouds.470
In 1947, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued revised Part 60-
Air Traffic Rules. 471 These displayed very little departure from
the 1937 provisions, with one exception. The 1947 rules ac-
knowledged of the introduction of a new technology. 472 Heli-
copter operations were considered for the first time.473 Unlike
airplanes, helicopters had the ability to operate at very slow air-
speeds.474 Thus, helicopters were permitted to fly outside con-
trol zones at or below seven hundred feet "at a reduced speed
which will give the pilot of such helicopter adequate opportu-
nity to see other air traffic or any obstruction in time to avoid
hazard of collisions. ' 475
In addition to recognizing helicopter operations, the 1947
regulations distinguished between "ground" and "flight" visibil-
ity.476 A definition for these two visibility criteria was provided in
Civil Air Regulations Draft Release No. 46-5, which was sent to
the aviation community for comment and recommendations.477
The resulting comments and meetings with the aviation commu-
nity were incorporated in one of the earliest NPRMs for air traf-
fic rules.4 78 The NPRM and final rule made a distinction
between ground and flight visibility, but offered no definition. 479




471 See Air Traffic Rules, 12 Fed. Reg. 5547 (Aug. 16, 1947) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 60).




476 See id. at 5549, 5551.
477 See CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS DRAFT RELEASE No. 46-5, supra note 126.
478 See Air Traffic Rules, 12 Fed. Reg. 3423 (proposed Oct. 1, 1946) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
479 See id.; Air Traffic Rules, 12 Fed. Reg. 5547 (Aug. 16, 1947) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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The language of the draft release did offer the following defini-
tion for ground visibility:
(a) when ground visibility at an airport within a control zone is
determined by an accredited observer to be less than three miles, clear-
ances for takeoff or landing or to enter the traffic pattern of such
an airport must be obtained from air traffic control, and such
clearances will be given by air traffic control if there is not inter-
ference with other aircraft.4
80
In contrast, the handling of flight visibility was described in the
draft release as follows:
(b) If an aircraft in flight is proceeding on a course which passes
through a control zone and avoids or passes over the traffic pat-
tern of the airport within the control zone, no clearance for such
flight is necessary from air traffic control provided the flight visi-
bility is at least three miles . this rule permits aircraft to pro-
ceed above an overcast or local haze conditions without
clearance from air traffic control....
While the above discussion of flight visibility does not state ex-
actly how, or who determines flight visibility, it does not prohibit
the pilot from making his or her own measurements. 482
In 1958, the CAB put out for consideration of the aviation
community the proposal to increase the minimum VFR weather
criteria.483 This proposal included: (1) increasing VFR ceiling
and visibility to 1500 feet and five miles in a high density airport;
(2) setting one mile as the "irreducible" minimum for all VFR;
(3) introducing "basic" and "special" VFR minimums; and (4)
increasing to five miles the minimums for acrobatic flight.48 4
The rational for offering these proposed changes was to see
"how much safety will be increased by raising the VFR weather
minimums and at what price to the users of the airspace." 485 The
CAB found that the proponents of a change were those operat-
ing faster aircraft, while those pilots operating slower aircraft
disagreed with a need to change VFR minimums. 486
480 CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS DRAFr RELEASE No. 46-5, supra note 126,
§ 60.200(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
481 Id.
482 See id.
483 SeeVFR Weather Minimums, 23 Fed. Reg. 6177 (Aug. 12, 1958) (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 60).
484 Id. at 6177.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 6178.
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The CAB ultimately rejected the proposal to increase visibility
minimums.487 In reviewing the accident records to date, the
CAB found no correlation that decreased visibility had been a
significant factor in collisions.4 8 Accordingly, they proposed
that reducing the number of collisions be handled by other
means, including: (1) limitations on airspeed; (2) communica-
tions in high-density airports; (3) all weather positive control
routes at higher altitudes serving faster aircraft; (4) simplifica-
tion of cruising altitudes for separation of VFR and IFR aircraft;
and (5) enhance visibility using high intensity lights and highly
luminescent paints.48 9
In the note that was added to the amended Section 60.30, the
CAB offered further insight into the rational for VFR weather
minimums:
Note: The minimum weather conditions prescribed in this sec-
tion for flights in controlled airspace are those within which a
pilot is expected to be able to observe and avoid other air traffic.
When operating in weather conditions equal to or above those
specified herein, irrespective of the type of flight plan an aircraft
may be operated under, i.e. IFR or VFR, the primary responsibil-
ity for the avoidance of collision rests with the pilot. It should be
recognized that the criteria contained herein prescribe the
"minimums" required for VFR flight. Good operating practice re-
quires that regular or continued flight in near minimum,
weather conditions be avoided.490
Regarding this note, a few points need highlighting. First, the
pilot is primarily responsible for seeing and avoiding other air-
craft. 1 Second, these minimums also apply to IFR operations
conducted under VMC conditions.49 2 Lastly, this note implies
that under some circumstances, operations at even these mini-
mums should be avoided, implying a duty on the pilot to use
higher criteria.49 ' The final regulation reflects the basic VFR
weather minimums as we know them today. The 1958 mini-
mums were:
49 4
487 Id. at 6177-78.






4 Id. at 6177.
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Table 2 - 1958 Basic VFR Minimums
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In 1967, recognizing that collision risk could be avoided by
limiting airspeed, the FAA adopted the 250 knot speed limit be-
low 10,000 feet.495 However, this restriction did not apply to air-
craft operations above 10,000 feet.496 This change did not
benefit aircraft operating at differing speeds above 10,000
feet.497
In 1968, a new weather minimum for operations above 10,000
feet was adopted to address this problem.48 To ensure that high
speed IFR aircraft did not encounter slower VFR traffic at
higher altitudes, the FAA adopted a rule requiring five statute
miles visibility and distance from clouds of 1,000 feet above and
below, and one mile horizontal.99
Overall, Section 91.155 expects a prudent pilot to obtain accu-
rate weather information, and comply with the minimums for
visibility and cloud clearances. 00 Such compliance facilitates the
495 General Operating and Flight Rules, 32 Fed. Reg. 15,708, 15,708 (Nov. 15,
1967) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
-6 See id. at 15,708-709.
497 See id.
498 See General Operating and Flight Rules, 33 Fed. Reg. 2992, 2992 (Feb. 15,
1968) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
499 Id.
500 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (2014).
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duty to observe and avoid other aircraft. 5°1 The following discus-
sion is offered to provide substance to these duties.
a. Visibility
With respect to visibility, Section 91.155 discusses two stan-
dards: (1) "ground" visibility; and (2) "flight" visibility.5 °2 Sec-
tion 91.155(a) specifies flight visibility for operations in the
various classes of airspace. ° ' Section 91.155(b) creates limited
exceptions to subpart (a) for helicopters and operations within
one half mile of the runway, without defining whether ground
or flight visibility.50 4 Section 91.155 (d) (1) and (2) specifically re-
fer to ground visibility for landings and takeoffs at Class B, C, D,
or E airports.0 5 The difference between the two, is that ground
visibility is defined by the Federal Aviation Regulations as "pre-
vailing horizontal visibility near the earth's surface as reported
by the U.S. National Weather Service or an accredited ob-
server."50 6 In contrast, flight visibility is defined as "the average
forward horizontal distance, from the cockpit of an aircraft in
flight, at which prominent unlighted objects may be seen and
identified by day and prominent lighted objects may be seen
and identified by night.150 7
In Administrator v. Harris, the NTSB Board offered definition
for a pilot's responsibility regarding the application of ground
visibility.508 In Harris, the respondent was charged with a viola-
tion of Section 91.105(d) [now Section 91.155(d)], landing at
an airport where a National Weather Service reported ground
visibility at two miles.50 9 This information was available to the
pilot, but he made no effort to obtain it.5 10 The pilot argued that
the reported visibility was inaccurate.5 11 The NTSB Board re-
jected this argument, stating "[t]he potential existence of an er-
ror in ground visibility report obtained from an [ATC] facility or
[FSS] does not alter the fact that such information constitutes
50, See id.
502 See id.
503 See id. § 91.155(a).
504 See id. § 91.155(b).
505 See id. § 91.155(d)(1)-(2).
506 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2014).
507 Id.
508 Adm'r v. Harris, 5 N.T.S.B. 785, 785-87 (1985).
5- Id. at 788-89.
510 Id. at 786.
511 Id. at 785-86.
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reported visibility within the purview of [Section 91.155(d)]. ' 12
Is it permissible for the pilot to substitute his first hand cockpit
observations of visibility for ground reported visibility? In an ear-
lier case, Administrator v. Kokkonen, the NTSB Board's response
was no.511 In Kokkonen, the reported ground visibility was less
than three miles and available to all pilots through numerous
sources.5 14 Respondent argued that his cockpit observations
found the visibility at all times above three miles.5 15 The NTSB
Board rejected this as irrelevant, stating "[f] light visibility, which
is measured forward from the cockpit of the aircraft, cannot be
used as a substitute for ground visibility. '516 The NTSB Board's
rationale was that in marginal weather, if every pilot is permitted
to make an individual and subjective determination on ground
visibility, chaos would result.5
17
However, a later NTSB Board decision somewhat clouds this
question. In Administrator v. Rolund, the NTSB Board ruled that
official reported weather regarding visibility was not necessarily
controlling under Section 91.155 (d) (1).518 In Rolund, the NTSB
Board permitted the weighing of various sources of information,
including respondent's own estimates of visibility.519 An official
report made approximately thirty minutes prior to takeoff called
for one and one half miles of visibility.5 20 A certified weather
observer reported three miles of visibility approximately thirty
minutes after takeoff.5 21 At the time of takeoff, one and one half
miles was the last reported visibility, half of the required three
miles. 2 It appears that respondent checked only his company's
computer system for weather.5 23 He did not seek the then-cur-
rent reported weather, including visibility, from any other
sources. 524 Based on these facts, the Administrative Law Judge
512 Id. at 786.
513 Adm'r v. Kokkonen, 4 N.T.S.B. 881, 882 (1983).
514 Id. at 881-82.
515 Id. at 881.
516 Id.
517 Id. at 882.
518 See generally Adm'r v. Rolund, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3991 (1993).
519 Id. at *2.
520 Id. at *4.
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(ALJ) found the respondent in violation of Section
91.105(d) (1) [now Section 91.155(d) (1)].525
However, on appeal, the NTSB Board reversed, finding no vi-
olation. 526  According to the NTSB Board, [Section
91.155(d) (1)] "states only that visibility must be 3 miles. It does
not direct how that weather determination is to be made[] "527
For the proposition that official weather reports may be impor-
tant, but not controlling, the Board cited Administrator v.
Gaub.528
While on its face this conclusion conflicts with our previous
discussion, there are some concerns associated with the ratio-
nale and conclusions contained in Rolund.529 First, the conclu-
sion that Section 91.155(d) (1) does not direct how weather
determinations are made and makes no reference to use of "offi-
cial weather" information ignores that this section deals only
with visibility for takeoff and landings, and that Section
91.155(d) (1) clearly specifies "ground" visibility is to be used.53 °
Though Section 91.155 (d) (1) does not reference a requirement
for using official reported weather,5 1' 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 specifically
states that "ground" visibility will come from the National
Weather Service or an accredited observer.53 2 Second, Gaub is
offered as support that official reports for visibility are not con-
trolling. In fact, Gaub involved cloud clearances and respondent
in that case was cited for a violation of what is now Section
91.155(c), which deals solely with cloud clearance, not
visibility. 533
Perhaps Rolund stands as support for a narrow exception,
where the official reported weather is so questionable as to be
deemed unreliable, takeoff can be made based on sufficient
"flight" visibility, under Section 91.155 (d) (2).
525 Id. at *6.
526 Id. at *3.
527 Id. at *2.
528 Id. Gaub is considered in detail under the following discussion of cloud
clearances.
529 The following are opinions and observations of the authors.
530 See 14 C.F.R. 91.155(d) (2014).
531 See id.
532 See id.
533 See Adm'r v. Gaub, 5 N.T.S.B. 1653, 1655 (1986).
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b. Cloud Clearance
Cloud clearances can be determined by many sources, includ-
ing the pilot's own observations. Whether the pilot's estimates
will be adopted as correct depends on the weight given to it over
other competing sources of measurement. This was the case in
Gaub.534 In that case, an airman was held to have violated Sec-
tion 91.155(c) (then 91.105 (c)) for operating in a control zone
when the cloud ceiling was allegedly less than 1,000 feet. 535 The
respondent contended that the ceiling he observed was greater
than 1,000 feet.5 36 The observations of others on the airport in-
dicated less than one thousand feet.537 The ALJ initially ruled
that a pilot could not substitute his judgment for officially re-
ported weather.5 38 However, on appeal, the NTSB Board dis-
agreed with the ALJ.5 9 The NTSB Board reasoned that since
weather is dynamic, if the weather has deteriorated since the last
weather report, the pilot should be able to substitute his judg-
ment in the interest of safety. 540 Whether the pilot's estimate is
accepted over other estimates will be based on a credibility de-
termination by the ALJ.54 If the pilot's estimate is found most
credible, he prevails. 542 However, the Board added that if a pilot
does substitute his judgment, he is still required to comply with
Section 91.155(c) .
c. Pilot's Duty to "See and Avoid" and to be Seen and
Avoided
As stated earlier, weather minimums were established for
flights in controlled airspace to enable a vigilant pilot to see and
avoid other aircraft. Even under IFR, the pilot is primarily re-
sponsible for collision avoidance when weather conditions per-
mit. In short, weather minimums serve as support for the pilot's
duty of vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft.
A pilot's duty to comply with VFR weather minimums dove-
tails with the duty to be vigilant for other aircraft. Compliance
534 See generally id.
535 Id. at 1654.
536 Id.
537 Id. at 1655.
538 Id.
539 Id.
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also enables the other aircraft pilots to meet their correspond-
ing duties to see and avoid the pilot's aircraft. In Administrator v.
Richey, the NTSB Board addressed the consequences of failing to
meet this responsibility.5 44 A general aviation (GA) pilot operat-
ing under VFR had a near collision with an Air Force T-38 jet
operating under IFR.545 The GA pilot was found in violation of
Section 91.105(a) (now Section 91.155(a)), in that he failed to
maintain a five hundred feet vertical clearance below clouds. 546
Pursuant to Section 91.113(b), even when an IFR aircraft en-
counters VMC conditions, the duty to see and avoid attaches to
that pilot; respondent's operation too close to the cloud base
prevented detection by the jet.5 47 The court stated "[i] t is imper-
ative, however, that VFR aircraft, when transiting controlled air-
space, maintain the separation from clouds prescribed by
[Section 91.115]. It was respondent's failure to remain at least
500 feet below the cloud deck which led to the near collision,
since respondent's aircraft was not in a position from which it
could see, and be seen by, other aircraft such as the T-38. ' '548 In
addition to facilitating a pilot's responsibility to see other air-
craft, complying with weather minimums also facilitates the
other pilot's duty to see and avoid opposing aircraft. 549 The rele-
vant sections of the Aeronautical Information Manual are set
out in Appendix C.
G. 14 C.F.R. § 91.185 IFR OPERATIONS: Two-WAY RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE.
Section 91.183 requires that, "[u]nless otherwise authorized
by ATC, the pilot in command of each aircraft operated under IFR
in controlled airspace must ensure that a continuous watch is
maintained on the appropriate frequency... . Section 91.185
establishes the course of action required of the pilot if commu-
nications are lost between the pilot and ATC while operating on
an IFR flight plan.5 1
5- See generally Adm'r v. Richey, 2 N.T.S.B. 734 (1974).
545 Id. at 737.
546 Id. at 741 (finding Richey was no more than 300 feet below the clouds).
547 Id. at 736-37.
54 Id. at 735.
549 Id. at 736-37.
550 14 C.F.R. § 91.183 (2014) (emphasis added).
551 See generally id. § 91.185. Section 91.185 addresses communication between
the pilot and ATC. We found cases or other references regarding this regulation
relating to a loss of flight control communication between a pilot in a "ground
cockpit" and a remotely piloted aircraft. Assuming the pilot on the ground can
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Section 91.185 is set out in its entirety in Appendix B. The
primary requirement under the regulation is that, if the commu-
nications failure occurred in visual conditions or visual condi-
tions are encountered after the failure, the pilot must remain
VFR and land as soon as practicable. 52 This requires the pilot to
maintain his own separation using the see and be seen rules in
VFR conditions.
If visual conditions do not exist, then Section 91.185 provides
that the pilot comply with specific rules regarding routing, alti-
tude and clearance limits.553 Since pilots are required to obey
the aviation regulations, ATC will be able to predict the pilot's
course of action during periods of "lost communication." Any
exception to following the specified routes, altitudes and times
must be based upon an emergency requiring "immediate"
action.554
Relevant provisions of the AIM are set out in Appendix C.
IV. REGULATIONS FACILITATING "SEE AND AVOID"
RESONSIBILITY
A. 14 C.F.R. § 91.105 FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS AT STATIONS
1. Introduction
The majority of this regulation is directed at the use of seat
belts and shoulder harnesses. However, Section 91.105 (a) (1) re-
quires that crewmember be at his or her station, unless absence
still communicate with ATC by radio or telephone, the situation is analogous to a
manned aircraft pilot maintaining communication with ATC while the fly-by-wire
digital flight control system fails, leaving the pilot without control of his own air-
craft. While this would likely cause an emergency if the airplane were completely
out of control, since there has been no loss of communication between the pilot
and ATC (which is the subject of the regulation), section 91.185 does not apply.
However, if the control link is severed and the aircraft reverts to automatic opera-
tion (the "automatic pilot" takes over), the de facto automatic "pilot" is not com-
municating with ATC or the human pilot, but neither is the aircraft out of
control or in immediate danger. In such situations, it is likely that section 91.185
would apply, as the objective of the regulation is to supply ATC with predictability
in the event of lost communications so that the appropriate airspace may be
cleared and midair collisions prevented. Accordingly, the "automatic pilot" as-
sumes the same duty of compliance (for routing, altitudes and times) with sec-
tion 91.185 as the human pilot, unless a certificate of waiver or authorization
(COA) specifies differently. In other words, the "lost communications" addressed
by section 91.185 and "loss of control link" which may be encountered by an
unmanned aircraft are different.
552 See generally id.
5 See id.
554 See AIM, supra note 15, at 6-6-1 (a)-(c).
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is necessary. As we shall see, this requirement was put in place to
ensure that the pilot is at his or her seat and "vigilant" to the
greatest extent possible. The duty to be vigilant is the corner-
stone of the see and avoid concept. Section 91.105 is set out in
Appendix B.
2. Discussion
Section 91.105 (a) (1) had its origin in 1959,255 and under Civil
Aviation Regulations read as follows:
Section 60.26 Flight Crew Members at Controls
All required flight crew members when on flight deck duty shall
remain at their respective stations while the aircraft is taking off
or landing, and while en route except when the absence of one
such flight crew member is necessary for the performance of his
duties in connection with the operation of the aircraft. All flight
crew members shall keep their seat belts fastened when at their
respective stations. 5 6
This provision had previously been in place for air carrier op-
erations.557 Importantly, the rationale for this requirement was
"[t] he absence of a flight crew member from his duty station for
the performance of such activities reduces unnecessarily the de-
gree of vigilance, attention to duty, and availability for emergency
action . . .under conditions of high density traffic. '558 Section
60.26 extended the reach to include all aircraft operations, civil
and military (public aircraft) .59 Constant vigilance was deemed
important for all aircraft operations. 560 This rulemaking narra-
tive clarified what was intended by the exception for leaving
one's station, that is when it is necessary for the "performance of
his duties in connection with the operation of the aircraft. 561
This exception was "not intended to encompass activities related
to furthering public relations or other activities not related to
operational safety of the airplane.5 6 2
555 See Absence of Flight Crew Members from Their Duty Stations and Right of
Way, 24 Fed. Reg. 3153, 3155 (1959).
556 14 CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS § 60.26 (1962).
557 See Absence of Flight Crew Members from Their Duty Stations and Right of
Way, 24 Fed. Reg. at 3155.
558 Id. at 3154 (emphasis added).
559 See id. at 3155.
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This regulation remained in place until 1965.563 At that time
the FAA acknowledged that there were some misunderstandings
in the aviation community as to what was an acceptable reason
for a crewmember's absence from his duty station.564 The
Agency reaffirmed that a crewmember's comfort and physical
alertness was also necessary.565 To clear up any confusion, the
phrase "or in connection with his physiological needs" was ad-
ded to this provision.566
How long may one crewmember be absent? In her memoran-
dum, the Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations (AGC-200) re-
sponded to this question, as well as the issue of sleeping during
an unaugmented controlled rest period.567 In its response, the
FAA stated there were only two instances that a crewmember
could leave his station. First, to perform duties in connection
with the operation of the aircraft. Second, in connection with
physiological needs.56 s Sleep is not considered in connection
with operation of the aircraft, and therefore not a permitted rea-
son for absence under the regulation.5 69 Regarding physiologi-
cal needs, the memo stated "the 'physiological needs' exception
has been interpreted narrowly to only permit short breaks for
activities such as using the restroom or stretching one's limbs
briefly during a long flight. 570
A crewmember's time away from his or her station must also
be reasonable. In Administrator v. Brown, the NTSB Board found
that a first officer's absence of twenty to thirty minutes on three
occasions was unreasonable and substantially in excess of what
was required to satisfy any physiological needs (i.e., use the rest-
room).5 In summary, crewmembers are expected to be at their
stations and vigilant, and any absence must be necessary and as




567 FED. AvIATION ADMIN., OPINION OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL FOR REGU-
LATIONS, AGC-200 (Jan. 20, 2012), available at www.faa.gov/about/office org/
headquarters-offices/agc/pol-adjudication/agc2OO/interpretations/data/in-
terps/2012/cintron-afs-800%20-%20 (2012) %201egal%20interpretation.pdf (In-
terpretation as to whether Part 91 allows a required pilot to take an in-flight rest
period on an unaugmented flight as an augmented flight, would have a qualified





571 See generally Adm'r v. Brown, 1 N.T.S.B. 2041 (1972).
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brief as possible, only long enough to perform duties in connec-
tion with the operation of the aircraft or to meet physiological
needs. 2
B. 14 C.F.R. § 91.117 AJRCRAFT SPEED
1. Introduction
14 C.F.R. § 91.117 establishes maximum airspeed restrictions
for aircraft operating at certain altitudes and within designated
airspace classes. It also provides for authorizing exceptions
through the Administrator or ATC. The current regulation is set
forth in Appendix B.
2. History of Section 91.117
At the time of the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938,573 the 1938 air traffic rules contained no restrictions on
airspeeds.5 74 By 1947, it appears that aircraft speed had in-
creased significantly and the CAB went out to the aviation com-
munity seeking comments on several issues, including airspeeds,
for future regulatory action.575 Providing some background, this
document noted that in years prior to 1947 aircraft speeds were
from seventy to 150 mph.176 However, by the time of the draft
release, aircraft speeds of 450 mph were possible and at that
speed they required:
[A]t least six times as much visibility in order to see and avoid
other traffic with an equal degree of safety .... Furthermore, our
present proximity-to-cloud rules should be reconsidered with
view toward a more practicable "see and be seen" rule which
would place the responsibility on each pilot to give due regard to
the speed at which he is flying and to remain a sufficient distance
from any cloud or cloud formation to enable him to observe
other air traffic in time to avoid any hazard of collision. 77
This document clearly acknowledges a relationship between visi-
bility, cloud clearances and speed in facilitating the see and
avoid rule. It appears that the issue of speed was to be handled
by each pilot and not rulemaking.
572 See id. at 2042-44.
573 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
574 See generally id.
575 CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS DRAvr RELEASE No. 46-5, supra note 126, pt. 18.
576 See id.
577 Id.
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In 1957, the Civil Aeronautics Board adopted aircraft speed
limits for the first time. 578 This rule was directed at "high density
air traffic zones," and is set out in Appendix B.
By 1963, the new Federal Aviation Agency had recodified the
regulations so that speed restrictions were now contained in the
new Part 91, and their reach was extended to below 10,000 feet
and within thirty miles of an airport.579 The specific language of
the resulting provision was:
§ 91.75 Operating on or in the Vicinity of an Airport; General
Rules.
(c) Speed. No person may operate-
(1) An arriving aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL within 30
nautical miles of an airport of intended landing (or
an airport where a simulated approach is to be made)
at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288
mph); or
(2) Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC, any
aircraft within an airport traffic area at an indicated
airspeed of more than-
(i) In the case of a reciprocating engine aircraft, 156
knots (180 mph);
(ii) In the case of a turbine-powered aircraft, 200
knots (230 mph).
However, if the minimum airspeed required by the operat-
ing limitations of an aircraft or by military normal operat-
ing procedures is greater than the maximum speed
prescribed in this paragraph, the aircraft may be operated
at the minimum airspeed.-58
In 1968, the new FAA considered the issue of speed. While
acknowledging that developing technology might also enhance
safety, the FAA was not ready to wait for this future develop-
ment. s l The 250-knot LAS was applied to all aircraft below ten
thousand feet.58 2 Other speed restrictions were set for opera-
tions within airport traffic areas.5 83
578 14 C.F.R. § 60.18 (1960).
579 See Proposed Recodification of Air Traffic and General Operating Rules, 28
Fed. Reg. 1004 (1963).
580 Id.
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By 1993, Section 91.117 as we know it today, was in place and
reflected the newly established airspace designations (i.e., class
A, B, C, etc.).584
3. Analysis of Section 91.117
The authors have found little formal discussion to indicate
that airspeed limits were being considered or proposed. The
1946 Civil Air Regulations Draft Release No. 46-5, discussed
above, did acknowledge that aircraft speeds were becoming a
concern. Speed, coupled with visibility and proximity-to-cloud
rules, all factored into the "see and avoid" rule. It did not pro-
pose a regulatory change, but did place responsibility on the pi-
lot to give due regard to airspeed.
The first speed restrictions were put in place at designated
"high density air traffic zones."58 5 The rational for this was "to
facilitate movement of traffic in the zone under VFR conditions
in a safer and more efficient manner. '5 6 In its 1968 NPRM, the
FAA substantiated the rationale behind the 250-knot limitation
below 10,000 feet:
Where flight operations are permitted on a see and avoid basis in
congested airspace, and in visibility as low as 3 miles, airspeeds
must be limited if an acceptable standard of safety is to be main-
tained. It is therefore proposed to establish 250 knots as the max-
imum permissible indicated airspeed for all aircraft operating
below 10,000 feet MSL.5s7
Then-recent studies were used to show that a pilot would not see
another aircraft on a collision course before the aircraft were
within two miles of one another. 5s8 Further, studies found that
upon sighting the other aircraft, a pilot requires ten seconds to
determine if a collision is imminent and to take evasive ac-
tion.58 9 With both aircraft at the 250-knot speed, seeing an air-
craft at two miles provides a window of only twelve seconds or
less.59° This is not the first time the see and avoid concept was
aligned with the "10 second" rule; in addition to the Administra-
tor authorizing a deviation, the 1968 rule permitted aircraft una-
ble to meet the 250-knot standard to operate at their minimum
584 See generally Airspace Reclassification, 58 Fed. Reg. 43553 (1993).
585 See 14 C.F.R. § 60.18 (1960).
586 Air Trafric Rules, 22 Fed. Reg. 814 (9157).
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safe airspeed, if that airspeed was above the regulation's maxi-
mum. 9' One can see that flight altitude and airspace class are
controlling, not the type of flight plan being flown.
a. Authorized Deviations
Under Section 91.117(a) and (b), deviations may be permit-
ted. Under Section 91.117(a), permission to deviate for opera-
tions below ten thousand feet must come from the
"administrator. 5 92 This has been interpreted to mean "only the
Administrator [of the FAA], or any person to whom he has dele-
gated his authority for this matter, may issue a deviation from
the speed requirement. . . . The authority to authorize such
deviation is delegated the Flight Standards Service. '' 9 However,
for U.S. registered aircraft operating outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States, Section 91.703(a) (3) precludes
application of the speed restriction contained in Section
91.117(a), even if the aircraft is operating in airspace that is
under U.S. control.594
Under Section 91.117(b), ATC may authorize deviations from
the two hundred knot limitation.59 5 Any authorized ATC devia-
tion may not exceed the 250 knot limit below ten thousand
feet.59 6 Deviations to speeds greater than 250 knots would re-
quire the Administrator's approval, pursuant to Section
91.117(a) .5 The relevant portions of the Aeronautical Informa-
tion Manual and relevant FAA orders can be found in Appendix
C.
C. 14 C.F.R. § 91.181 COURSE TO BE FLOWN
The full text of 14 C.F.R. § 91.181 is seet out in Appendix B.
This regulation clearly requires flight on an airway to be on the
centerline of the airway and flight on other assigned routes to
591 14 C.F.R. § 91.70 (1968).
592 14. C.F.R. § 91.117(a).
593 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OPINION OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL FOR REGU-
LATIONS, AGC-200 (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_
org/headquartersoffices/agc/poladjudication/agc200/interpretations/ data/
interps/2011/bonilla%20-%20 (2011) %20legal%20interpretation.pdf.
594 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OPINION OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL FOR REGU-
LATIONS, AGC-200 (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/of-
fice-org/headquarters-offices/agc/polIadjudication/agc2OO/interpretations/
data/interps/2008/davis-afs-201%20-%20 (2008) %20legal%20interpretation.pdf.
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be on a "direct" course.598 However, the second sentence of par-
agraph (b) seems to indicate that "see and avoid" maneuvering
is allowable only while on direct routes. 99 If the regulation is
interpreted in this manner, however, it directly conflicts with
Section 91.113, which requires all aircraft in visual conditions
(including those on IFR flight plans) to comply with the right-
of-way rules and to maneuver as necessary in order to see and
avoid potential conflicting traffic.600
The source of the ambiguity in Section 91.181 apparently
stems from a 1989 amendment of the general operating and
flight rules which was supposed to make the regulations, "more
understandable and easier to use. '60 1 No substantive changes
were made to Section 181, but the section was condensed and
renumbered.60 2 The pre-amendment section (numbered as
91.123) was as follows:
§ 91.123 Course to be Flown.
Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, no person may operate an
aircraft within controlled airspace, under IFR, except as follows:
(a) On a Federal airway, along the centerline of that airway.
(b) On any other route, along the direct course between the
navigational aids or fixes defining that route.
However, this section does not prohibit maneuvering the aircraft
to pass well clear of other air traffic or the maneuvering of the
aircraft, in VFR conditions to clear the intended flight path both
before and during climb or descent. 6 3
Note that the last sentence of the pre-amendment regulation
is a stand-alone paragraph which refers to the previous para-
graph that contains both subparagraphs (a) and (b).604 Further,
this final paragraph (allowing collision avoidance maneuvering
in visual conditions) uses the term "section" which indicates that
the entire section (meaning Section 91.123) is subject to its
terms.605
The 1989 amendment simply condensed the last paragraph
into subparagraph (b), thereby causing possible confusion as to
598 See id.
599 See id.
600 See id. § 91.113.
60, Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 34284 (Aug. 18, 1989) (effective Aug. 16, 1990).
There were substantive changes as well, but section 181 was not one of them.
602 Id.
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its applicability to subparagraph (a) as well.60 6 However, the
word "section" is still used in the current regulation (91.181),
indicating that the sentence applies to the whole section, re-
gardless of the fact that it currently resides only under subpara-
graph (b).607 It would seem that the 1989 amendment was not in
accordance with generally accepted standards of statutory con-
struction, especially since the goal of the amendment was simpli-
fication and not substantive change.
Relevant portions of the AIM can be found in Appendix C.
D. 14 C.F.R. § 91.209 AIRCRAFT LIGHTS
1. Introduction
14 C.F.R. § 91.209(a) prohibits the operation of aircraft from
sunset to sunrise (with special criteria for the State of Alaska)
unless position lights are lighted.60 8 Section 91.209(b) provides
that aircraft equipped with an anti-collision light system, must
have that light on at all times, unless, the PIC determines that
safety interests require that it be turned off.6 0 9 The current regu-
lation is set forth in Appendix B.
2. History of Section 91.209
Aircraft position lights, their location, and color has its origins
in maritime law.610 The first regulations of 1927 provided for the
location and intensity of position lights and landing lights under
its Air Traffic Rules; these rules can be found in Appendix B.
Interestingly, the lighting requirements were contained in the
air traffic rules, which are the responsibility of the aircraft opera-
tor, or pilot.611 At that time, therefore, the responsibility for
lighting was with the operator, not the manufacturer. This may
reflect that early lighting was an "after market" consideration.
By 1938, the lighting requirement had shifted to the aircraft
manufacturer; Section 04 of the regulations outlines the re-
quirements for airworthiness, including lighting, and Section 15
outlines the minimum requirements for equipment that is to
606 See id. § 91.183.
607 See id.
608 14 C.F.R. § 91.209 (2013).
609 Id.
610 See generally 33 C.F.R. § 83.21 (2012).
611 See AIR COMMERCE PFGULATIONS, supra note 236, §§ 30, 76.
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meet Section 04.612 Also in this version, the light intensity stan-
dard had changed from a measure of visibility miles to
"candlepower. ' 613
Jumping forward to 1963, the lighting systems in place were
contained in the FARs and were recodified under the current
Part 91.614 The new Section 91.33 required for VFR night opera-
tions that the aircraft have both position lights and anticollision
lights for large aircraft or other aircraft if required by its airwor-
thiness certificate. 615 The new Section 91.73 required that the
position lights be on during periods of darkness.61 6 It did not,
however, contain a similar requirement that the anticollision
lights be on.617 Correcting this discrepancy in 1976, the FAA
proposed an addition to Section 91.73, which would require
that an installed anticollision light would also need to be
lighted.618 The final rule was adopted in 1978, and added sub-
section (b), which requires lighted anticollision lights, unless
the PIC finds it in the best interest of safety to turn it off.619 In
adopting this rule change, the FAA acknowledged the use of
strobe lights as an anticollision light.620
In 1989, the recodification of Part 91, Section 91.73 became
the new Section 91.209 as we know it today.6 21
3. Summary of Section 91.209
Throughout the history of this regulation, we find that the
responsibility to see and avoid at night relies heavily on aircraft
lighting. At the outset, in 1928 it was felt the lighting of the left
and right positions lights must be sufficient to be seen at least
two miles. The white rear position light needed to be seen at
three miles. The range of visibility conforms to VFR visibility re-
quirement of three miles discussed in Section 91.155.622 The two
to three mile standard also correlates with the "10 second rule"
612 AERONAUTICS BRANCH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AIR COMMERCE REGULA-
TIONS (1938).
613 See id. at 15.204.





618 Operations Review Program, 41 Fed. Reg. 56280, 56283 (1976).
619 Operations Review Program, 43 Fed. Reg. 22636, 22640 (1978).
620 Id. at 22637.
621 54 Fed. Reg. 34282, 34306 (1989).
622 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (2014).
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previously discussed in Section 1I.B. 6 21 Section 91.209 ensures
that the distance established to see and avoid during day VFR
operations is also preserved while operating at night.6 24
While use of the anticollision light contains an exception if
the PIC deems its use a safety problem, use of the position lights
cannot be waived by the PIC. As stated by the ALJ in Administra-
tor v. Simonye, "[Section 91.209] specifies, without exception, that
no person may, during the period from sunset to sunrise, oper-
ate an aircraft unless it has lighted position lights. '625 Stressing
the seriousness of lighting,the ALJ found a violation in this case
even though the balloon operated without lighted position
lights for only fifteen minutes after official sunset.626
Section 91.209(b) was added in 1996 and requires that all air-
craft equipped with anticollision lights, "to operate those lights
during all operations, including daytime VFR. '627 Section
91.209(a), in contrast, carries on the long established require-
ment that the use of position lights be demanded only between
sunset and sunrise. 628
Relevent FAA Circulars are set out in Appendix C.
V. REGULATIONS PROVIDING FOR USEAGE OF
ENHANCED SYSTEMS
A third objective of this research. was to identify how systems
have been used to supplement or replace previously identified
"See and Avoid" responsibilities. The authors identified two. sec-
tions that met this requirement in our review of 14 C.F.R. Part
91.
First, 14 C.F.R. § 91.221 requires that all aircraft equipped
with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
shall have that system on and operating.629 TCAS I, II and III
utilize interrogations and replies from airborne transponders.630
TCAS I provides traffic advisories to the pilot.63 ' TCAS II pro-
623 See infra Part II.B.
624 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.209.
625 Adm'r v. Simonye, 4 N.T.S.B. 159 (1982) (ALJ's original decision) (re-
manded on unrelated issue).
626 See id. at 165.
627 Airworthiness Standards, Systems and Equipment Rules Based on European
Joint Aviation Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 5151, 5164 (1996).
628 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.209(a)
629 See id. § 91.221.
630 SeeJames V. Kucher & Ann C. Drumm, The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoid-
ance System, 16 LINCOLN LABORATORYJ. 277, 279-80 (2007).
631 See id. at 281.
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vides traffic advisories and resolution advisories (RA) in the ver-
tical plane.63 2 TCAS III provides traffic advisories and RAs to the
pilot in the vertical and horizontal planes.63 3 Under Part 91, the
pilot is authorized to deviate in response to a TCAS RA.634
The second system providing supplemental and enhanced
"see and avoid" is ADS-B, and 14 C.F.R. § 91.225 defines the im-
plementation of this system.635 This technology does not require
ground based radar interrogations; rather, it relies on onboard
equipment to provide surveillance information to ATC and
eventually other airborne users. 6 After January 1, 2020, all air-
craft (with limited exceptions) will be required to have this tech-
nology installed.637 The following discussions elaborate on these
technologies.
A. 14 C.F.R. § 91.221 TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION
AVOIDANCE SYSTEM EQUIPMENT AND USE
1. Introduction
Section 91.221 requires that aircraft with traffic alert and colli-
sion avoidance systems (TCAS) installed will utilize approved
equipment and that equipment be on and operating. 3 8 Part 91
does not require installation, however, Part 121, 135, 125, and
129 operations mandate use of TCAS for certain passenger con-
figurations.63 9 Section 91.221 is set out in Appendix B.
2. Statutory and Regluatory Background
Interest in collision avoidance systems began in 1955 with the
ATA and aviation industry proposing a back up system to the
FAA's ground based radar for enhanced separation in areas
where surveillance coverage was lacking. 640 In the 1970s these
632 Id.
633 Id.
634 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.123.
635 See generally id. § 91.225.
636 Fact Sheet - Automatic Responent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), FAA.Gov,
www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/news-story.cfm?newsid=7131 (last visited Oct. 1,
2014).
637 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.225.
6- See id. § 91.221.
639 These regulatory provisions and their full citations are shown in Appendix
B.
4 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, 52 Fed. Reg. 32268 (1987).
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efforts centered on using signals from aircraft transponders as
the basis for collision avoidance systems.641
On December 30, 1987, the Airport and Airway Safety and
Capacity Expansion Act of 1987 became law.642 Section 203 of
that act required that the Administrator complete development
of TCAS systems, and within eighteen months develop and cer-
tify TCAS II systems, and within thirty months of that certifica-
tion, have regulations in place to require its use on civil aircraft
with seating capacity of more than thirty seats.643
Following this act, the FAA published an NPRM to propose
regulatory changes to require TCAS I or II on aircraft operating
under Parts 121, 125, 135, and 129 of the FARs, and proposing
implementation within three to five years of the final rule.644
Comments from the industry were encouraged.645 On January
10, 1989, the FAA published the final rule requiring the installa-
tion and use of TCAS. 646 This rule adopted the following sched-
ule of compliance: 647
FIGURE 3: TCAS FINAL RULE COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE
T'W" ,,MW • I* a TU M I I .
As shown, air carriers are required to have TCAS I or Il de-
pending on seating capacity.648 In contrast Part 91 operators
were not required to install TCAS; installation for Part 91 opera-
tors was, and continues to be, voluntary." 9 Section 91.221 does
require that on all TCAS-equipped U.S. registered civil aircraft,
whether TCAS is installed by regulation or voluntary, it must be
641 Id.
642 See generally Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-223, 101 Stat. 794 (1987).
-3 See id.
- Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, 52 Fed. Reg. 32268, 32276
(1987).
-5 See id.
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turned on and operating.650 For 121, 125, and 129, passenger
operation compliance was directed to be by December 30,
1991.651 Part 135 had until February 9, 1995.652
Implementation did not go as anticipated, and in 1994, the
FAA acknowledged that development and testing, equipment
complexity, and supplemental type certification of TCAS I justi-
fied extending the compliance date for Part 121, 129, and 135
passenger operators to December 31, 1995.653
In 2003, responding to the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Invest-
ment and Reform Act (AIR-21), 654 the FAA required that all
cargo aircraft of a certain weight also be equipped with TCAS.6 55
In addition, this final rule also established the compliance dates
currently contained in the FARs for 121, 125, and 129 operators
contained in Appendix B.656
3. Analysis of Section 91.221
Today, operations under Part 91 do not require the installa-
tion of TCAS equipment. However, for those Part 91 operators
who chose to voluntarily install this equipment, and for all air
and cargo carriers who are required to have this equipment,
TCAS must be on and operating. In addition to Section 91.221,
TCAS is covered by Section 91.123(a,), which provides that no
PIC may deviate from an ATC clearance, except if amended
clearance is obtained, if there is an emergency, or the deviation is
in response to a TCAS resolution advisory (RA).657
650 14 C.F.R. § 90.221 (2014).
651 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, 54 Fed. Reg. 940, 950-51
(1989).
652 Id.
653 Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems, 59 Fed. Reg. 67584 (1994).
654 See generally Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act (AIR-21),
Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2003).
655 Collision Avoidance Systems, 68 Fed. Reg. 15884, 15884 (2003).
656 Id. at 15902-03.
657 14 C.F.R. § 91.123(a) (2014):
Compliance with ATC clearances and instructions.
(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in com-
mand may deviate from that clearance unless an amended clear-
ance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is in
response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolu-
tion advisory. However, except in Class A airspace, a pilot may
cancel an IFR flight plan if the operation is being conducted in
VFR weather conditions. When a pilot is uncertain of an ATC
clearance, that pilot shall immediately request clarification from
ATC.
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The authors searched for any judicial interpretation of Sec-
tion 91.221 but found none. The authors would not anticipate
violations of this provision; the regulation requires only that if
TAS is installed that it be on and operational. It is unlikely a
PIC would not use this valuable tool if it were available.
In contrast, violations of Section 91.123(a) have occurred.
Some of the deviations in those cases were identified by a TCAS
warning. For instance, in Administrator v. Ted Ray Moore, the cap-
tain of a DC-10 wandered off course while lining up for a runway
at Los Angeles International Airport.6 58 He came close enough
to a Boeing 747 that TCAS in both aircraft issued warnings."'
In Brehmer v. FAA, two air carrier flights were flying at 39,000
feet; one eastbound and the other westbound on the same
line.66 ° The ATC controller failed to notice they were on a head-
on collision course and took no action.661 One aircraft did ask
ATC about the other aircraft heading toward it, but before ATC
could respond, TCAS alerted both pilots and each took evasive
action.662 In this case, TCAS averted a serious and possibly fatal
incident involving many passengers onboard these flights.6 63
The ALJ noted that in the FAA's supporting comments for re-
moval of the controller, the agency stated " [w] ere it not for the
TCAS alert in each aircraft, a tragic accident could have resulted
with the loss of hundreds of lives and millions of dollars in prop-
erty damage. 664 Consistent with Section 91.123(a), the devia-
tion from ATC clearance was the result of a TCAS RA. Relevant
sections of the AIM are set out in Appendix C.
4. FAA Advisory Circulars
Advisory Circular 120-55C contains significant information for
air carriers relating to installation, training, and inflight use of
TCAS 11.665 It also notes that the information contained in this
document is not the only means to address TCAS issues.666
658 Adm'r v. Ted Ray Moore, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4992, at *1 (2002).
659 See id.
660 Brehmer v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 294 F.3d 1344, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(involving a controller's appeal of an arbitrator's decision upholding the control-
ler's removal).




665 See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A.C. 120-55C, WITH CHG. 1, AmR CApIEjR
OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND USE OF TCAS 11 (2013) [hereinafter A.C. 120-55C].
666 See id. at 1.
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Advisory Circular 90-48C (1983) emphasizes the "see and
avoid" concept and alerts pilots to problem areas relating to
human factors issues to enhance scanning to reduce midair col-
lisions.667 While focused on visual surveillance under Part 91, it
is included in this section to reconfirm that the see and avoid
concept applies equally to IFR, as well as VFR. Access to onboard
TCAS equipment should not negate the need for visual surveil-
lance. AC 90-48C is set out in Appendix C.
5. Implementation of TCAS in the National Airspace System
The following is a general description of TCAS by the FAA:
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is an
airborne system developed by the FAA that operates indepen-
dently from the ground-based Air Traffic Control (ATC) system.
TCAS was designed to increase cockpit awareness of proximate
aircraft and to serve as a 'last line of defense' for the prevention
of mid-air collisions.
There are two levels of TCAS systems:
TCAS I was developed to accommodate the general aviation
(GA) community and the regional airlines. This system issues
'Traffic Advisories' (TAs) to assist pilots in visual acquisition of
intruder aircraft. TCAS I is mandated on aircraft with 10 to 30
seats, although TCAS II may be installed instead.
TCAS II is a more sophisticated system which provides the infor-
mation of TCAS I, and also analyzes the projected flight path of
approaching aircraft and issues 'Resolution Advisories' (RAs) to
the pilot to resolve potential mid-air collisions. TCAS II is re-
quired internationally in aircraft with more than 30 seats or
weighing more than 15,000 kg.
The TCAS II Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) were updated and approved by RTCA, Inc. Special
Committee 147 and published in document DO-185A in Decem-
ber, 1997 and available through RTCA, Inc. This latest revision to
the system is referred to as 'Version 7' in the United States. The
international community adopted these standards for the Air-
borne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) and it is now man-
dated throughout most of Europe and other countries such as
Japan and Australia.668
As is typical of any new technology, the implementation of
TCAS required extensive training of both pilots and ATC per-
667 See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A.C. 90-48C, PILOT'S ROLE IN COLLISION
AVOIDANCE (1983).
668 FED. AvIATION ADMIN., THE TRAFFIc ALERT AND COLLISION AvOIDANCE SYS-
TEM (Sept. 2013), available at http://faa.gov.
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sonnel. In one case the results were tragic, as the role of the
pilot's actions in regard to an RA versus contrary controller in-
structions were apparently poorly defined at the time (at least in
some countries).669  On July 1, 2002, a Russian airliner
(TU154M) carrying children on a UNESCO-sponsored vacation
to Spain collided with a DHL flight (B757-200) that was enroute
from Italy to Brussels.6 70 Both aircraft were equipped with TCAS
II made by the same manufacturer in the United States.671 The
midair collision occurred over southern Germany, but both air-
craft were under Swiss air traffic control.6 72 The controller lost
separation of the aircraft while his attention was drawn to other
duties.673 The control center systems were undergoing mainte-
nance and several safety features had been rendered inopera-
tive, without the full knowledge and understanding of the
controller.674 Further, the other assigned controller was taking
an extended rest break, leaving a single person to control two
physically separate radar screens and sectors.675 Upon realizing
the gravity of the separation conflict situation the controller or-
dered an immediate descent for the Russian airliner, which
complied.676 Shortly thereafter both aircraft received RA's. The
DHL was instructed by the TCAS to descend and did so. 677 Cock-
pit recordings indicate that the Russian aircraft was instructed to
climb by the TCAS, but continued to comply with the control-
ler's instructions to descend after some confusion as to what to
do.678 The developing situation had been monitored on radar
by German controllers at the Karlsruhe center, who tried to call
Zurich (11 times) with a warning, but the direct lines were also
out of service for maintenance (without notice to Karlsruhe or
other adjoining centers) .679 All aboard both aircraft perished in
the collision. 680 Excerpts from the accident report establish the
following events in cockpit of the Russian airliner:
669 See generally GERMAN FED. BuREAu OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION
(BFU), REPORT AX001-1-2/02 (May 2004).
670 See id. at 5.
671 "Reversal RA" feature (CP 112 modification) had been developed but was
not installed in either aircraft at the time of the accident. See id. at 35.
672 See id. at 35.
673 See id. at 82-85.
674 See id.
675 See id. at 83.
676 See id. at 85.
677 See id. at 100.
678 See id.
679 See id. at 44.
680 See id. at 5.
2015]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
At 21:34:42 TCAS generated a TA ("traffic, traffic")
Airplane approaching from the left [10 o'clock] had been previ-
ously displayed on the TCAS.
21:34:49 Zurich, "... descend flight level 350, expedite, I have
crossing traffic."
21:34:56 the control column was pushed forward
21:34:56 TCAS generated an RA ("climb, climb")
21:34:59 Copilot [in left rear seat]: "It (TCAS) says climb". The
PIC [in front left seat] replied: "He (ATC) is guiding us down."
The copilot's response: "descend?"
21:35:03 Zurich, ". . descend level 350, expedite descent." 'Ya
• . . we have traffic at your 2 o'clock [traffic was actually at 10
o'clock] position now at 3-6-0."
PIC asked: "Where is it?"
Copilot answered: "Here on the left side!"
Navigator [center rear seat]: "It is going to pass beneath us!"
21:35:24 TCAS issued an RA "increase climb".
Copilot: "It says climb"!
21:35:27 Five seconds before the collision the control column
was pulled back, associated with a minor increase of trust levers
setting.
21:35:31 During the last second before collision the control col-
umn was pulled back abruptly and the thrust levers were pushed
fully forward.
21:35:32 Impact6 '
The BFU Report established the causes of the accident as
follows:
The following immediate causes have been identified:
* The imminent separation infringement was not noticed by
ATC in time. The instruction for the TU154M to descend
was given at a time when the prescribed separation to the
B757-200 could not be ensured anymore.
* The TU154M crew followed the ATC instruction to de-
scend and continued to do so even after TCAS advised
them to climb. This [maneuver] was performed contrary to
the generated TCAS RA.
The following systemic causes have been identified:
* The integration of ACAS/TCAS II into the system aviation
was insufficient and did not correspond in all points with
the system philosophy. The regulations concerning ACAS/
TCAS published by ICAO and as a result the regulations of
681 See id. at 8-9. A relative of several of the Russian victims went to Switzerland
in 2004 and stabbed the controller to death. See Father of Air Crash Victims Held
Over Stabbing, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2004), www.theguardian.com/world/
2004/feb/27/russia.germany.
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national aviation authorities, operational and procedural
instructions of the TCAS manufacturer and the operators
were not standardized, incomplete and partially
contradictory.
" Management and quality assurance of the air navigation
service company did not ensure that during the night all
open workstations were continuously staffed by controllers.
" Management and quality assurance of the air navigation
service company tolerated for years that during times of low
traffic flow at night only one controller worked and the
other one retired to rest.6 8
2
The first systemic cause of "insufficient TCAS integration" re-
lied upon the fact that the Russian publications and training left
a doubt as to whether the pilot is required to follow RA direc-
tions or has the option to override the RA and follow ATC in-
structions. 6 3 The TU154M Flight Operations Manual made
clear that ATC has the highest priority in the avoidance of colli-
sion risks:
For the avoidance of in-flight collisions the visual control of the
situation in the airspace by the crew and the correct execution of all
instructions issued by A TC is to be regarded as the most important tool
TCAS is an additional instrument which ensures the timely deter-
mination of oncoming traffic, the classification of the risk and, if
necessary, planning of an advice for a vertical avoidance
[maneuver] .684
It was not made clear in the description of the system philoso-
phy that TCAS is exclusively meant as a "last line of defense" and
at the RA stage the system philosophy is "follow the RA. ' ' 685 Nor
was it made clear that TCAS is not part of the conceptual design
of ATC and TCAS advisories must be disconnected from instruc-
tions given by ATC controllers.68 6
The accident report states in its Analysis Summary:
The TU154M crew had attentively observed the development on
the TCAS display showing the conflicting traffic and discussed it
internally. When the distance between the airplanes was still ap-
proximately 10 NM, the commander of the TU154M visually
identified the other airplane. Thus the TA was no surprise for
the crew. When they received the instruction of the controller to
682 See id. at 110.
683 See id.
684 Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
685 See generally id.
686 See generally id.
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descend the FL 350 and the explicit information about the con-
flicting traffic it was clear to them that the controller had also
realized the situation and had made a decision to solve the
problem.
They followed this instruction very swiftly because they were in a
situation of uncertainty, which now could be considered as set-
tled. After TCAS issued an RA to climb the crew stuck to their
decision to follow the controller's instruction. The decision to
follow the controller's instruction was even confirmed to 'cor-
rect' by the repeated instruction to descend and the information
of the controller about the other airplane being at FL 360.
The BFU assumes, however, that the TU154M crew would have
followed TCAS if the controller had not earlier instructed and
avoidance maneuver in the form of a descent. The two avoidance
[maneuver] instructions were not discussed by the two pilots,
which leads to the conclusion that the decision for the already
initiated descent was not questioned. Only the copilot sitting on
the rear left but without any assigned function in the cockpit,
referred twice to the TCAS and the instruction to climb and thus
questioned the descent. But he did not find audience because
the PIC had no doubt about the correctness of the controller's
instruction.
This decision did not take into consideration that an RA is a ver-
tical avoidance [maneuver] where the airplanes involved get
complementary advisories for collision avoidance.
The flight operations regulations of the TU154M operator and
ICAO documents do not include clear directives as to which ac-
tions the crew should take, if the instructions issued by ATC and
an RA contradict each other. They include, however, a clear
statement that [maneuvers] contrary to an RA are prohibited.
It is to be assumed that the crew considered the instruction to
descend to FL 350 more as a [maneuver] to avoid an imminent
collision than normal [maneuvers] to re-establish the prescribed
separation. This fits the picture of the swift initiated and carried
out descent which was not finished early enough to level off at FL
350.
After the crew initiated descent contrary to the RA, the outcome
was left the chance.
The BFU considers the accomplishment of the [maneuver] con-
trary to the RA to be one of the immediate causal factors having
led to the accident .... 687
ACAS/TCAS as actually implemented apparently falls short of its
intended purpose.
687 Id. at 105-06.
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6. NASA TCAS Study
A 1993 study by the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) team, provides dramatic results indicating that TCAS
has improved safety by helping pilots avoid mid-air collisions
with targets they never even saw previous to the traffic con-
flict.688 A pilot is not always able to see and avoid every threat at
all times. A tool such as TCAS can significantly improve a pilot's
ability to comply with his duty to see and avoid other aircraft.
Comments from the ASRS reports include:
Hazy holiday weekend in Southern California (LA basin). Many,
many VFR aircraft in [the] area. My crew alert for traffic. TCAS
scope cluttered with traffic. On departure ... climbing. . . [a]
traffic conflict [at] 12:30, 3 miles, 500 to 1,000 feet above [was
noted] on TCAS. I hoped to climb (zoom) above it as soon as it
was acquired visually. However, it was not acquired visually until
after evasive action was taken based on TCAS II RA and ATC traf-
fic advisory. TCAS and ATC saved the day.689
The study background is extracted below: 690
Excerpt 1
Research Report
THE BEHAVIORAL IMPACT OF TCAS II ON
THE NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM
by
VJ Meilone & SM Frank
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
During dt tatter months of 1991 through mid.1992, the ASRS analyst staffwere alerted to a significant ilncrease in
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS tl)-tclated incident reportin. In July, 1992, both the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Aviation Safety and the National Transrortalion Safety Board (NTSB) tasked
the ASRS to complete a database analysis of TCAS It incident reports in preparation for a congressional subcoammittee
hearing on TCAS II ises.
ASRS Quick Response (QR) No, 235, TCAS Incident Reports Analysis was submtted to the FAA and the NTSB on July
29, 1992. During the coding and analysis of a random sampling of 170 reports used in QX 235, the ASRS research team
identified evidence of increasing air traf.ac controller consternation with and resistance to the implementation ofTCAS It
technology Into the national airspace system. There were also strong indications from the data set that the aviation
community, governet agencies, and industry may have unAittingly underestimated the impact of TCAS 11 avoidance
maneuvers on both the air lrafnc controller and flight crew constinencies. The ASRS decided to undertake this sWy to
verify or refute the impressions that emerged from QR 235.
-8 See generally Vincent J. Mellone & Stephanie M. Frank, Behavioral Impact of
TCAS II on the National Air Traffic Control System, NASA.Gov, http://
asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/47_Behavioral-Impact ofTCASII.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2014).
689 TCAS II: Genie Out of the Bottle, NASA.GOV, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publica-
tions/directdine/dl4_tcas.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
690 Mellone & Frank, supra note 688.
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Figure 4 of the study shows that of the TCAS related reports
collected, 68% of the pilots were never able to visually acquire
the intruding aircraft.691 Accordingly, without TCAS, it is possi-
ble that a loss of required separation or even collision would
have been the outcome.692 Even when the target was visually ac-
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Table 4, below, documents the comments made by report
writers.695 The comments clearly indicate the majority believe
TCAS improves flight safety with regards to collision avoid-
ance.696 However, the majority of the report authors were pilots,
as opposed to air traffic controllers.697
Table 4 - TCAS II "Quick Response"
Key Findings _
[TCAS II Enhanced Safety 876
[ TCAS II "Saved the Day" 624
fTCAS II assisted In Visual Sighting of Intruder Aircraft 527
[TCAS II prevented an NMAC (near-mid-air collision) I 482
[TCAS II Derogated Safety 66
[TCAS II Increased Workload 51
ITCAS II Prevented an Airborne ConflictlLess Severe f 40
ITCAS II Caused a Loss of Standard Separation I 17
ITCAS II Display Is Too Cluttered or Distracting I
FTotal Citations from 170 "QR Reports I 2,63
Despite the value of systems such as TCAS, there is always the
potential for incorrect use because of improper initial or recur-
rent training. The following comment shows that sensory en-
hancing tools can be used improperly:
I was training a developmental [controller] on Arrival Control.
We had an air taxi (X) for sequence to visual approach Runway
15. The developmental pointed out aircraft (Y) [to air taxi (X)]
and the pilot responded, "Is he following someone out there at
800 feet?" The developmental was going to clear him for the vis-
ual approach when I stopped him and asked [the pilot of air taxi
(X) ] ... if he had aircraft (Y) in sight. He said not visually, but
had him on TCAS II. This seems to be happening more and
more... It appears [that pilots] ... are using TCAS II instead of
looking out the window. As an air traffic controller I cannot have
pilots using TCAS for visual separation to maintain spacing (as
on one occurrence a crew offered to do). There is no TCAS II
separation.698
Advisory Circular AC 120-55C, CHG 1, 3-18-13, provides de-
tails and guidance on how operators should implement TCAS
training and operational procedures for flight crews including
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TCAS operational use. The relevant portions of this circular are
set out in Appendix C.
Relevant portions of the Air Traffic Controller's Manual are
set out in Appendix C.
B. 14 C.F.R. § 91.225 AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE-
BROADCAST (ADS-B) OUT EQUIPMENT AND USE
1. Introduction
Section 91.225 requires that after January 1, 2020, ADS-B
meeting specific TSO or Part 21 standards will be required for
most operations in Class A, B, C, and E airspace.699 If the aircraft
was not originally, or has not been subsequently certificated with
an electrical system, some but not all operations in Class B, C, or
E airspace will be authorized. 700 Permission to deviate for non-
equipped ADS-B aircraft, or inoperative ADS-B, would have to
be obtained through the ATC facility serving the jurisdiction of
the flight.701 ADS-B equipment that has been approved for a
deviation pursuant to Section 21.618 are considered in compli-
ance with Section 21.225.702 In summary, by 2020 all aircraft will
be required to have ADS-B installed and functioning for opera-
tion in the National Airspace System. 703 Deviations may be re-
quested and aircraft without electrical systems will be given
some relief if operating in designated airspace.704 The regula-
tion is set out in full in Appendix B.
2. Statutory and Regluatory Background
On December 12, 2003, the Vision 100-Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act became law.705 In this act, the Congress
made significant findings. First that the total impact of civil avia-
tion on the United States economy exceeded $900 billion annu-
ally and accounted for 11 million jobs.70 6 Second, that future
growth of air travel will necessitate increased investments in re-
search and development.70 7 Accordingly, Section 709 of this act






705 Vision 100 Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 108-176, 117
Stat. 2490 (Dec, 12, 2003).
706 Id. at 2493, § 4.
707 Id. at 2493, § 4.
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required the establishment of a 'joint planning and develop-
ment office to manage work related to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System," (NextGen).7 °8 Among other assign-
ments, the NextGen office was to coordinate development of
new technologies to maximize their potential in aircraft and in
the ATC system.7 °9 NextGen's goals included taking advantage
of ground-based and space-based communications and naviga-
tion, and "accommodating a wide range of aircraft operations,
including airlines, air taxis, helicopters, general aviation, and
unmanned aerial vehicles ....
Subsequent to the passage of this act, the FAA published an
NPRM that proposed Automatic Dependent Surveillance -
Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment be used on aircraft operat-
ing in specified classes of airspace in the NAS.711 The NPRM's
rationale was:
The solution to managing the anticipated growth in the use of
the NAS is the Next Generation Air Transportation System, or
NextGen, which will assure the safe and efficient movement of
people and goods as demand increases. NextGen will use tech-
nology to allow precise navigation, permit accurate real-time
communications, and vastly improve situational awareness. The
goal: A system flexible enough to accommodate safely whatever
number, type and mix of aircraft there will be in U.S. skies by
2025.712
The NPRM stressed that ATC currently relies on radar for air-
craft surveillance and separation. While transponders enhanced
radar's abilities, ATC still depends on ground-based radar sta-
tions.71 3 In some areas of the country radar coverage is not feasi-
ble, such as mountainous and remote areas.714 The NPRM went
on to suggest that ADS-B will be critical to NextGen, in that
"ADS-B is automatic because no external interrogation is re-
quired, but is 'dependent' because it relies on onboard position
sources and onboard broadcast transmission systems to provide
708 Id. at 2582, § 709(a)(1).
709 Id. at 2583, § 709(a) (2) (F).
710 Id. at 2584, § 709(c) (2) and (6). Note: This language suggests that the
broad range of aircraft, including helicopters and UAS, have equal access to op-
erating in the NAS.
71 See generally Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Performance Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, 72
Fed. Reg. 56947 (Oct. 5, 2007).
712 Id. at 56949.
713 Id.
714 Id. at 56950.
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surveillance information to ATC and ultimately to other
users."
715
Accordingly, the NPRM proposed that aircraft operations in
certain classes of airspace will require the installation and use of
ADS-B OUT after January 1, 2020.716 The airspace designated
for ADS-B closely parallels that airspace within which aircraft
were required to be equipped with mode C transponders.7 17
Also, similar to regulatory requirement for transponders,
under Section 91.225, limited exceptions would be authorized
for aircraft that were not originally certificated with an electrical
system, or have not been subsequently certificated.718 Examples
given included balloons and gliders. 71 9 The procedure for non-
equipped aircraft to enter designated airspace was proposed to
be the same as aircraft not equipped with transponders. 720 The
NPRM went on to discuss ADS-B IN technology, stating that op-
erators choosing to voluntarily721 install this added avionics fea-
ture would benefit from increased situational awareness,
including while operating on airport surfaces.722 Enhanced sur-
veillance would therefore be provided for both airborne and
surface operations at busy airports.
715 Id. at 56951.
716 See id. at 56959. ADS-B OUT refers to aircraft appropriately equipped to
broadcast information to other aircraft and ATC. See id. at 56951. On the other
hand, ADS-B IN goes one step further and allows an appropriately equipped air-
craft to receive ADS-B OUT information and display it on equipment within the
aircraft. See id.
717 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.130(d) (2010) (Class C airspace requires transponders
pursuant to section 91.215 and ADS-B after 2020 under section 91.225. Section
91.131(d) requires transponders under section 91.215 and ADS-B under section
91.225 after 2020 in Class B airspace. See id. § 91.131(d). Section 91.135(c) re-
quires transponders under section 91.215 and ADS-B under section 91.225 after
2020 in Class A airspace. See id. § 91.135(c). Finally, section 91.215(b) (3) requires
transponders and ADS-B within the 30 NM Mode C veil.). See 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.215(b) (3) (2014).
718 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance
Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 56947,
56958.
719 Id.
720 Id. at 56957.
721 Remember, this NPRM proposed only ADS-B Out be installed, not ADS-B
In.
722 Id. at 56961.
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On May 28, 2010, the FAA published the Final Rule regarding
ADS-B usage and performance requirements.7 23 The final rule
made very small changes in airspace designations. The majority
of changes appear to be related to engineering requirements,
which are not relevant to this inquiry.12 ' For simplicity, the dif-
ferences were published in the final rule as follows: 7 25
TABLE 3.- SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROPOSED RULE AND THE FINAL RULE
Issue ares The NPRM- The W tule.-
Tedshudl Standard Order Proposed portorrance sads so defined in TOO- Requiro s pedornr anrc standards as defined in TSO-
C166a (1090 MHz ES) at TSO-C154b (UAJ). C166b (1090 MHz ES) or TSO-C154€ (UAT),
Airspace ............... Proposed requiring all vircralt above FL 240 to transmit Reores all arcraft in Class A airpace (FL 180 ard
on the 1090 MHz ES broa dcast link, above) to tranrort on the 10-0 MHz ES broadcast
Proposed ADS-B pedomtorce standards for operations Requirs ADS-B perfonsrnce sisdwds for opera"bosr
in an Class E aispace at and above 10,000 fet M.L in Class E aispace at and above 10,000 feet MSL
excludng lhe airspace at and Lelsow 2,600 fst AGL
NAC . ... . Proposed a NAC a 9. which provides nvgato, cuo- Requires NAG5 < 0.05 NM.
racy c 30 metars. (NAC, -8)
NIC .................. Proposed cranges in NIC be brosdcast wsithin 10 se;- Requires hangea In NIC be broadcaswt ihin 12 sec-
onds. onds.
SIL ................... Proposed a SIL of 2 or 3 ............. . R ms an SDA of 2.
Reqres a St. of .
Antenna Diverity .. Proposed antenna diversity In all airspace specifed in Does not require atenna verlty.
the erto.
Tot Laency....... Proposed illents inthe posiion source 0.5 ecords Requires uu rerpensated latency < 0.6 s conds and
and latency inthe ADS-B source < 1 second. rraximum torta lte cy -2.0 seconds.
Message Eler ..ts Proposed a broadcast message eleent for "reoving Does not requie a broadcast mersage element for "re-
ATC seivicsW. cerving ATC seivices."
An ebility to tur off ADS-B Proposed that he plot be abe to turn off ADS- trans- Does sotr* m ethe p tt be alle to iseble or turn off
Out. mirsos if drected by ATC. ADS-8 tro snlss.
The FAA acknowledged that numerous comments recom-
mended limiting the amount of airspace and altitudes.7 26 For
example, limiting the requirement for ADS-B further to Class A
or B airspace only, or allowing exceptions for certain users (i.e.
skydiving) .727 The agency declined to accept these invitations,
stating:
ADS-B cannot be used for ATC surveillance if all aircraft are not
appropriately equipped. Moreover, it is unreasonable to set up a
regulatory framework and performance standards that are based
on using two primary systems for surveillance; nor is it feasible to
fund and maintain two such systems. The airspace requirements
specified in this rule for ADS-B Out meet ATC surveillance
needs.728
One last issue that should be addressed is the lengthy timeline
for program implementation. Full implementation was not re-
quired until January 1, 2020, nearly ten years after the effective
723 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance
Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, 75 Fed. Reg. 30160
(2010).
724 See generally id.
725 Id. at 30166.
726 See id.
727 Id. at 30167.
728 Id.
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date of the final rule. 72 9 Here again, the FAA offered a rationale
for this decision. First, the FAA believed this time was necessary
for operators to equip their aircraft to meet the requirements of
this rule.73 0 Second, this timeframe would provide sufficient op-
erational experience to enable ADS-B to be the primary source
for surveillance. 73 1 Lastly, the ground infrastructure for imple-
mentation was due to be completed in 2013; this would permit
seven years of operational experience prior to full implementa-
tion in 2020.732
As with previous Part 91 provisions, the authors searched for
any judicial actions directed at Section 91.225, but found none.
This was not unexpected, given that the regulation will not be
effective until 2020.
The FAA has also published Advisory Circular 90-114 on Sep-
tember 21, 2012, incorporating Change 1, to provide further
guidance regarding ADS-B.733
While ADS-B does not relieve a pilot from the duty to see and
avoid other aircraft, it assists in helping a pilot visually locate
another aircraft that he may not have seen before. The Univer-
sity of North Dakota (UND) conducted an FAA-sponsored re-
search study regarding ADS-B, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of
ADS-B in the Collegiate Flight Training Environment." 73 4 Pilots
with and without ADS-B IN equipped aircraft were asked how
many aircraft they visually spotted during routine training
flights.73 5 Those with ADS-B IN reported visually acquiring sig-
nificantly more aircraft than those without ADS-B IN. According
to the study, "collected data indicates that ADS-B made a signifi-
cant contribution to overall traffic awareness, visual acquisitions,
and avoidance maneuvering, thus enhancing the overall level of
safety. It also improved lesson preparation and enhanced in-





733 See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AC 90-114 wrrH CHG 1, AUTomATIc DE-
FENDANT SURVEILLANCE BROADCASE (A05-B) OPERATIONS (Sept. 21, 2012).
734 UNIV. OF N.D., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ADS-B IN THE COLLEGIATE
FLIGHT TRAINING ENVIRONMENT, FAA PROGRAM COE-GA, AWARD NUMBER: 04-C-
GA-ERAU, SUBCONTRAT #61061-UND (Mar. 31, 2009). Approximately sixty
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UND researchers collected over 26,000 surveys from flight
crews regarding their experience with ADS-B and collision
avoidance/traffic acquisition. 73 7 Pilots of ADS-B equipped air-
craft on average saw 4.78 aircraft per flight, while non-ADS-B
equipped aircraft pilots saw an average of only 2.28 aircraft per
flight. 738 Significance was statistically established. (t=35.874,
p<.05) The term 'saw' means any form of aircraft location: visual
or located on the ADS-B traffic display.73 9
ADS-B also improved a pilot's ability to visually acquire traffic.
Pilots were again surveyed on how many aircraft they were able
to visually acquire within a 3-mile radius.740 ADS-B equipped pi-
lots were able to visual acquire an average of 2.97 aircraft per
flight, while non-ADS-B equipped pilots only acquired 1.86 air-
craft per flight.741 Also statistically significant. (t--16.852,
p<.05). 742
An additional relevant question was answered during the
study as well: "Considering only the times when pilots had to
maneuver, did ADS-B provide significantly more primary warn-
ings that prompted avoidance maneuvers than either ATC ad-
visories or visual-only acquisitions? '743 The study found that
ADS-B provided significantly more warnings that prompted
avoidance maneuvering than either ATC or visual acquisition.
This was also statistically significant. (F(2,16916)=3.25, p<.05). 744
General comments from pilots of ADS-B equipped aircraft in-
cluded: "Significant safety improvement. I kind of feel naked
without it[,]" and "[b]est box in the airplane. I never knew how
many planes I didn't see."745 These comments speak for them-
selves regarding the value of such technology in assisting a pilot
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C. DISCUSSION OF OTHER FORMS OF TRANSPORTATION:
MARITIME ANTICOLLISION RULES AND PERSPECTIVES IN SUPPORT
OF PART 3 OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH
Marine navigation rules were the genesis for the aviation regu-
lations, although aviation navigation requires operation in three
dimensions and so must be structured to aviation's specific re-
quirements. However, with minor exceptions, like requiring ves-
sel speed changes under certain circumstances, the marine and
aviation right-of-way rules for vehicles in sight of each other are
nearly identical.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the
United Nations agency with responsibility for the safety of ships
and is analogous to the ICAO.746 IMO currently has 170 Mem-
ber States and the United States has been a member state since
1950.747 The IMO Convention on the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) of 1972 has been
ratified and adopted by the United States and codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1602.748
The Navigation Rules are divided into four functional areas:
Part A is applicable to "all vessels"; Part B, Section I is applicable
to vessels in "any condition of visibility"; Part B, Section II, is
applicable to "vessels in sight of one another"; and Part B, Sec-
tion III, consisting of Rule 19, is applicable to "vessels not in
sight of one another. ' 749 The Navigation Rules are set out below.
It should be noted that the marine regulations in the first
three areas are similar and analogous to the aviation rules, in-
cluding the "see and be seen" rules for right-of-way contained in
Part B, Section I. However, the rule pertaining to vessels not in
sight of one another, Rule 19, has no counterpart in the aviation
rules. 750 Rule 19 states in part, "[a] vessel which detects by radar
746 See IMO-What It Is, IMO.oRG, http://www.imo.org/About/Documents/
What%20it%20is%200ct%202013_Web.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
747 See id. at 2.
748 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).
7- See Navigation Rules, U.S. DEPr. HOMELAND SECURITY, www.navcen.uscg.gov/
?pageName=navRulesContent (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
750 The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) "was designed to
increase cockpit awareness of proximate aircraft and to serve as a 'last line of
defense' for the prevention of mid-air collisions." See Related Links, SEE AND
AvoID, www.seeandavoid.org/Home/RelatedLinks (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
"When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in command may deviate
from that clearance unless an amended clearance is obtained, an emergency ex-
ists, or the deviation is in response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system
resolution advisory." 14 C.F.R. § 91.123(a) (2014). Any deviation must be in re-
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alone the presence of another vessel shall determine if a close-
quarters situation is developing or risk of collision exists. If so,
she shall take avoiding action in ample time. 7 51
Rule 19 does not require compliance with the situation-spe-
cific rules (crossing, overtaking, etc.) given in the visual right-of-
way rules.7 52 No vessel has the "right-of-way" over another under
Rule 19: it is a dual action rule.75 3 The only requirement is to
take early, bold action.5
In aviation, as we have seen, ground-based radar has tradition-
ally been responsible for collsion avoidance, while airborne ra-
dar generally has been limited to the role of weather depiction
and avoidance. However, the military and larger ships have been
using onboard radar for collision avoidance purposes since at
least the 1940s.755 There was not the option of placing radar
control centers in the vast spaces of open water and so the sens-
sponse to a Resolution Advisory (RA) only, which is very close quarters. "Do not
deviate from an assigned clearance based only on TA [Traffic Advisory] informa-
tion." Advisory Circular 120-55C. Maritime Navigation Rule 19 allows far greater
latitude for earlier action and self-separation prior to reaching the last line of
defense, while there is still "ample time" before close quarters or risk of actual
collision. Navigation Rules, supra note 749. Generally, ocean-going ships are self-
separating and do not need authority to deviate from a "clearance."
751 Navigation Rules, supra note 749. It should be noted that Rule 7 of the
Marine Operating Rules requires that all means available be used in collision
avoidance and if the vessel has a working radar it will be on and used:
(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the pre-
vailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of col-
lision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to
exist.
(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and opera-
tional, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning
of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic
observation of detected objects.
Id. (emphasis added).
752 See generally id.
753 See generally id.
754 Id. "Turns must be bold enough to be apparent to the other vessel by radar.
A turn that might be apparent to another vessel visually, through the change in
aspect or lights, might not be large enough to be apparent to the radar observer."
FARWELL'S RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD, supra note 337, at 455 (emphasis ad-
ded). The rule does give guidance regarding using two specific "unusual" avoid-
ance maneuvers, "so far as possible the following shall be avoided: (i) An
alteration of course to port for a vessel forward of the beam, other than for a
vessel being overtaken; (ii) An alteration of course toward a vessel abeam or abaft
the beam." See Navigation Rules, supra note 752.
755 See NAT'L GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE RADAR NAVIGATION AND
MANEUVERING BOARD MANUAL 2 (2001).
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ing equipment had to be on the ship and the traffic information
interpreted directly by the ship's personnel. 75 6
The early radars were large, heavy, unreliable and difficult to
read with accuracy. It took special training for the operators to
be proficient. 757 Often in the early days of radar, accidents were
referred to as "radar assisted collisions" because of its misuse.758
Further, radar sometimes would give a false sense of security so
that the traditional forms of the "lookout" were de-
emphasized.759
Today, however, the bridge of a modern large ship resembles
the "glass cockpit" of a modern airliner. Integrated Bridge Sys-
tems (IBS) allow centralized access to multiple sensors which
may be integrated into a multifunction displays or heads-up dis-
plays.76° Inputs to the IBS may include the autopilot, electronic
chart display, GPS, radar, AIS, electro-optical, CCTV, infrared,
laser range finding and other appropriate data; all such data is
recorded and stored.7 6 '
Again, like the early radar use, an overdependence on IBS can
cause problems. In 1995, the GPS input wire on the Royal Maj-
esty came loose and the ship was allowed to drive itself onto the
756 See id.
757 FARWELL'S RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD, supra note 337, at 158.
For years the marine community has debated which is the best ra-
dar display for navigation and collision avoidance. Two dimensions
are at issue: ship's head-up versus north-up display and true motion
versus relative motion display .... A stabilized radar display gives
the user gives the user the option of selecting head-up or north-up
display .... Radars may also be switched to display target informa-
tion in true motion or relative motion.... The collision regulations
generally take no position on which of the possible displays consti-
tute proper use of the equipment. Id.
See also generally Radar Navigation and Maneuvering Board Manual, supra note
757.
758 See Nicholas J. Healy, Radar and the New Collision Regulations, 37 TUL L. REv.
621, 635 (1962).
759 See id. at 635.
7- IBS standards are set forth in SOLAS Regulation V/19 and IMO Maritime
Safety Committee Resolution MSC.64(67). See generally SOLAS Regulation V/19,
IMO Maritime Safety Committee Resolution MSC.64(67). The IBS system "Smart-
Bridge" was developed by Lockheed-Martin. See FARWELL'S RULES OF THE NAUTI-
CAL ROAD, supra note 337, at 164.
761 See generally FARWELL'S RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD, supra note 337, at 164.
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) is analogous to ADS-B. Transponders
transmit, and other vessels receive, a variety of data including vessel identity, GPS
position, course, speed, etc. This information is used in determining and resolv-
ing traffic conflicts. AIS data may be received before the target is observed on
radar, allowing risk detection and assessment to begin earlier.
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shore of Nantucket.762 The GPS malfunction went undiscovered
for over thirty hours.7 6 3 The NTSB issued an urgent safety bulle-
tin, essentially requesting that operators of sophisticated ships
maintain traditional vigilance methods and safeguards along
with the use of any technical equipment on board.764
A number of major ports in the United States established the
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), a navigation service that is analo-
gous to an approach/departure control.765 These sites may in-
clude ground-based radar for controller usage. v66 The VTS
regulations are contained at 33 C.F.R. 161 and authorize the
VTS to "control, supervise, or otherwise manage traffic 767 . . .
"essentially, to issue direction to minimize the risk of collision."
Some VTSs have integrated, or are currently integrating, AIS
into its control scheme.
Although it is beyond the scope of the current research, it
would be interesting to visit an appropriate VTS and research
AIS integration regarding any possible information of correla-
tive value to integrating ADS-B into air traffic control.
Marine Collision Avoidance Terms and Perspectives:
" Well clear-no risk of collision, i.e., "Past and well clear" or
measured by diverging heading and/or distance/time. If the
vessel is not well clear the collision avoidance rules are trig-
gered and maneuvering may be necessary.768
* Close-quarters-"That area around a ship where a collision
with an approaching vessel could not be avoided by the action
of the approached vessel alone, if the approaching vessel
made a major, sudden and unexpected course change. " "'
Ships, like airplanes, are sometimes required to operate at
close-quarters, like vessels traveling in opposite directions in
the designated lanes of a seaway or airliners on final approach
to parallel runways.
* Safe passing distance-may involve some risk of collision, but
avoids the high risk of being so near as to be in "close-
quarters."77 °
762 See Marine Accident Report, N.T.S.B. Report No. Mar-97/01, p. 30 (1997).
763 See id.
764 See generally id.
765 To find UTS ports, check the VTS Finder. VTS Finder,
www.worldvtsguide.org/VTS-Finder (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
766 See Vessel Traffic Service, U.S. DEPT. HOMELAND SECURITY, www.navcen.uscg.
org/?pageName=vtsMain (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
767 33 C.F.R. § 161 (2014).
768 Acacia Vera Navigation Co. v. Kezia, Ltd., 78 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1996).
769 See FARWELL'S RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD, supra note 337, at 253.
770 Id. at 251 n.32.
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In extremis-imminent collision hazard. When an approach
situation reaches the point where both vessels must maneuver
if collision is to be avoided, the situation is described as in
extremis.771 Regardless of who is at fault, each vessel has to do
everything it can to avoid collision.772
The relevant Navigation Rules are set out in Appendix B.773
VI. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The first objective of this research was to identify and analyze
those provisions contained in Part 91 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations that impose a duty or responsibility on the pilot in
command to "see and avoid" other aircraft. The authors also an-
alyzed a second set of Part 91 regulations that relate to the pi-
lot's responsibility to see and avoid aircraft. Finally, a third
objective of this research was to identify and analyze how new
systems or technologies have been used to supplement or en-
hance the pilot's ability to see and avoid other aircraft. To this
end, the authors sought out and reviewed historic agency
rulemaking, policy development through manuals and circulars,
and judicial treatment of individual regulatory provision that are
associated with the responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft.
This research was limited in scope to focus on the Part 91
regulations responsible for imposing a responsibility to see and
avoid other aircraft. However, during this research, the authors
uncovered other facets of the see and avoid concept. While
these fell outside the scope of work for this assignment, these
collateral issues should be considered in future research:
1. The duty to see and avoid is not limited to seeing and avoid-
ing other aircraft. There is a broader responsibility to also
see and avoid other hazards, including terrain and obstacles.
2. The duty to see and avoid has a long history not confined
solely to the operation of aircraft. Regulation of other forms
of transportation also emphasizes the see and avoid concept,
including maritime and surface transportation. It would be
useful to look into these other modes of transportation and
771 See The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 461 (1851).
772 The Mauch Chunk, 154 F. 182, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1907); see also FARWELL'S
RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD, supra note 337, at 120.
773 Official versions of the Navigation Rules are contained in the International
Navigational Rules Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-75, 91 Stat. 308 (July 27, 1977),
and the Inland Navigation Rules Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-591, 94 Stat. 3415
(Dec. 24, 1980).
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analyze their handling of this concept for application to the
aviation arena.
3. One technology that appears well-suited to enhancing the
see and avoid concept is ADS-B. However, it is clear that it is
in its infancy. Under the federal Aviation Regulations, it will
not be fully deployed until 2020. Accordingly, much critical
analysis of its deployment, specifically judicial oversight, is
not yet available. Most current attention appears to be fo-
cused on its engineering. Future research should follow this
developing technology and its impact on see and avoid,
which in this case would perhaps be better described as
"sense and avoid".
4. New technology will continue to be developed and intro-
duced that will challenge our traditional see and avoid con-
cepts. One that specifically comes to mind is the employment
of enhanced flight vision systems (EFVS). In its recent
NPRM,"' the FAA proposes to permit the pilot to use EFVS
to replace natural vision and continue IFR approach de-
scents from 100 feet above the runway all the way to
touchdown.
774 See generally Revisions to Operational Requirements for the Use of En-
hanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS) and to Pilot Compartment View Require-
ments for Vision Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 34935 (2013) (extending comment
deadline for earlier NPRM 78 Fed. Reg. 54700 (2013).
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VII. APPENDICES
A. APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§ 121.356 Collision avoidance system
Effective January 1, 2005, any airplane you operate under this
part must be equipped and operated according to the following
table:
Chart 1 - § 121.356 Collision Avoidance System
Collision Avoidance Systems
If you operate any- Then you must operate that airplane with-
(a) Turbine-powered (1) An appropriate class of Mode S
airplane of more than transponder that meets Technical Standard
33,000 pounds maximum Order (TSO) G-112, or a later version, and
certificated takeoff weight one of the following approved units:
(i) TCAS II that meets TSO CI 9b (version
7.0), or takeoff weight a later version.
(ii) TCAS II that meets TSO CI 19a (version
6.04A Enhanced) that was installed in that
airplane before May 1, 2003. If that TCAS II
version 6.04A Enhanced no longer can be
repaired to TSO C-119a standards, it must be
replaced with a TCAS II that meets TSO
G- 19b (version 7.0), or a later version.
(iii) A collision avoidance system equivalent
to TSO C- 19b (version 7.0), or a later
version, capable of coordinating with units
that meet TSO C-I 19a (version 6.04A








of more than 33,000 pounds
maximum certificated
takeoff weight
(1) TCAS I that meets TSO C-118, or a later
version, or
(2) A collision avoidance system equivalent to
has a TSO C-1 18, or a later version, or
(3) A collision avoidance system and Mode S
transponder that meet paragraph (a) (1) of
this section.
(1) TCAS I that meets TSO C-118, or a later
version, or
(2) A collision avoidance system equivalent to
maximum TSO C-1 18, or a later version, or
(3) A collision avoidance system and Mode S
transponder that meet paragraph (a) (1) of
this section.
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§ 135.180 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, after
December 31, 1995, no person may operate a turbine
powered airplane that has a passenger seat configuration,
excluding any pilot seat, of 10 to 30 seats unless it is
equipped with an approved traffic alert and collision
avoidance system. If a TCAS II system is installed, it must
be capable of coordinating with TCAS units that meet
TSO C-119.
(b) The airplane flight manual required by § 135.21 of this
part shall contain the following information on the TCAS
I system required by this section:
(1) Appropriate procedures for-
(i) The use of the equipment; and
(ii) Proper flightcrew action with respect to the
equipment operation.
(2) An outline of all input sources that must be operat-
ing for the TCAS to function properly.
§ 125.224 Collision avoidance system
Effective January 1, 2005, any airplane you operate under this
part 125 must be equipped and operated according to the fol-
lowing table:
2015]
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Chart 2 - § 125.224 Collision Avoidance System
Collision Avoidance Systems
If you operate any... Then you must operate that airplane with:
(a) Turbine-powered (1) An appropriate class of Mode S
airplane of more than transponder that meets Technical Standard
33,000 pounds maximum Order (TSO) C-112, or a later version, and one
certificated takeoff weight of the following approved units:
(i) TCAS II that meets TSO C-1 19b (version
7.0), or a later version.
(ii) TCAS II that meets TSO C-119a (version
6.04A Enhanced) that was installed in that
airplane before May 1, 2003. If that TCAS II
version 6.04A Enhanced no longer can be
repaired to TSO C-119a standards, it must be
replaced with a TCAS II that meets TSO
C-119b (version 7.0), or a later version.
(iii) A collision avoidance system equivalent to
TSO C-1 19b (version 7.0), or a later version,
capable of coordinating with units that meet
TSO C-119a (version 6.04A Enhanced), or a
later version.
(b) Piston-powered (1) TCAS I that meets TSO C-118, or a later
airplane of more than version, or
33,000 pounds maximum (2) A collision avoidance system equivalent to
certificated takeoff weight TSO C-1 18, or a later version, or
(1) (3) A collision avoidance system and Mode
S transponder that meet paragraph (a) (1) of
this section.
§ 129.18 Collision avoidance system.
Effective January 1, 2005, any airplane you, as a foreign air car-
rier, operate under part 129 must be equipped and operated
according to the following table:775
775 All above regulations were in place as of October 3, 2013, on the FAA web-
site at http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=92b219c6a2264e3c4c536
dc3738eb337&c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Titlel4/14cfrv3_02.tpl.
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Chart 3 - § 129.18 Collision Avoidance System
Collision Avoidance Systems
If you operate in the
United States any... Then you must operate that airplane with:
(a) Turbine-powered (1) An appropriate class of Mode S
airplane of more than transponder that meets Technical Standard
33,000 pounds maximum Order (TSO) C-112, or a later version, and
certificated takeoff weight one of the following approved units;
(i) TCAS II that meets TSO C-119b (version
7.0), or takeoff weight a later version.
(ii) TCAS II that meets TSO C-119a (version
6.04A Enhanced) that was installed in that
airplane before May 1, 2003. If that TCAS II
version 6.04A Enhanced no longer can be
repaired to TSO C-119a standards, it must be
replaced with a TCAS II that meets TSO
C-119b (version 7.0), or a later version.
(iii) A collision avoidance system equivalent to
TSO C-119b (version 7.0), or a later version,
capable of coordinating with units that meet
TSO C-119a (version 6.04A Enhanced), or a
later version.
(b) Turbine-powered (1) TCAS I that meets TSO C-118, or a later
airplane with a version, or
passenger-seat (2) A collision avoidance system equivalent to
configuration, excluding excluding any TSO C-1 18, or a later version,
any pilot seat, or 10-30 seats or
(3) A collision avoidance system and Mode S
transponder that meet paragraph (a) (1) of
this section.
B. APPENDIX B: RELEVANT ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
§ 91.123 Compliance with ATC clearances and instructions
(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in
command may deviate from that clearance unless an
amended clearance is obtained, an emergency exists, or
the deviation is in response to a traffic alert and collision
avoidance system resolution advisory. However, except in
Class A airspace, a pilot may cancel an IFR flight plan if
the operation is being conducted in VFR weather condi-
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tions. When a pilot is uncertain of an ATC clearance, that
pilot shall immediately request clarification from ATC.
(b) Except in an emergency, no person may operate an air-
craft contrary to an ATC instruction in an area in which
air traffic control is exercised.
(c) Each pilot in command who, in an emergency, or in re-
sponse to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system res-
olution advisory, deviates from an ATC clearance or
instruction shall notify ATC of that deviation as soon as
possible.
(d) Each pilot in command who (though not deviating from
a rule of this subpart) is given priority by ATC in an emer-
gency, shall submit a detailed report of that emergency
within 48 hours to the manager of that ATC facility, if
requested by ATC.
(e) Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, no person operating
an aircraft may operate that aircraft according to any
clearance or instruction that has been issued to the pilot
of another aircraft for radar air traffic control purposes.
§ 91.13 Careless or Reckless Operation
(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No
person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
(b) Aircraft operations other than for the purpose of air navi-
gation. No person may operate an aircraft, other than for
the purpose of air navigation, on any part of the surface
of an airport used by aircraft for air commerce (including
areas used by those aircraft for receiving or discharging
persons or cargo), in a careless or reckless manner so as
to endanger the life or property of another.
(a) No person may operate an aircraft so close to another air-
craft as to create a collision hazard.
(b) No person may operate an aircraft in formation flight ex-
cept by arrangement with the pilot in command of each
aircraft in the formation.
(c) No person may operate an aircraft, carrying passengers
for hire, in formation flight.
91.113 Right-of-Way Rules: Except Water Operations
(a) Inapplicability. This section does not apply to the opera-
tion of an aircraft on water.
(b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of
whether an operation is conducted under instrument
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flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be main-
tained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see
and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives
another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way
to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of
it unless well clear.
(c) In distress. An aircraft in distress has the right-of-way over
all other air traffic.
(d) Converging. When aircraft of the same category are con-
verging at approximately the same altitude (except head-
on, or nearly so), the aircraft to the other's right has the
right-of-way. If the aircraft are of different categories:
(1) A balloon has the right-of-way over any other cate-
gory of aircraft;
(2) A glider has the right-of-way over an airship, powered
parachute, weight-shift-control aircraft, airplane, or
rotorcraft;
(3) An airship has the right-of-way over a powered para-
chute, weight-shift-control aircraft, airplane, or
rotorcraft.
However, an aircraft towing or refueling other aircraft has the
right-of-way over all other engine-driven aircraft.
(e) Approaching head-on. When aircraft are approaching
each other head-on, or nearly so, each pilot of each air-
craft shall alter course to the right.
(f) Overtaking. Each aircraft that is being overtaken has the
right-of-way and each pilot of an overtaking aircraft shall
alter course to the right to pass well clear.
(g) Landing. Aircraft, while on final approach to land or
while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in
flight or operating on the surface, except that they shall
not take advantage of this rule to force an aircraft off the
runway surface which has already landed and is attempt-
ing to make way for an aircraft on final approach. When
two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the
purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has
the right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this
rule to cut in front of another which is on final approach
to land or to overtake that aircraft.
Section 91.155 Basic VFR Weather Minimums
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and
section 91.157, no person may operate an aircraft under
VFR when the flight visibility is less, or at a distance from
2015]
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clouds that is less, than that prescribed for the corre-
sponding altitude and class of airspace in the following
table:
Table 1 - Basic VFR Weather Minimums
Airspace Flight visibility Distance from clouds
Class A Not Applicable Not Applicable.
Class B 3 statute miles Clear of Clouds.
Class C 3 statute miles 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.




Less than 10,000 feet MSL 3 statute miles 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal





1,200 feet or less above the surface
(regardless of MSL altitude)
Day, except as provided in § 91.155(b) 1 statute mile Clear of clouds.
Night, except as provided in § 91.155(b) 3 statute miles 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
More than 1,200 feet above the surface but
less than 10,000 feet MSL
Day I statute mile 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
Night 3 statute miles 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
More than 1,200 feet above the surface and 5 statute miles 1,000 feet below.
at or above 10,000 feet MSL 1,000 feet above.
1 statute mile
horizontal.
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(g) Class G Airspace. Notwithstanding the provisions of para-
graph (a) of this section, the following operations may be
conducted in Class G airspace below 1,200 feet above the
surface:
(1) Helicopter. A helicopter may be operated clear of
clouds if operated at a speed that allows the pilot ade-
quate opportunity to see any air traffic or obstruction
in time to avoid a collision.
(2) Airplane, powered parachute, or weight-shift-control
aircraft. If the visibility is less than 3 statute miles but
not less than 1 statute mile during night hours and
you are operating in an airport traffic pattern within
1/2 mile of the runway, you may operate an airplane,
powered parachute, or weight-shift-control aircraft
clear of clouds.
(h) Except as provided in § 91.157, no person may operate
an aircraft beneath the ceiling under VFR within the lat-
eral boundaries of controlled airspace designated to the
surface for an airport when the ceiling is less than 1,000
feet.
(i) Except as provided in § 91.157 of this part, no person may
take off or land an aircraft, or enter the traffic pattern of
an airport, under VFR, within the lateral boundaries of
the surface areas of Class B, Class C, Class D, or Class E
airspace designated for an airport-
(1) Unless ground visibility at that airport is at least 3
statute miles; or
(2) If ground visibility is not reported at that airport,
unless flight visibility during landing or takeoff, or
while operating in the traffic pattern is at least 3
statute miles.
(j) For the purpose of this section, an aircraft operating at
the base altitude of a Class E airspace area is considered to
be within the airspace directly below that area.776
§ 91.185 IFR operations: Two-Way Radio Communications
Failure 777
776 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (2014).
777 The Pilot/Controller Glossary defines "lost communications" as "[1]oss of
the ability to communicate by radio. Aircraft are sometimes referred to as
NORDO (No Radio). Standard pilot procedures are specified in 14 C.F.R. Part
91 .. " See Pilot/Controller Glossary, FAA.Gov, http://www.faa.gov/air-traffic/pub-
lications/atpubs/pcg/L.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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(a) General. Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, each pilot
who has two-way radio communications failure when op-
erating under IFR shall comply with the rules of this
section.
(b) VFR Conditions. If the failure occurs in VFR conditions, or if
VFR conditions are encountered after the failure, each pilot shall
continue the flight under VFR and land as soon as practicable.
(c) IFR Conditions. If the failure occurs in IFR conditions, or
if paragraph (b) of this section cannot be complied with,
each pilot shall continue the flight according to the
following:
(1) Route.
(i) By the route assigned in the last ATC clearance
received;
(ii) If being radar vectored, by the direct route from
the point of radio failure to the fix, route, or air-
way specified in the vector clearance;
(iii) In the absence of an assigned route, by the
route that ATC has advised may be expected in
a further clearance; or
(iv) In the absence of an assigned route or a route
that ATC has advised may be expected in a fur-
ther clearance, by the route filed in the flight
plan.
(2) Altitude. At the highest of the following altitudes or
flight levels for the route segment being flown:
(i) The altitude or flight level assigned in the last
ATC clearance received;
(ii) The minimum altitude (converted, if appropri-
ate, to minimum flight level as prescribed in
§ 91.121(c)) for IFR operations; or
(iii) The altitude or flight level ATC has advised may
be expected in a further clearance.
(3) Leave Clearance Limit.
(i) When the clearance limit is a fix from which an
approach begins, commence descent or descent
and approach as close as possible to the expect-
further-clearance time if one has been received,
or if one has not been received, as close as possi-
ble to the estimated time of arrival as calculated
from the filed or amended (with ATC) estimated
time en route.
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(ii) If the clearance limit is not a fix from which an
approach begins, leave the clearance limit at the
expect-further-clearance time if one has been re-
ceived, or if none has been received, upon arri-
val over the clearance limit, and proceed to a fix
from which an approach begins and commence
descent or descent and approach as close as pos-
sible to the estimated time of arrival as calculated
from the filed or amended (with ATC) estimated
time en route.778
§ 91.105 Flight Crewmembers at Stations.
(a) During takeoff and landing, and while en route, each re-
quired flight crewmember shall-
(1) Be at the crewmember station unless the absence is necessary
to perform duties in connection with the operation of the air-
craft or in connection with physiological needs; and
(2) Keep the safety belt fastened while at the
crewmember station.
(b) Each required flight crewmember of a U.S.-registered
civil aircraft shall, during takeoff and landing, keep his or
her shoulder harness fastened while at his or her assigned
duty station. This paragraph does not apply if-
(1) The seat at the crewmember's station is not
equipped with a shoulder harness; or
(2) The crewmember would be unable to perform re-
quired duties with the shoulder harness fastened.779
§ 91.117 Aircraft Speed.
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no
person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at
an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288
m.p.h.).
(b) Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC, no per-
son may operate an aircraft at or below 2,500 feet above
the surface within 4 nautical miles of the primary airport
of a Class C or Class D airspace area at an indicated air-
speed of more than 200 knots (230 mph.). This para-
graph (b) does not apply to any operations within a Class
B airspace area. Such operations shall comply with para-
graph (a) of this section.
778 14 C.F.R. § 91.185 (1989) (emphasis added).
779 14 C.F.R. § 91.105 (2013) (emphasis added).
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(c) No person may operate an aircraft in the airspace under-
lying a Class B airspace area designated for an airport or
in a VFR corridor designated through such a Class B air-
space area, at an indicated airspeed of more than 200
knots (230 mph).
(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular opera-
tion is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in
this section, the aircraft may be operated at that mini-
mum speed.78 °
§ 60.18 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Airport.
(f) High density air traffic zone. In any area not above 3,000
feet above the surface in which the Administrator finds
that the volume of traffic is such as to adversely affect
safety, he shall designate such airspace as a high density
air traffic zone in which the following rules shall apply:
(1) Speed. No person shall operate an airraft within a high den-
sity air traffic zone at a speed in excess of 180 mph or 160
knots indicated airspeed unless operational limitations for a
particular aircraft required greater airspeeds, in which case
the aircraft shall not be flown in excess of the minimum
speed consistent with the safe operational limitations of the
aircraft.781
Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, no person may operate
an aircraft within controlled airspace under IFR except as
follows:
(a) On an ATS route, along the centerline of that airway.
On any other route, along the direct course between the navi-
gational aids or fixes defining that route. However, this section
does not prohibit maneuvering the aircraft to pass well clear of
other air traffic or the maneuvering of the aircraft in VFR condi-
tions to clear the intended flight path both before and during
climb or descent.78 2
§ 91.209 Aircraft lights
No person may:
(a) During the period from sunset to sunrise (or, in Alaska,
during the period a prominent unlighted object cannot
be seen from a distance of 3 statute miles or the sun is
more than 6 degrees below the horizon)-
780 14 C.F.R. § 91.117 (2013).
781 Civil Air Regulations, Air Traffic Rules, 14 C.F.R. § 60.18 (1960).
782 14 C.F.R. § 91.181 (2012).
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(1) Operate an aircraft unless it has lighted position
lights;
(2) Park or move an aircraft in, or in dangerous proxim-
ity to, a night flight operations area of an airport un-
less the aircraft-
(i) Is clearly illuminated;
(ii) Has lighted position lights; or
(iii) Is in an area that is marked by obstruction
lights;
(3) Anchor an aircraft unless the aircraft-
(iv) Has lighted anchor lights; or
(v) Is in an area where anchor lights are not re-
quired on vessels; or
Operate an aircraft that is equipped with an anticollision light
system, unless it has lighted anticollision lights. However, the an-
ticollision lights need not be lighted when the pilot-in-command
determines that, because of operating conditions, it would be in
the interest of safety to turn the lights off. 8 3
Lighting requirements were:
§ 30 Carrying Passengers at Night.
Licensed aircraft when engaged in carrying passengers for
hire any time between one-half hour after sunset and one-half
hour before sunrise must be equipped with electric landing
lights and navigation lights.
§ 76 Lights.
(A) Angular Limits. The angular limits laid down in these
rules will be determined as when the aircraft is in a
normal flying position.
(B) Airplane Lights. Between one-half hour after sunset
and one-half hour before sunrise airplanes in flight
must show the following lights:
(1) On the right side a green light and on the left side
a red light, showing unbroken light between two
vertical planes whose dihedral angle is 1100 when
measure to the right and left, respectively, from
dead ahead. These lights shall be visible at least 2
miles.
(2) At the rear and as far aft as possible a white light
shining rearward visible in a dihedral angle of 1400
bisected by a vertical plane through the line of
flight and visible at least 3 miles.
783 14 C.F.R. § 91.209 (2013).
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(C) Airship Lights. Between one-half hour after sunset and
one-half hour before sunrise airships shall carry and
display the same lights that are prescribed for air-
planes, excepting the side lights shall be doubled hori-
zontally in a fore-and-aft position, and the rear light
shall be doubled vertically. Lights in a pair shall be at
least 7 feet apart.
(D) Balloon Lights. A free balloon, between one-half hour
after sunset and one-half hour before sunrise, shall dis-
play one white light not less than 20 feet below the car,
visible for at least 2 miles. A fixed balloon, or airship,
shall carry three lights-red, white, and red-in a vertical
line, one over the other, visible at least 2 miles. The
top red light shall be not less than 20 feet below the
car, and the lights shall be not less than 7 nor more
than 10 feet apart.
(E) Lights When Stationary-Between one-half hour after
sunset and one-half hour before sunrise all aircraft
which are on the surface of water and not under con-
trol, or which are moored or anchored in navigation
lanes, shall show a white light visible for at least 2 miles
in all directions.
(2) Balloon or airship mooring cables between one-
half hour after sunset and one-half hour before
sunrise shall show groups of three red lights at in-
tervals of at least every 100 feet measured from the
basket, the first light in the first group to be ap-
proximately 20 feet from the lower red balloon
light. The object to which the balloon or airship is
moored on the ground shall have a similar group
of lights to mark its position.8
§ 91.221 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Equip-
ment and Use
(a) All airspace: U.S.-registered civil aircraft. Any traffic alert
and collision avoidance system installed in a U.S.-regis-
tered civil aircraft must be approved by the
Administrator.
Traffic alert and collision avoidance system, operation re-
quired. Each person operating an aircraft equipped with an op-
784 AIR COMMERCE REGULATIONS, supra note 236.
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erable traffic alert and collision avoidance system shall have that
system on and operating.7"5
§ 91.225 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
Out Equipment and Use
(a) AfterJanuary 1, 2020, and unless otherwise authorized by
ATC, no person may operate an aircraft in Class A air-
space unless the aircraft has equipment installed that-
(1) Meets the requirements in TSO-C166b, Extended
Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broad-
cast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Service-Broad-
cast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio
Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz); and
(2) Meets the requirements of § 91.227.
(b) AfterJanuary 1, 2020, and unless otherwise authorized by
ATC, no person may operate an aircraft below 18,000 feet
MSL and in airspace described in paragraph (d) of this
section unless the aircraft has equipment installed that-
(1) Meets the requirements in-
(i) TSO-C166b; or
(ii) TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT)
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) Equipment Operating on the Fre-
quency of 978 MHz;
(2) Meets the requirements of § 91.227.
(c) Operators with equipment installed with an approved
deviation under § 21.618 of this chapter also are in com-
pliance with this section.
(d) AfterJanuary 1, 2020, and unless otherwise authorized by
ATC, no person may operate an aircraft in the following
airspace unless the aircraft has equipment installed that
meets the requirements in paragraph (b) of this section:
(1) Class B and Class C airspace areas;
(2) Except as provided for in paragraph (e) of this sec-
tion, within 30 nautical miles of an airport listed in
appendix D, section 1 to this part from the surface
upward to 10,000 feet MSL;
(3) Above the ceiling and within the lateral boundaries
of a Class B or Class C airspace area designated for
an airport upward to 10,000 feet MSL;
(4) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section,
Class E airspace within the 48 contiguous states and
7.5 14 C.F.R. § 91.221 (2013).
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the District of Columbia at and above 10,000 feet
MSL, excluding the airspace at and below 2,500 feet
above the surface; and
(5) Class E airspace at and above 3,000 feet MSL over the
Gulf of Mexico from the coastline of the United
States out to 12 nautical miles.
(e) The requirements of paragraph (b) of this section do not
apply to any aircraft that was not originally certificated
with an electrical system, or that has not subsequently
been certified with such a system installed, including bal-
loons and gliders. These aircraft may conduct operations
without ADS-B Out in the airspace specified in
paragraphs (d) (2) and (d) (4) of this section. Operations
authorized by this section must be conducted-
(1) Outside any Class B or Class C airspace area; and
(2) Below the altitude of the ceiling of a Class B or Class
C airspace area designated for an airport, or 10,000
feet MSL, whichever is lower.
(f) Each person operating an aircraft equipped with ADS-B
Out must operate this equipment in the transmit mode at
all times.
(g) Requests for ATC authorized deviations from the require-
ments of this section must be made to the ATC facility
having jurisdiction over the concerned airspace within
the time periods specified as follows:
(1) For operation of an aircraft with an inoperative ADS-
B Out, to the airport of ultimate destination, includ-
ing any intermediate stops, or to proceed to a place
where suitable repairs can be made or both, the re-
quest may be made at any time.
(2) For operation of an aircraft that is not equipped with
ADS-B Out, the request must be made at least 1 hour
before the proposed operation.
(h) The standards required in this section are incorporated
by reference with the approval of the Director of the Of-
fice of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1
CFR part 51. All approved materials are available for in-
spection at the FAA's Office of Rulemaking (ARM-1), 800
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202-267-9677), or at the National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-
6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/
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code-of federalregulations/ibr_locations.html. This
material is also available from the sources indicated in
paragraphs (h) (1) and (h) (2) of this section.
(1) Copies of Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C1I66b,
Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information
Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on
the Radio Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz) (De-
cember 2, 2009) and TSO-C154c, Universal Access
Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on
the Frequency of 978 MHz (December 2, 2009) may
be obtained from the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, Subsequent Distribution Office, DOT Ware-
house M30, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q
75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785; telephone (301)
322-5377. Copies of TSO -C166B and TSO-C154c are
also available on the FAA's Web site, at http://
www.faa.gov/aircraft/air cert/design-approvals/
tso/. Select the link "Search Technical Standard
Orders."
(2) Copies of Section 2, Equipment Performance Re-
quirements and Test Procedures, of RTCA DO-260B,
Minimum Operational Performance Standards for
1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Informa-
tion Services-Broadcast (TIS-B), December 2, 2009
(referenced in TSO-C166b) and Section 2, Equip-
ment Performance Requirements and Test Proce-
dures, of RTCA DO-282B, Minimum Operational
Performance Standards for Universal Access Trans-
ceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B), December 2, 2009 (referenced
in TSO C-154c) may be obtained from RTCA, Inc.,
1828 L Street, NW., Suite 805, Washington, DC
20036-5133, telephone 202-833-9339. Copies of
RTCA DO-260B and RTCA DO-282B are also availa-




786 14 C.F.R. § 91.225 (2014).
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Rule 1-Application
(a) These Rules shall apply to all vessels upon the high seas
and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seago-
ing vessels....
Rule 2-Responsibility
(a) Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the
owner, master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of
any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect
of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary
practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the
case.
(b) In construing and complying with these Rules due regard
shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and
to any special circumstances, including the limitations of
the vessels involved, which may make a departure from
these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.
PART B-STEERING AND SAILING RULES
Section/Subpart I-Conduct of Vessels in Any Condition of
Visibility.
Rule 4-Application
Rules in this section apply to any condition of visibility.
Rule 5-Lookout
Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight
and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the
prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full ap-
praisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.
Rule 6-Safe Speed
Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she
can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be
stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circum-
stances and conditions.
In determining a safe speed the following factors shall be among
those taken into account:
(a) By all vessels:
(i) The state of visibility;
(ii) The traffic density including concentrations of fish-
ing vessels or any other vessels;
(iii) The manageability of the vessel with special refer-
ence to stopping distance and turning ability in the
prevailing conditions;
(iv) At night, the presence of background light such as
from shore lights or from back scatter from her own
lights;
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(v) The state of wind, sea and current, and the proximity
of navigational hazards;
(vi) The draft in relation to the available depth of water.
(b) Additionally, by vessels with operational radar:
(i) The characteristics, efficiency and limitations of the
radar equipment;
(ii) Any constraints imposed by the radar range scale in
use;
(iii) The effect on radar detection of the sea state,
weather and other sources of interference;
(iv) The possibility that small vessels, ice and other float-
ing objects may not be detected by radar at an ade-
quate range;
(v) The number, location and movement of vessels de-
tected by radar;
(vi) The more exact assessment of the visibility that may
be possible when radar is used to determine the
range of vessels or other objects in the vicinity.
Rule 7-Risk of Collision
(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to
the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine
if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be
deemed to exist.
(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment iffitted and oper-
ational, including long-range scanning to obtain early
warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or
equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.
(c) Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty in-
formation, especially scanty radar information.
(d) In determining if risk of collision exists the following con-
siderations shall be among those taken into account:
(i) Such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass
bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreci-
ably change.
(ii) Such risk may sometimes exist even when an ap-
preciable bearing change is evident, particularly
when approaching a very large vessel or a tow or
when approaching a vessel at close range.
Rule 8-Action to Avoid Collision
(a) Any action shall be taken in accordance with the Rules of
this Part and, if the circumstances of the case admit, be
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positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the
observance of good seamanship.
(b) Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision
shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be large
enough to be readily apparent to another vessel observ-
ing visually or by radar; a succession of small alterations
of course and/or speed should be avoided.
(c) If there is sufficient sea room, alteration of course alone
may be the most effective action to avoid a close-quarters
situation provided that it is made in good time, is substan-
tial and does not result in another close-quarters
situation.
(d) Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall
be such as to result in passing at a safe distance. The ef-
fectiveness of the action shall be carefully checked until
the other vessel is finally past and clear.
(e) If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess
the situation, a vessel may slacken her speed or take all
way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion.
(f) (i) A vessel which, by any of these rules, is required not to
impede the passage or safe passage of another vessel shall,
when required by the circumstances of the case, take early
action to allow sufficient sea room for the safe passage of
the other vessel. (ii) A vessel required not to impede the
passage or safe passage of another vessel is not relieved of
this obligation if approaching the other vessel so as to in-
volve risk of collision and shall, when taking action, have
full regard to the action which may be required by the
rules of this part. (iii) A vessel, the passage of which is not
to be impeded remains fully obliged to comply with the
rules of this part when the two vessels are approaching
one another so as to involve risk of collision.
Section/Subpart 11-Conduct of Vessels in Sight of One
Another
Rule 11-Application
Rules 11-18 apply to vessels in sight of one another.
Rule 13-Overtaking
(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules, any ves-
sel overtaking any other shall keep out of the way of the
vessel being overtaken.
(b) A vessel shall be deemed to be overtaking when coming
up with a another vessel from a direction more than 22.5
degrees abaft her beam, that is, in such a position with
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reference to the vessel she is overtaking, that at night she
would be able to see only the sternlight of that vessel but
neither of her sidelights.
(c) When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether she is overtak-
ing another, she shall assume that this is the case and act
accordingly.
(d) Any subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two
vessels shall not make the overtaking vessel a crossing ves-
sel within the meaning of these Rules or relieve her of
the duty of keeping clear of the overtaken vessel until she
is finally past and clear.
Rule 14-Head-on Situation
(a) Unless otherwise agreed [using onboard communications]
when two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal
or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of colli-
sion each shall alter her course to starboard so that each
shall pass on the port side of the other.
(b) Such a situation shall be deemed to exist when a vessel
sees the other ahead or nearly ahead and by night she
could see the masthead lights of the other in a line or
nearly in a line or both sidelights and by day she observes
the corresponding aspect of the other vessel.
(c) When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether such a situa-
tion exists she shall assume that it does exist and act
accordingly....
Rule 15-Crossing Situation
When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk
of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard
side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of
the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.
Rule 16-Action by Give-way Vessel
Every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of another
vessel shall, so far as possible, take early and substantial action to
keep well clear.
Rule 17-Action by Stand-on Vessel
(a) (i) Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way, the
other shall keep her course and speed.
(ii) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid colli-
sion by her maneuver alone, as soon as it becomes appar-
ent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is
not taking appropriate action in compliance with these
Rules.
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(b) When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her
course and speed finds herself so close that collision can-
not be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone,
she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid
collision.
(c) A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing sit-
uation in accordance with subparagraph (a) (ii) of this
Rule to avoid collision with another power-driven vessel
shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter
course to port for a vessel on her own port side.
(d) This Rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obli-
gation to keep out of the way.
Rule 18-Responsibilities Between Vessels
Except where Rules 9, 10, and 13 otherwise require:
(a) A power-driven vessel underway shall keep out of the way
of:
(ii) a vessel not under command;
(iii) a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver;
(iv) a vessel engaged in fishing;
(v) a sailing vessel.
(e) A seaplane on the water shall, in general, keep well clear
of all vessels and avoid impeding their navigation. In cir-
cumstances, however, where risk of collision exists, she
shall comply with the Rules of this Part.
(f) (i) A WIG [wing in ground-effect] craft shall, when tak-
ing off, landing and in flight near the surface, keep well
clear of all other vessels and avoid impeding their
navigation;
(ii) a WIG craft operating on the water surface shall
comply with the Rules of this Part as a power-driven
vessel.
Section/Subpart III-Conduct of Vessels in Restricted Visibility
Rule 19-Conduct of Vessels in Restricted Visibility
(a) This Rule applies to vessels not in sight of one another when
navigating in or near an area of restricted visibility.
(b) Every vessel shall proceed at a safe speed adapted to the
prevailing circumstances and conditions of restricted visi-
bility. A power-driven vessel shall have her engines ready
for immediate maneuver.
(c) Every vessel shall have due regard to the prevailing cir-
cumstances and conditions of restricted visibility when
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complying with the Rules [of Section I of this Part, Rules
4 through 10].
(d) A vessel which detects by radar alone the presence of an-
other vessel shall determine if a close-quarters situation is
developing or risk of collision exists. If so, she shall take
avoiding action in ample time, provided that when such
action consists of an alteration in course, so far as possi-
ble the following shall be avoided:
(i) An alteration of course to port for a vessel forward of
the beam, other than for a vessel being overtaken;
(ii) An alteration of course toward a vessel abeam or
abaft the beam.78 7
§ 91.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsi-
ble for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of
that aircraft.
(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action,
the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this
part to the extent required to meet that emergency.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under
paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of
the Administrator, send a written report of that devaiton
to the Administrator.
C. APPENDIX C: REGULATORY GUIDANCE
6-4-1. Two-way Radio Communications Failure
a. It is virtually impossible to provide regulations and proce-
dures applicable to all possible situations associated with
two-way radio communications failure. During two-way ra-
dio communications failure, when confronted by a situa-
tion not covered in the regulation, pilots are expected to
exercise good judgment in whatever action they elect to
take. Should the situation so dictate they should not be re-
luctant to use the emergency action contained in 14 CFR
Section 91.3(b).
b. Whether two-way communications failure constitutes an
emergency depends on the circumstances, and in any
event, it is a determination made by the pilot. 14 CFR Sec-
tion 91.3(b) authorizes a pilot to deviate from any rule in
787 14 C.F.R § 91.3 (2012).
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Subparts A and B to the extent required to meet an
emergency.
c. In the event of two-way radio communications failure, ATC
service will be provided on the basis that the pilot is operat-
ing in accordance with 14 CFR.
Section 91.185. A pilot experiencing two-way communications
failure should (unless emergency authority is exercised) comply
with 14 CFR Section 91.185 ... 788
6-1-2. Emergency Condition-Request Assistance Immediately
a. An emergency can be either a distress or urgency condition
as defined in the Pilot/Controller Glossary. Pilots do not
hesitate to declare an emergency when they are faced with
distress conditions such as fire, mechanical failure, or struc-
tural damage. However, some are reluctant to report an
urgency condition when they encounter situations which
may not be immediately perilous, but are potentially cata-
strophic. An aircraft is in at least an urgency condition the
moment the pilot becomes doubtful about position, fuel
endurance, weather, or any other condition that could ad-
versely affect flight safety. This is the time to ask for help,
not after the situation has developed into a distress
condition.
b. Pilots who become apprehensive for their safety for any
reason should request assistance immediately. Ready and will-
ing help is available in the form of radio, radar, direction
finding stations and other aircraft. Delay has caused acci-
dents and cost lives. Safety is not a luxury! Take action!
AIM 7-6-3 Near Midair Collision Reporting
a. Purpose and Data Uses. The primary purpose of the Near
Midair Collision (NMAC) Reporting Program is to provide
information for use in enhancing the safety and efficiency
of the National Airspace System. Data obtained from
NMAC reports are used by the FAA to improve the quality
of FAA services to users and to develop programs, policies,
and procedures aimed at the reduction of NMAC occur-
rences. All NMAC reports are thoroughly investigated by
Flight Standards Facilities in coordination with Air Traffic
Facilities. Data from these investigations are transmitted to
FAA Headquarters in Washington, DC, where they are
compiled and analyzed, and where safety programs and
recommendations are developed.
788 AIM, supra note 15, at ch. 10.
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b. Definition. A near midair collision is defined as an inci-
dent associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a
possibility of collision occurs as a result of proximity of less
than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received
from a pilot or a flight crew member stating that a collision
hazard existed between two or more aircraft.
c. Reporting Responsibility. It is the responsibility of the pilot
and/or flight crew to determine whether a near midair col-
lision did actually occur and, if so, to initiate a NMAC re-
port. Be specific, as ATC will not interpret a casual remark
to mean that a NMAC is being reported. The pilot should
state 'I wish to report a near midair collision.'
d. Where to File Reports. Pilots and/or flight crew members
involved in NMAC occurrences are urged to report each
incident immediately:
1. By radio or telephone to the nearest FAA ATC facility or
FSS.
2. In writing, in lieu of the above, to the nearest Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO).
e. Items to be Reported.
1. Date and time (UTC) of incident.
2. Location of incident and altitude.
3. Identification and type of reporting aircraft, aircrew des-
tination, name and home base of pilot.
4. Identification and type of other aircraft, aircrew destina-
tion, name and home base of pilot.
5. Type of flight plans; station altimeter setting used.
6. Detailed weather conditions at altitude or flight level.
7. Approximate courses of both aircraft: indicate if one or
both aircraft were climbing or descending.
8. Reported separation in distance at first sighting, prox-
imity at closest point horizontally and vertically, and
length of time in sight prior to evasive action.
9. Degree of evasive action taken, if any (from both air-
craft, if possible).
10. Injuries, if any.
f. Investigation. The FSDO in whose area the incident oc-
curred is responsible for the investigation and reporting of
NMACs.
g. Existing radar, communication, and weather data will be
examined in the conduct of the investigation. When possi-
ble, all cockpit crew members will be interviewed regarding
factors involving the NMAC incident. Air traffic controllers
2015]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
will be interviewed in cases where one or more of the in-
volved aircraft was provided ATC service. Both flight and
ATC procedures will be evaluated. When the investigation
reveals a violation of an FAA regulation, enforcement ac-
tion will be pursued.
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM):
8-1-6. Vision in Flight
c. Scanning for Other Aircraft
1. Scanning the sky for other aircraft is a key factor in colli-
sion avoidance. It should be used continuously by the pilot
and copilot (or right seat passenger) to cover all areas of
the sky visible from the cockpit. Although pilots must meet
specific visual acuity requirements, the ability to read an
eye chart does not ensure that one will be able to effi-
ciently spot other aircraft. Pilots must develop an effective
scanning technique which maximizes one's visual capabili-
ties. The probability of spotting a potential collision threat
obviously increases with the time spent looking outside the
cockpit. Thus, one must use timesharing techniques to ef-
ficiently scan the surrounding airspace while monitoring
instruments as well.
2. While the eyes can observe an approximate 200 degree arc
of the horizon at one glance, only a very small center area
called the fovea, in the rear of the eye, has the ability to
send clear, sharply focused messages to the brain. All
other visual information that is not processed directly
through the fovea will be of less detail. An aircraft at a
distance of 7 miles which appears in sharp focus within the
foveal center of vision would have to be as close as 7/10 of
a mile in order to be recognized if it were outside of foveal
vision. Because the eyes can focus only on this narrow
viewing area, effective scanning is accomplished with a se-
ries of short, regularly spaced eye movements that bring
successive areas of the sky into the central visual field.
Each movement should not exceed 10 degrees, and each
area should be observed for at least 1 second to enable
detection. Although horizontal back-and-forth eye move-
ments seem preferred by most pilots, each pilot should de-
velop a scanning pattern that is most comfortable and
then adhere to it to assure optimum scanning.
3. Studies show that the time a pilot spends on visual tasks
inside the cabin should represent no more that 1/4 to 1/3
of the scan time outside, or no more than 4 to 5 seconds
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on the instrument panel for every 16 seconds outside.
Since the brain is already trained to process sight informa-
tion that is presented from left to right, one may find it
easier to start scanning over the left shoulder and proceed
across the windshield to the right.
4. Pilots should realize that their eyes may require several
seconds to refocus when switching views between items in
the cockpit and distant objects. The eyes will also tire more
quickly when forced to adjust to distances immediately af-
ter close-up focus, as required for scanning the instrument
panel. Eye fatigue can be reduced by looking from the in-
strument panel to the left wing past the wing tip to the
center of the first scan quadrant when beginning the exte-
rior scan. After having scanned from left to right, allow the
eyes to return to the cabin along the right wing from its tip
inward. Once back inside, one should automatically com-
mence the panel scan.
5. Effective scanning also helps avoid "empty-field myopia."
This condition usually occurs when flying above the clouds
or in a haze layer that provides nothing specific to focus
on outside the aircraft. This causes the eyes to relax and
seek a comfortable focal distance which may range from
10 to 30 feet. For the pilot, this means looking without
seeing, which is dangerous.
8-1-8. Judgment Aspects of Collision Avoidance
a. Introduction. The most important aspects of vision and the
techniques to scan for other aircraft are described in para-
graph 8-1-6, Vision in Flight. Pilots should also be familiar
with the following information to reduce the possibility of
mid-air collisions.
b. Determining Relative Altitude. Use the horizon as a refer-
ence point. If the other aircraft is above the horizon, it is
probably on a higher flight path. If the aircraft appears to
be below the horizon, it is probably flying at a lower
altitude.
c. Taking Appropriate Action. Pilots should be familiar with
rules on right-of-way, so if an aircraft is on an obvious colli-
sion course, one can take immediate evasive action, prefer-
ably in compliance with applicable Federal Aviation
Regulations.
d. Consider Multiple Threats. The decision to climb, de-
scend, or turn is a matter of personal judgment, but one
should anticipate that the other pilot may also be making a
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quick maneuver. Watch the other aircraft during the ma-
neuver and begin your scanning again immediately since
there may be other aircraft in the area.
e. Collision Course Targets. Any aircraft that appears to have
no relative motion and stays in one scan quadrant is likely
to be on a collision course. Also, if a target shows no lateral
or vertical motion, but increases in size, take evasive action.
f. Recognize High Hazard Areas.
1. Airways, especially near VORs, and Class B, Class C, Class
D, and Class E surface areas are places where aircraft
tend to cluster.
2. Remember, most collisions occur during days when the
weather is good. Being in a "radar environment" still re-
quires vigilance to avoid collisions.
g. Cockpit Management. Studying maps, checklists, and
manuals before flight, with other proper preflight plan-
ning; e.g., noting necessary radio frequencies and organiz-
ing cockpit materials, can reduce the amount of time
required to look at these items during flight, permitting
more scan time.
h. Windshield Conditions. Dirty or bug-smeared windshields
can greatly reduce the ability of pilots to see other aircraft.
Keep a clean windshield.
i. Visibility Conditions. Smoke, haze, dust, rain, and flying to-
wards the sun can also greatly reduce the ability to detect
targets.
j. Visual Obstructions in the Cockpit.
1. Pilots need to move their heads to see around blind
spots caused by fixed aircraft structures, such as door-
posts, wings, etc. It will be necessary at times to maneu-
ver the aircraft; e.g., lift a wing, to facilitate seeing.
2. Pilots must ensure curtains and other cockpit objects;
e.g., maps on glare shield, are removed and stowed dur-
ing flight.
k. Lights On.
1. Day or night, use of exterior lights can greatly increase
the conspicuity of any aircraft.
2. Keep interior lights low at night.
1. ATC Support. ATC facilities often provide radar traffic ad-
visories on a workload-permitting basis. Flight through
Class C and Class D airspace requires communication with
ATC. Use this support whenever possible or when required.
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4-4-15. Use of Visual Clearing Procedures
a. Before Takeoff. Prior to taxiing onto a runway or landing
area in preparation for takeoff, pilots should scan the ap-
proach areas for possible landing traffic and execute the
appropriate clearing maneuvers to provide them a clear
view of the approach areas.
b. Climbs and Descents. During climbs and descents in flight
conditions which permit visual detection of other traffic,
pilots should execute gentle banks, left and right at a fre-
quency which permits continuous visual scanning of the
airspace about them.
c. Straight and Level. Sustained periods of straight and level
flight in conditions which permit visual detection of other
traffic should be broken at intervals with appropriate clear-
ing procedures to provide effective visual scanning.
d. Traffic Pattern. Entries into traffic patterns while descend-
ing create specific collision hazards and should be avoided.
e. Traffic at VOR Sites. All operators should emphasize the
need for sustained vigilance in the vicinity of VORs and
airway intersections due to the convergence of traffic.
f. Training Operations. Operators of pilot training programs
are urged to adopt the following practices:
1. Pilots undergoing flight instruction at all levels should
be requested to verbalize clearing procedures (call out
"clear" left, right, above, or below) to instill and sustain
the habit of vigilance during maneuvering.
2. High-wing airplane. Momentarily raise the wing in the
direction of the intended turn and look.
3. Low-wing airplane. Momentarily lower the wing in the
direction of the intended turn and look.
4. Appropriate clearing procedures should precede the ex-
ecution of all turns including chandelles, lazy eights,
stalls, slow flight, climbs, straight and level, spins, and
other combination maneuvers.789
Advisory Circular 90-48C, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance"
1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular is issued for the purpose of
alerting all pilots to the potential hazards of midair collision and
near midair collision, and to emphasize those basic problem ar-
eas related to the human causal factors where improvements in
pilot education, operating practices, procedures, and improved
scanning techniques are needed to reduce midair conflicts.
789 AIM, supra note 15, at 4-4-15.
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a. "See and Avoid" Concept
(1) The flight rules prescribed in Part 91 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) set forth the concept of
"See and Avoid." This concept requires that vigilance
shall be maintained at all times, by each person operat-
ing an aircraft, regardless of whether the operation is
conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Vis-
ual Flight Rules (VFR).
(2) Pilots should also keep in mind their responsibility for
continuously maintaining a vigilant lookout regardless
of the type of aircraft being flown. Remember that
most MAC [midair collision] accidents and reported
NMAC [near midair collision] incidents occurred dur-
ing good VFR weather conditions and during the
hours of daylight.
b. Visual Scanning
(1) Pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic
movement within their field of vision as well as period-
ically scanning the entire visual field outside of their
aircraft to ensure detection of conflicting traffic. Re-
member that the performance capabilities of many air-
craft, in both speed and rates of climb/descent, result
in high closure rates limiting the time available for de-
tection, decision, and evasive action. (See the "Dis-
tance-Speed-Time" chart in Appendix 1.)
(2) The probability of spotting a potential collision threat
increases with the time spent looking outside, but cer-
tain techniques may be used to increase the effective-
ness of the scan time. The human eyes tend to focus
somewhere, even in a featureless sky. In order to be
most effective, the pilot should shift glances and
refocus at intervals. Most pilots do this in the process
of scanning the instrument panel, but it is also impor-
tant to focus outside to set up the visual system for ef-
fective target acquisition.
(3) Pilots should also realize that their eyes may require
several seconds to refocus when switching views be-
tween items in the cockpit and distant objects. Proper
scanning requires the constant sharing of attention
with other piloting tasks, thus it is easily degraded by
such psychophysiological conditions such as fatigue,
boredom, illness, anxiety, or preoccupation.
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(4) Effective scanning is accomplished with a series of
short, regularly-spaced eye movements that bring suc-
cessive areas of the sky into the central visual field.
Each movement should not exceed 10 degrees, and
each area should be observed for at least 1 second to
enable detection. Although horizontal back-and-forth
eye movements seem preferred by most pilots, each pi-
lot should develop a scanning pattern that is most
comfortable and then adhere to it to assure optimum
scanning.
(5) Peripheral vision can be most useful in spotting colli-
sion threats from other aircraft. Each time a scan is
stopped and the eyes are refocused, the peripheral vi-
sion takes on more importance because it is through
this element that movement is detected. Apparent
movement is almost always the first perception of a
collision threat and probably the most important, be-
cause it is the discovery of a threat that triggers the
events leading to proper evasive action. It is essential
to remember, however, that if another aircraft appears
to have no relative motion, it is likely to be on a colli-
sion course with you. If the other aircraft shows no lat-
eral or vertical motion, but is increasing in size, take
immediate evasive action.
(6) Visual search at night depends almost entirely on pe-
ripheral vision. In order to perceive a very dim lighted
object in a certain direction, the pilot should not look
directly at the object, but scan the area adjacent to it.
Short stops, of a few seconds, in each scan will help to
detect the light and its movement.
(7) Lack of brightness and color contrast in daytime and
conflicting ground lights at night increase the diffi-
culty of detecting other aircraft.
(8) Pilots are reminded of the requirement to move one's
head in order to search around the physical obstruc-
tions, such as door and window posts. The doorpost
can cover a considerable amount of sky, but a small




(i) Prior to taxiing onto a runway or landing area for
takeoff, scan the approach areas for possible land-
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ing traffic by maneuvering the aircraft to provide
a clear view of such areas. It is important that this
be accomplished even though a taxi or takeoff
clearance has been received.
(ii) During climbs and descents in flight conditions
which permit visual detection of other traffic, exe-
cute gentle banks left and right at a frequency
which permits continuous visual scanning of the
airspace about them.
(iii) Execute appropriate clearing procedures before
all turns, abnormal maneuvers, or acrobatics.
d. Airspace, Flight Rules, and Operational Environment.
(1) Pilots should be aware of the type of airspace in which
they intend to operate in order to comply with the
flight rules applicable to that airspace. Aeronautical
information concerning the National Airspace System
is disseminated by three methods: aeronautical charts
(primary); the Airman's Information Manual (AIM);
and the Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) system. The
general operating and flight rules governing the oper-
ation of aircraft within the United States are contained
in Part 91 of the FAR.
(2) Pilots should:
(i) Use currently effective aeronautical charts for the
route or area in which they intend to operate.
(ii) Note and understand the aeronautical legend
and chart symbols related to airspace informa-
tion depicted on aeronautical charts.
(iii) Develop a working knowledge of the various air-
space segments, including the vertical and hori-
zontal boundaries.
(iv) Develop a working knowledge of the specific
flight rules (FAR 91) governing operation of air-
craft within the various airspace segments.
(v) Use the AIM. The Basic Flight Information and
ATC Procedures describe the airspace segments
and the basic pilot responsibilities for operating
in such airspace.
(vi) Contact the nearest FAA Flight Service Station for
any pertinent NOTAMS pertaining to their area
of operation.
(3) Pilots should also be familiar with, and exercise cau-
tion, in those operational environments where they
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may expect to find a high volume of traffic or special
types of aircraft operation. These areas include Termi-
nal Radar Service Areas (TRSA's), airport traffic pat-
terns, particularly at airports without a control tower;
airport traffic areas (below 3,000 feet above the sur-
face within five statute miles of an airport with an op-
erating control tower); terminal control areas; control
zones, including any extensions; Federal airways; vicin-
ity of VOR's; restricted areas; warning areas; alert ar-
.eas; Military Operating Areas (MOA); intensive
studentjet training areas; military low-level high-speed
training routes; instrument approach areas; and areas
of high density jet arrival/departure routings, espe-
cially in the vicinity of major terminals and military
bases.
e. Use of Communications Equipment and Air Traffic Advi-
sory Services.
(1) One of the major factors contributing to the likeli-
hood of NMAC incidents in terminal areas that have
an operating air traffic control (ATC) system has been
the mix of known arriving and departing aircraft with
unknown traffic. The known aircraft are generally in ra-
dio contact with the controlling facility (local, ap-
proach, or departure control) and the other aircraft
are neither in two-way radio contact nor identified by
ATC at the time of the NMAC. This precludes ATC
from issuing traffic advisory information to either
aircraft.
(2) Although pilots should adhere to the necessary com-
munications requirements when operating VFR, they
are also urged to take advantage of the air traffic advi-
sory services available to VFR aircraft.
(3) Pilots should:
(i) Use the AIM.
a. The basic AIM contains a section dealing with
services available to pilots, including informa-
tion on VFR advisory services, radar traffic in-
formation services for VFR pilots, and
recommended traffic advisory practices -at
nontower airports.
b. The airport/facility directory contains a list of
all major airports showing the services available
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to pilots and the applicable communication
frequencies.
(ii) Develop a working knowledge of those facilities
providing traffic advisory services and the area in
which they give these services.
(iii) Initiate radio contact with the appropriate termi-
nal radar or nonradar facility when operating
within the perimeters of the advertised service ar-
eas or within 15 miles of the facility when no ser-
vice area is specified.
(iv) When it is not practical to initiate radio contact
for traffic information, at least monitor the appro-
priate facility communication frequency, particu-
larly when operating in or through arrival/
departure routes and instrument approach areas.
(v) Remember that controller observation of aircraft
in the terminal area is often limited by distance,
depth perception, aircraft conspicuity, and other
normal visual acuity problems. Limitations of ra-
dar (when available), traffic volume, controller
workload, unknown traffic, etc., may prevent the
controller from providing timely traffic advisory
information. Traffic advisories are secondary to
the controllers' primary duties (which are separat-
ing aircraft under their control and issuing safety
advisories when aware of safety conflicts). There-
fore, the pilot is responsible for seeing and avoid-
ing other traffic. Traffic advisories should be
requested and used when available to assist the pi-
lot to see and avoid other traffic by assisting, but
not substituting in any way, the pilot's own visual
scanning. It is important to remember that adviso-
ries which air traffic control may provide are not
intended to lessen in any manner the pilot's obli-
gation to properly scan to see and avoid traffic.
f. Airport Traffic Patterns.
(1) A significant number of midair collisions, as well as
near midair collisions, have occurred within the traffic
pattern environment.
(2) Pilots should:
(i) When operating at tower-controlled airports,
maintain two-way radio contact with the tower
while within the airport traffic area. Make every
210
"SEE AND AVOID" RULES
effort to see and properly avoid any aircraft
pointed out by the tower, or any other aircraft
which may be in the area and unknown to the
tower.
(ii) When entering a known traffic pattern at a
nontower airport, keep a sharp lookout for other
aircraft in the pattern. Enter the pattern in level
flight and allow plenty of spacing to avoid overtak-
ing or cutting any aircraft out of the pattern.
(iii) When approaching an unfamiliar airport fly over
or circle the airport at least 500 feet above traffic
pattern altitude (usually at 2,000 feet or more
above the surface) to observe the airport layout,
any local traffic in the area, and the wind and traf-
fic direction indicators. Never descend into the
traffic pattern from directly above the airport.
(iv) Be particularly alert before turning to the base
leg, final approach course, and during the final
approach to landing. At nontower airports, avoid
entering the traffic pattern on the base leg or
from a straight-in approach to the landing runway.
(v) Compensate for blind spots due to aircraft design
and flight attitude by moving your head or maneu-
vering the aircraft.
g. Flying In Formation.
(1) Several midair collisions have occurred which involved
aircraft on the same mission, with each pilot aware of
the other's presence.
(2) Pilots who are required, by the nature of their opera-
tions, to fly in pairs or in formation are cautioned to:
(i) Recognize the high statistical probability of their
involvement in midair collisions.
(ii) Make sure that adequate preflight preparations
are made and the procedures to be followed are
understood by all pilots intending to participate
in the mission.
(iii) Always keep the other aircraft in sight despite
possible distraction and preoccupation with
other mission requirements.
2015]
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(iv) Avoid attempting formation flight without having
obtained instruction and attained the skill neces-
sary for conducting such operations.79 °
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FIGURE 1: CRITICAL SECONDS CHART
790 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 90-48C, PILOTS' ROLE IN
COLLISION AVOIDANCE (1983) [hereinafter A.C. 90-48C].
791 A human being needs about ten seconds from the sighting of a target to
initiating avoiding action. The other two seconds in the table are aircraft re-
sponse time. The ten seconds is a minimum to avoid collision and does not guar-
antee a passage that is "well clear."
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AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL (AIM) 2013
SECTION 2. CONTROLLED AIRSPACE
3-2-3 Class B Airspace
e. ATC Clearance and Separation. An ATC clearance is re-
quired to enter and operate within Class B airspace. VFR
pilots are provided sequencing and separation from other
aircraft while operating within Class B airspace.
3. This program is not to be interpreted as relieving pi-
lots of their responsibilities to see and avoid other
traffic operating in basic VFR weather conditions, to
adjust their operations and flight path as necessary to
preclude serious wake encounters, to maintain appro-
priate terrain and obstruction clearance or to remain
in weather conditions equal to or better than the
minimums required by 14 C.F.R. section 91.155. Ap-
proach control should be advised and a revised clear-
ance or instruction obtained when compliance with
an assigned route, heading and/or altitude is likely to
compromise pilot responsibility with respect to ter-
rain and obstruction clearance, vortex exposure, and
weather minimums.792
3-2-4 Class C Airspace
(k) Secondary Airports
[Subsections 1-3 note that secondary airports may underlie class
C airspace. These subsections discuss under what conditions air-
craft operating to or from these secondary airports will be pro-
vided Class C Airspace services].
4. This program is not to be interpreted as relieving pi-
lots of their responsibilities to see and avoid other traf-
fic operating in basic VFR weather conditions, to
adjust their operations and flight path as necessary to
preclude serious wake encounters, to maintain appro-
priate terrain and obstruction clearance or to remain
in weather conditions equal to or better than the mini-
mums required by 14 C.F.R. Section 91.155. Approach
control should be advised and a revised clearance or
instruction obtained when compliance with an as-
signed route, heading and/or altitude is likely to com-
promise pilot responsibility with respect to terrain and
792 AIM, supra note 15, at 3-2-3(e) (3).
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obstruction clearance, vortex exposure, and weather
minimums.79 3
SECTION 3 CLASS G AIRSPACE
3-3-1 General
Class G airspace (uncontrolled) is that portion of airspace that
has not been designated as Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, or
Class E airspace.
3-3-2. VFR Requirements
Rules governing VFR flight have been adopted to assist the pilot
in meeting the responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft.
Minimum flight visibility and distance from clouds required for
VFR flight are contained in 14?CFR Section 91.155. TM
CHAPTER 4. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
Section 1. Services Available to Pilots
4-1-18. Terminal Radar Services for VFR Aircraft
[Subsections (a)-(d) describe radar sequencing and separation
service provided VFR aircraft operating in a TRSA]
e. PILOT RESPONSIBILITY. THESE SERVICES ARE NOT
TO BE INTERPRETED AS RELIEVING PILOTS OF
THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO SEE AND AVOID OTHER
TRAFFIC OPERATING IN BASIC VFR WEATHER CONDI-
TIONS, TO ADJUST THEIR OPERATIONS AND FLIGHT
PATH AS NECESSARY TO PRECLUDE SERIOUS WAKE
ENCOUNTERS, TO MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE TER-
RAIN AND OBSTRUCTION CLEARANCE, OR TO RE-
MAIN IN WEATHER CONDITIONS EQUAL TO OR
BETTER THAN THE MINIMUMS REQUIRED BY 14 CFR
SECTION?91.155. WHENEVER COMPLIANCE WITH AN
ASSIGNED ROUTE, HEADING AND/OR ALTITUDE IS
LIKELY TO COMPROMISE PILOT RESPONSIBILITY RE-
SPECTING TERRAIN AND OBSTRUCTION CLEAR-
ANCE, VORTEX EXPOSURE, AND WEATHER
MINIMUMS, APPROACH CONTROL SHOULD BE SO
ADVISED AND A REVISED CLEARANCE OR INSTRUC-
TION OBTAINED (emphasis omitted).
CHAPTER 7. VISUAL 795
Section 3. VFR-ON-TOP
7-3-1. VFR-ON-TOP
793 Id. at 3-2-4(f)(4).
794 Id. at 3-3-2.
795 FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66.
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a. You may clear an aircraft to maintain "VFR-on-top" if the




1. When an aircraft has been cleared to maintain "VFR-on-
top," the pilot is responsible to fly at an appropriate VFR
altitude, comply with VFR visibility and distance from
cloud criteria, and to be vigilant so as to see and avoid
other aircraft. The pilot is also responsible to comply with
instrument flight rules applicable to the flight (e.g., adher-
ence to ATC clearances). 796
6-1-1. Pilot Responsibility and Authority
a. The pilot-in-command of an aircraft is directly responsible
for and is the final authority as to the operation of that
aircraft. In an emergency requiring immediate action, the
pilot-in-command may deviate from any rule in 14 C.F.R.
Part 91, Subpart A, General, and Subpart B, Flight Rules, to
the extent required to meet that emergency.
b. If the emergency authority of 14 CFR Section 91.3(b) is
used to deviate from the provisions of an ATC clearance,
the pilot-in-command must notify ATC as soon as possible
and obtain an amended clearance.
c. Unless deviation is necessary under the emergency authority of 14
CFR Section 91.3, pilots of JFR flights experiencing two-way radio
communications failure are expected to adhere to the procedures
prescribed under [FAR 91.185] "IFR operations, two-way radio
cominunications failure. ,,97
6-4-1. Two-way Radio Communications Failure
a. It is virtually impossible to provide regulations and proce-
dures applicable to all possible situations associated with
two-way radio communications failure. During two-way ra-
dio communications failure, when confronted by a situa-
tion not covered in the regulation, pilots are expected to
exercise good judgment in whatever action they elect to
take. Should the situation so dictate they should not be re-
luctant to use the emergency action contained in 14 CFR
Section 91.3(b).
b. Whether two-way communications failure constitutes an emergency
depends on the circumstances, and in any event, it is a determi-
796 Id. at 7-3-1-.
797 AIM, supra note 15, at 6-6-1(a)-(c) (emphasis added).
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nation made by the pilot. 14 C.F.R. Section 91.3(b) autho-
rizes a pilot to deviate from any rule in Subparts A and B to
the extent required to meet an emergency.
c. In the event of two-way radio communications failure, ATC
service will be provided on the basis that the pilot is operating in
accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.185. A pilot experiencing two-
way communications failure should (unless emergency authority is
exercised) comply with 14 CFR Section 91.185[.]7 98
NOTE [on 91.185(b) VFR Conditions]
The primary objective of this provision in 14 CFR Section 91.185
[to maintain VFR and land] is to preclude extended IFR opera-
tion by these aircraft within the ATC system. Pilots should recog-
nize that operation under these conditions may unnecessarily as
well as adversely affect other users of the airspace, since ATC
may be required to reroute or delay other users in order to pro-
tect the failure aircraft. However, it is not intended that the re-
quirement to "land as soon as practicable" be construed to
mean "as soon as possible." Pilots retain the prerogative of exer-
cising their best judgment and are not required to land at an
unauthorized airport, at an airport unsuitable for the type of
aircraft flown, or to land only minutes short of their intended
destination. ... "
6-4-2. Transponder Operation During Two-way Communica-
tions Failure
a. If an aircraft with a coded radar beacon transponder ex-
periences a loss of two-way radio capability, the pilot should
adjust the transponder to reply on Mode A/3, Code 7600.
b. The pilot should understand that the aircraft may not be
in an area of radar coverage. 0 0
b. Aeronautical Information Manual
5-5-9. Speed Adjustments
a. Pilot.
1. Advises ATC any time cruising airspeed varies plus or
minus 5 percent or 10 knots, whichever is greater, from
that given in the flight plan.
2. Complies with speed adjustments from ATC unless:
(a) The minimum or maximum safe airspeed for any
particular operation is greater or less than the re-
quested airspeed. In such cases, advises ATC.
798 Id.
799 Id.
800 Id. at 6-4-2(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
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NOTE-
It is the pilot's responsibility and prerogative to refuse speed adjustments
considered excessive or contray to the aircraft's operating specifications.
(b) Operating at or above 10,000 feet MSL on an ATC
assigned SPEED ADJUSTMENT of more than 250
knots LAS and subsequent clearance is received for
descent below 10,000 feet MSL. In such cases, pilots
are expected to comply with 14 C.F.R. Section
91.117(a).
3. When complying with speed adjustment assignments,
maintains an indicated airspeed within plus or minus 10
knots or 0.02 Mach number of the specified speed.
b. Controller.
1. Assigns speed adjustments to aircraft when necessary
but not as a substitute for good vectoring technique.
2. Adheres to the restrictions published in the FAAO JO
7110.65, Air Traffic Control, as to when speed adjust-
ment procedures may be applied.
3. Avoids speed adjustments requiring alternate decreases
and increases.
4. Assigns speed adjustments to a specified IAS (KNOTS)/
Mach number or to increase or decrease speed using
increments of 10 knots or multiples thereof.
5. Terminates ATC-assigned speed adjustments when no
longer required by issuing further instructions to pilots
in the following manner:
(a) Advises pilots to "resume normal speed" when
the aircraft is on a heading, random routing,
charted procedure, or route without published
speed restrictions
[. ..
6. Gives due consideration to aircraft capabilities to re-
duce speed while descending.
7. Does not assign speed adjustments to aircraft at or
above FL390 without pilots consent.8 1
FAA AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Order JO 7110.65V80 2
5-7-1. APPLICATION
Keep speed adjustments to the minimum necessary to achieve
or maintain required or desired spacing. Avoid adjustments re-
801 Id. at 5-5-9.
802 FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66 (incorporating chg. 3 (2013).
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quiring alternate decreases and increases. Terminate speed ad-
justments when no longer needed.
NOTE-
It is the pilot's responsibility and prerogative to refuse speed adjustment
that he/she considers excessive or contrary to the aircraft's operating
specifications.
5-7-4. TERMINATION




"Resume normal speed" is only used where there is not underlying pub-
lished speed restriction. It does not delete speed restrictions on upcoming
segments offlight and does not relieve the pilot of those speed restrictions
which are applicable to 14 C.ER. Section 91.117 803
5-3-5. Airway or Route Course Changes
a. Pilots of aircraft are required to adhere to airways or routes
being flown. Special attention must be given to this re-
quirement during course changes. Each course change
consists of variables that make the technique applicable in
each case a matter only the pilot can resolve. Some vari-
ables which must be considered are turn radius, wind ef-
fect, airspeed, degree of turn, and cockpit instrumentation.
An early turn, as illustrated below, is one method of adher-
ing to airways or routes. The use of any available cockpit
instrumentation, such as Distance Measuring Equipment,
may be used by the pilot to lead the turn when making
course changes. This is consistent with the intent of 14 C.E.R
Section 91.181, which requires pilots to operate along the center-
line of an airway and along the direct course between navigational
aids or fixes.
b. Turns which begin at or after fix passage may exceed air-
way or route boundaries. FIG. 5-3-1 contains an example
flight track depicting this, together with an example of an
early turn.
c. Without such actions as leading a turn, aircraft operating
in excess of 290 knots true air speed (TAS) can exceed the
normal airway or route boundaries depending on the
amount of course change required, wind direction and ve-
locity, the character of the turn fix (DME, overhead naviga-
tion aid, or intersection), and the pilot's technique in
803 Id.
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making a course change. For example, a flight operating at
17,000 feet MSL with a TAS of 400 knots, a 25 degree bank,
and a course change of more than 40 degrees would ex-
ceed the width of the airway or route; i.e., 4 nautical miles
each side of centerline. However, in the airspace below
18,000 feet MSL, operations in excess of 290 knots TAS are
not prevalent and the provision of additional IFR separa-
tion in all course change situations for the occasional air-
craft making a turn in excess of 290 knots TAS creates an
unacceptable waste of airspace and imposes a penalty upon
the preponderance of traffic which operate at low speeds.
Consequently, the FAA expects pilots to lead turns and
take other actions they consider necessary during course
changes to adhere as closely as possible to the airways or
route being flown.80 4
FIGURE 2
FM 54-1
Adherfin to Airways or Routes
TURN AT OR AFTER
Turn Fix
FAA ADVISORY CIRCULARS
A.C. 20-30B, Aircraft Position Light and Anticollision Light
Installations
1. PURPOSE. This circular sets forth acceptable means, but
not the only means, of showing compliance with the Federal Avi-
804 AIM, supra note 15, at 5-3-5(a)-(c) (emphasis added).
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ation Regulations (FAR) applicable to installed position lights
and anticollision lights.8 0
5
4. Aeronautics Information Manual, Chapter 4-4-16 (2014)
4-4-16. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS I &
II)
a. TCAS I provides proximity warning only, to assist the pilot
in the visual acquisition of intruder aircraft. No recom-
mended avoidance maneuvers are provided nor authorized
as a direct result of a TCAS I warning. It is intended for use
by smaller commuter aircraft holding 10 to 30 passenger
seats, and general aviation aircraft.
b. TCAS II provides traffic advisories (TAs) and resolution ad-
visories (RAs). Resolution advisories provide recom-
mended maneuvers in a vertical direction (climb or
descend only) to avoid conflicting traffic. Airline aircraft,
and larger commuter and business aircraft holding 31 pas-
senger seats or more, use TCAS II equipment.
1. Each pilot who deviates from an ATC clearance in re-
sponse to a TCAS II RA must notify ATC of that devia-
tion as soon as practicable and expeditiously return to
the current ATC clearance when the traffic conflict is
resolved.
2. Deviations from rules, policies, or clearances should be
kept to the minimum necessary to satisfy a TCAS II RA.
3. The serving IFR air traffic facility is not responsible to
provide approved standard IFR separation to an aircraft
after a TCAS II RA maneuver until one of the following
conditions exists:
(a) The aircraft has returned to its assigned altitude
and course.
(b) Alternate ATC instructions have been issued.
c. TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot's basic authority
and responsibility to ensure safe flight. Since TCAS does
not respond to aircraft which are not transponder
equipped or aircraft with a transponder failure, TCAS
alone does not ensure safe separation in every case.
d. At this time, no air traffic service nor handling is predi-
cated on the availability of TCAS equipment in the
aircraft.8 0 6
805 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRcuLAR 20-30B(1), AIRCRAFT POSITION
LIGHT AND ANTICOLLISION LIGHT INSTALLATIONS (1981).
806 AIM, supra note 15, at 4-4-16.
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12. TCAS OPERATIONAL USE.
a. General. Each operator electing to use TCAS II should fol-
low and implement those skills addressed and the guidance
provided on TCAS training in paragraph 9 [above in AC].
NOTE: In no case should a pilot maneuver opposite to a
TCAS RA.
b. Pilot Responsibilities. The intent of a TCAS is to serve as a
backup to visual collision avoidance, application of right-of-way
rules, and air traffic separation service. For TCAS to work as
designed, immediate and correct crew response to TCAS
advisories is essential. Delayed crew response or reluctance
of a flight crew to adjust the aircraft's flight path as advised
by TCAS due to air traffic control (ATC) clearance provi-
sions, fear of later FAA scrutiny, or other factors could sig-
nificantly decrease or negate the protection afforded by
TCAS. Flight crews should respond to a TCAS in accor-
dance with the following guidelines when responding to
alerts:
(1) Respond to TAs by attempting to establish visual con-
tact with the intruder aircraft and other aircraft which
may be in the vicinity. Coordinate to the degree possi-
ble with other crewmembers to assist in searching for
traffic. Do not deviate from an assigned clearance
based only on TA information. For any traffic acquired
visually, continue to maintain safe separation in accor-
dance with current regulations and good operating
practices.
(2) When an RA occurs, the PFshould respond immediately by
directing attention to RA displays and maneuver as in-
dicated, unless doing so would jeopardize the safe op-
eration of the flight or the flightcrew can ensure
separation with the help of definitive visual acquisition
of the aircraft causing the RA. By not responding to an
RA, the flightcrew effectively takes responsibility for
achieving safe separation. In so choosing, consider the
following cautions:
(a) The traffic may also be equipped with TCAS and it
may maneuver in response to an RA coordinated
with your own TCAS.
(b) The traffic acquired visually may not be the same
traffic causing the RA.
(c) Visual perception of the encounter may be mis-
leading. Unless it is unequivocally clear that the
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target acquired visually is the one generating the
RA and there are no complicating circumstances,
the pilot's instinctive reaction should always be to
respond to RAs in the direction and to the degree
displayed.
(3) Satisfy RAs by disconnecting the autopilot (AP) (if
necessary) and auto throttle system (when required by
the airframe manufacturer's procedures), and using
prompt positive control inputs in the direction and
with the magnitude the TCAS advises. To achieve the
required vertical rate (normally 1,500 feet per minute
(fpm) climb or descent), first adjust the aircraft's pitch
using the suggested guidelines shown in the table be-
low. Then refer to the vertical speed indicator (VSI)
and make all necessary pitch adjustments to place the




250 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) below 40
10,000 feet
APPROACH below 200 KIAS 5* to 7a
(a) On aircraft with pitch guidance for TCAS RA dis-
plays, follow the RA pitch command for initial, in-
crease, reversal, and weakening RAs.
(b) For the TCAS to provide safe vertical separation,
initial Vertical Speed (VS) response is required
within 5 seconds of when the RA is first displayed.
Excursions from assigned altitude, when respond-
ing to an RA, typically should be no more than
300 to 500 feet to satisfy the conflict. VS responses
should be made to avoid red arcs or outlined
pitch avoidance areas and, if applicable, to accu-
rately fly to the green arc or outlined pitch gui-
dance area.
(4) Respond immediately to any increase or reversal RA
maneuver advisories. Initial VS response to an increase
or reversal RA is expected by the TCAS within 2 1/2
seconds after issuance of the advisory. Again, avoid red
arcs or outlined pitch avoidance areas and fly to the
green arc or outlined pitch guidance area.
(5) The PM should advise the PF on the progress of
achieving the vertical rates commanded by the TCAS.
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The PM and any onboard observers will assist in the
visual search for the intruder and continue to cross-
check the TCAS displayed information with other
available traffic information to ensure the RA response
is being flown correctly.
(6) If an initial corrective RA is downgraded or weakened,
such as a "CLIMB" RA downgraded to a "DO NOT DE-
SCEND" RA, pilots should respond to the weakening
RA and adjust the aircraft's VS to the rate depicted by
the green (fly to) arc or line on the instantaneous ver-
tical speed indicator (LVSI) or other suitable indicator,
while keeping the needle or pitch guidance symbol
out of the red arc or outlined pitch avoidance area.
Pilots should remember that attention to the RA dis-
play and prompt reaction to the weakened RA will
minimize altitude excursions and potential disruptions
to ATC. This will allow for proper resolution of en-
counters and reduce the probability of additional RAs
against the intruder or other traffic.
(7) Evasive maneuvering must be limited to the minimum
required to comply with the RA. Excessive responses to
RAs are not desirable or appropriate because of other
potential traffic and ATC consequences. From level
flight, proper response to an RA typically results in an
overall altitude deviation of 300 to 500 ft in order to
successfully resolve a traffic conflict.
(8) In some instances it may not be possible to respond to
a TCAS RA and continue to satisfy a clearance at the
same time. Even if a TCAS RA maneuver is inconsis-
tent with the current clearance, respond appropriately
to the RA. Since TCAS tracks all transponder-
equipped aircraft in the vicinity, responding to an RA
for an intruder assures a safe avoidance maneuver
from that intruder and from other Mode C-equipped
aircraft. Guidance in this paragraph does not conflict
with that in subparagraph 12b(2).
(9) If a TCAS RA requires maneuvering contrary to right-
of-way rules, cloud clearance rules for visual flight
rules (VFR), instrument flight rules (IFR), or other
such criteria, pilots should follow the TCAS RAs to
resolve the immediate traffic conflict. Pilots should
keep deviations from rules or clearances to the mini-
mum necessary to satisfy a TCAS RA.
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(10) If a TCAS RA response requires deviation from an
ATC clearance, expeditiously return to the current
ATC clearance when the traffic conflict is resolved,
the TCAS "CLEAR OF CONFLICT" message is heard,
or follow any subsequent change to clearance as ad-
vised by ATC. In responding to a TCAS RA that di-
rects a deviation from assigned altitude,
communicate with ATC as soon as practicable after
responding to the RA. When the RA is cleared, the
flightcrew should advise ATC that they are returning
to their previously assigned clearance or should ac-
knowledge any amended clearance issued. In addi-
tion, the flightcrew's discretionary use of other types
of reports may be desired. See Appendix 4 for sug-
gested phraseology.
(11) If a TCAS RA maneuver is contrary to other critical
cockpit warnings, pilots should respect those other
critical warnings as defined by TCAS certification and
training (that is, responses to stall warning, wind-
shear, and ground proximity warning system (GPWS)
take precedence over a TCAS RA, particularly when
the aircraft is less than 2,500 feet above ground level
(AGL)).
(12) Pilots should use TCAS traffic information displays to
increase their awareness of nearby traffic and to assist
in establishing visual contact with other aircraft. Cer-
tain electronic flight information system (EFIS)
TCAS installations operating in conjunction with
'track up' mode may require the pilot to make al-
lowances for the difference between the aircraft
heading and track when visually sighting nearby
aircraft.
(13) Unless approved by the Administrator, pilots should
operate TCAS while in flight in all airspace, including
oceanic, international, and foreign airspace.
(14) When feasible, flightcrews should use the same alti-
tude data source used by the PF to provide altitude
information to TCAS and the ATC transponders. Us-
ing a common altitude source precludes unnecessary
RAs due to differences between altitude data sources.
(15) Note and accurately report TCAS encounters and sys-
tem anomalies in accordance with operator policies
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in order to make remedial improvements to TCAS or
the National Airspace System (NAS).
NOTE: ARINC operates a Web-based data collection scheme on
behalf of the FAA. The Web site can be found at
www. tcasreport, com.
(16) The TCAS alone does not ensure safe separation in
every case, nor diminish the pilot's basic authority
and responsibility to ensure safe flight. TCAS does
not respond to aircraft which are not transponder-
equipped or to aircraft with a transponder failure,
and can display erroneous indications when a tran-
sponder malfunctions. TCAS RAs may, in some cases,
conflict with flightpath requirements due to terrain,
such as an obstacle-limited climb segment or an ap-
proach to rising terrain. Since the basis for many ap-
proved instrument procedures and IFR clearances is
avoiding high terrain or obstacles, it is particularly
important that pilots maintain situational awareness
(SA) and continue to use good operating practices
and judgment when following TCAS RAs. Pilots
should make frequent outside visual scans while us-
ing see-and-avoid techniques. Communication with
ATC should be initiated as necessary.
c. Examples of Potential Consequences of Disregarding RA
Information.
(1) An aircraft seen visually may not necessarily be the air-
craft causing the RA or may not be the only aircraft to
which TCAS is responding.
(2) It is difficult to visually determine the vertical displace-
ment of other aircraft, especially when ground refer-
ence information is unreliable or at cruise altitudes
where the Earth's horizon is obscured. Therefore, dis-
regarding RA information and maneuvering vertically
based solely on visual acquisition may result in a loss of
safe separation.
(3) ATC may not know when TCAS issues RAs. It is possi-
ble for ATC to unknowingly issue instructions that are
contrary to the TCAS RA indications. Safe vertical sep-
aration may be lost during TCAS coordination when
one aircraft maneuvers opposite the vertical direction
indicated by TCAS and the other aircraft maneuvers as
indicated by TCAS. As a result, both aircraft may expe-
rience excessive altitude excursions in vertical chase
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scenarios due to the aircraft maneuvering in the same
vertical direction. Accordingly, during an RA, do not
maneuver contrary to the RA based solely upon ATC
instructions. ATC may not be providing separation ser-
vice or be communicating with the aircraft causing the
RA.
(4) Disregarding RA during a coordinated encounter with
another TCAS II-equipped aircraft can result in loss of
safe separation.
d. TCAS Good Operating Practices. The following are identi-
fied TCAS good operating practices:
(1) To preclude unnecessary transponder interrogations
and possible interference with ground radar surveil-
lance systems, do not activate TCAS ("TA-ONLY' or
"TA/RA") until taking the active runway for depar-
ture. A transponder selected to "XPNDR" or "ON" is
adequate for ATC and nearby Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)-equipped aircraft to
"see" the aircraft while taxiing on the airport surface.
(2) Following landing and clearing of the runway, de-se-
lect TCAS from "TA-ONLY' or "TA/RA". Select
"XPNDR" or "ON" while taxiing to the ramp area.
Upon shutdown, select "STBY' on the transponder.
(3) During flight, use TCAS displays to enhance SA. Use
displays which have a range selection capability in an
appropriate range setting for the phase of flight. For
example, use minimum range settings in the terminal
and longer ranges for climb/descent and cruise as
appropriate.
(4) Note that TCAS RAs can occur while aircraft are le-
gally separated.
(5) It is appropriate to operate the TCAS in "TA-ONLY" in
circumstances where unnecessary RAs frequently oc-
cur and where such RAs are disruptive to the opera-
tion of the aircraft. These circumstances may include:
(a) During takeoff towards known nearby traffic that
is in visual contact and which could cause an un-
wanted RA during initial climb, such as a visually
identified helicopter passing near the departure
end of the runway. Select "TA/RA" after the po-
tential for an unwanted RA ceases to exist, such as
after climbing above a known VFR corridor.
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(b) In instrument or visual conditions during ap-
proaches to closely spaced parallel runways
(CSPR).
(c) In visual conditions, when flying in close proxim-
ity to other aircraft.
(d) At certain airports, during particular procedures,
or in circumstances identified by the operator as
having a significant potential for unwanted or in-
appropriate RAs.
(e) In the event of particular in-flight failures, such as
engine failure, as specified by the Aircraft Flight
Manual (AEM) or operator.
(f) During takeoffs or landings outside of the nominal
TCAS reference performance envelope for RAs, as
designated by the AFM or operator. TCAS refer-
ence performance for RAs is typically attainable
during takeoffs and landings at airports within the
envelope of ISA ±50 'F sea level to 5,300 feet MSL.
When takeoffs or landings are outside of this en-
velope, use of "TA-ONLY' may be appropriate dur-
ing the limited time period when TCAS reference
performance cannot be achieved. This typically oc-
curs when the aircraft is at low speed in specified
limiting configurations during takeoff or landing
at hot day, high-altitude airports, such as Mexico
City or La Paz.
(6) When safe, practical, and in accordance with the air
carrier's approved operating procedures, pilots should
limit VS to 1,500 fpm or less when within 1,000 feet of
assigned altitudes. This procedure will reduce the fre-
quency of unnecessary RAs and be in conformance
with the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) and
ICAO guidance.
e. Operator Responsibilities. Operators have the following
general responsibilities regarding the TCAS:
(1) Ensure followup and evaluation of unusual TCAS
events; and
(2) Periodically assess TCAS training, checking, and main-
tenance programs to ensure their correctness, perti-
nence, timeliness, and effectiveness.
f. ATC Responsibilities. Highlighted below are ATC responsi-
bilities relating to TCAS.
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(1) Controllers will not knowingly issue instructions that
are contrary to RA guidance when they are aware that a
TCAS maneuver is in progress. When an aircraft devi-
ates from its clearance in response to an RA, ATC is
still responsible for providing assistance to the deviat-
ing aircraft as requested until:
" The pilot informs ATC that the RA conflict is clear;
and the aircraft has returned to the previously as-
signed altitude; or
" Alternate ATC instructions have been issued and the
pilot has acknowledged them.
NOTE: See Appendix 4 for suggested phraseology.
(2) Workload permitting, controllers may continue to pro-
vide pertinent traffic information in accordance with
the current edition of FAA OrderJO 7110.65, Air Traf-
fic Control.
(3) Maintain awareness of TCAS programs and program
changes.
(4) Train ATC specialists on TCAS and expected flight-
crew responses to TCAS advisories and provide famil-
iarization flights for specialists on TCAS-equipped
aircraft to the extent possible.
(5) When requested by the flightcrew, and if appropriate,
provide separation from TCAS-observed traffic and as-
sistance in returning to the assigned clearance. Issue
additional clearance instructions when the situation so
requires.
(6) Advise pertinent FAA offices, such as a FSDO, via
TCAS questionnaires about airspace or airports where
excessive numbers of RAs occur. This facilitates initia-
tion of corrective actions related to TCAS enhance-
ments, TCAS procedures, and airspace adjustments.
Forward the information to www.tcasreport.com.
13. TCAS EVENT REPORTING.
NOTE: ARINC operates a Web-based data collection scheme on
behalf of the FAA. The Web site can be found at
www.tcasreport.com.
a. General. Operators and manufacturers are encouraged to
develop procedures to ensure effective identification,
tracking, and followup of significant TCAS-related events,
as appropriate. Such procedures should focus on providing
useful information to:
(1) Properly assess the importance of TCAS events.
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(2) Follow up on information related to specific TCAS
events, as necessary.
(3) Keep the industry and the FAA informed of the per-
formance of TCAS in the NAS and in international
operations.
(b) Pilot Reports.
(1) Mandatory Report. As of March 8, 2010, a new National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) immediate notifi-
cation rule (§ 830.5) added the following to the list of
reportable events that require immediate notification
of the NTSB ACAS RAs issued either:
" When an aircraft is being operated on an IFR flight
plan and compliance with the advisory is necessary to
avert a substantial risk of collision between two or
more aircraft; or
" To an aircraft operating in Class A airspace.
(2) Other Reports.
(a) TCAS-Specific Reports. Pilots should make the fol-
lowing reports for TCAS RAs, as necessary.
1. Upon query from ATC, or after a deviation from
an ATC clearance, make radio communications
as appropriate to report a response to a TCAS
advisory. Refer to AIM Chapter 4, Section 4,
ATC Clearances and Aircraft Separation, for
guidance, and Appendix 4 for recommended
phraseology.
2. Reports, as specified by the operator, concern-
ing TCAS anomalies, procedural difficulties, or
system failures are typically made by pilots
through one or more of the following methods:
* Pilot/observer questionnaire;
* Logbook entry and Aircraft Communications Ad-
dressing and Reporting System (ACARS); or
" Other records used by that operator, such as a
captain's report.
NOTE: An example of a typical reporting form for TCAS event
information is shown in Appendix 2.
(b) Near Midair Collision (NMAC) Reports. Flight-
crews should continue to submit NMAC reports in
accordance with existing policies and procedures.
Crews should be aware that there is no requirement
to submit an NMAC report solely due to a TCAS
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event and that a TCAS report does not constitute
an NMAC report.
(c) ATC Clearances and Instructions Reports. Unless
required due to other circumstances, reports in
compliance with § 91.123, compliance with ATC
clearances and instructions reports, or regarding
emergency deviation from an ATC clearance are
not necessary solely as a result of a TCAS maneuver.
(d) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Reports.
The flightcrew may file ASRS reports at their
discretion.
c. Maintenance Personnel Reports. Maintenance personnel
should report TCAS problems that relate to system per-
formance, manufacturers, and/or vendors to the appropri-
ate principal avionics inspector (PAL).
d. TCAS Manufacturer Reports. TCAS avionics manufactur-
ers report problems found with specific TCAS systems in
accordance with established Service Difficulty Report
(SDR) procedures. Report generic problems, such as those
that may relate to the definition of collision avoidance sys-
tem algorithms as defined by RTCA/DO-185, to the Air-
craft Engineering Division (AIR-100) in Washington, DC.
14. FAA RESPONSE TO TCAS EVENTS. Regarding regulatory
compliance issues, the FAA will not initiate enforcement action
solely on the basis of a TCAS event. Letters of investigation will
not be sent to pilots involved in a TCAS-related deviation,
provided:
* The aircraft was equipped with a TCAS, the system was op-
erable, and the equipment was turned on at the time of the
event;
" The pilots have properly operated their aircraft in compli-
ance with ATC clearances prior to the TCAS-related
deviation;
" The pilots have successfully completed their air carrier's
FAA-approved TCAS training program; and
* The pilots have otherwise complied with the requirements
of § 91.123.807
The Air Traffic Controller's Manual, Order JO 7110.65V
states:
2-1-27. TCAS RESOLUTION ADVISORIES
807 A.C. 120-55C, supra note 665.
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a. When an aircraft under your control jurisdiction in-
forms you that it is responding to a TCAS Resolution
Advisory (RA), do not issue control instructions that
are contrary to the RA procedure that a crew member
has advised you that they are executing. Provide safety
alerts regarding terrain or obstructions and traffic ad-
visories for the aircraft responding to the RA and all
other aircraft under your control jurisdiction, as
appropriate.
b. Unless advised by other aircraft that they are also re-
sponding to a TCAS RA, do not assume that other air-
craft in the proximity of the responding aircraft are
involved in the RA maneuver or are aware of the re-
sponding aircraft's intended maneuvers. Continue to
provide control instructions, safety alerts, and traffic
advisories as appropriate to such aircraft.
c. Once the responding aircraft has begun a maneuver in
response to an RA, the controller is not responsible for
providing standard separation between the aircraft
that is responding to an RA and any other aircraft, air-
space, terrain or obstructions. Responsibility for stan-
dard separation resumes when one of the following
conditions are met:
1. The responding aircraft has returned to its assigned
altitude, or
2. A crew member informs you that the TCAS maneu-
ver is completed and you observe that standard sep-
aration has been reestablished, or
3. The responding aircraft has executed an alternate
clearance and you observe that standard separation
has been reestablished.
NOTE-
1. A C 120-55A, Air Carrier Operational Approval and Use of TCAS
II, suggests pilots use the following phraseology to notify controllers
during TCAS events. When a TCAS RA may affect an ATC clear-
ance, inform ATC when beginning the maneuver, or as soon as
workload permits.
EXAMPLE-
1. "New York Center, United 321, TCAS climb."
NOTE-
2. When the RA has been resolved, the flight crew should advise A TC
they are returning to their previously assigned clearance or subse-
quent amended clearance.
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EXAMPLE-
3. "New York Center, United 321, clear of conflict, returning to as-
signed altitude.
AC 90-48C
4. ACTION. The following areas warrant special attention
and continuing action of all pilots to avoid the possibility
of becoming involved in a midair conflict.
a. "See and Avoid" Concept.
(1) The flight rules prescribed in Part 91 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations (FAR) set forth the con-
cept of "See and Avoid." This concept requires that
vigilance shall be maintained at all times, by each
person operating an aircraft, regardless of whether the
operation is conducted under Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) or Visual Flight Rules (VFR).
(2) Pilots should also keep in mind their responsibility
for continuously maintaining a vigilant lookout re-
gardless of the type of aircraft being flown. Re-
member that at most MAC accidents and reported
NMAC incidents occurred during good VFR
weather conditions and during the hours of
daylight.""°9
10-1-1 EMERGENCY DETERMINATIONS
a. An emergency can be either a Distress or an Urgency condi-
tion as defined in the "Pilot/Controller Glossary."
b. A pilot who encounters a Distress condition should declare
an emergency by beginning the initial communication
with the word "Mayday," preferably repeated three times.
For an Urgency condition, the word "Pan-Pan" should be
used in the same manner.
c. If the words "Mayday" or "Pan-Pan" are not used and you
are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or
potential emergency, handle it as though it were an
emergency.
d. Because of the infinite variety of possible emergency situa-
tions, specific procedures cannot be prescribed. However,
when you believe an emergency exists or is imminent, se-
lect and pursue a course of action which appears to be
most appropriate under the circumstances and which most
nearly conforms to the instructions in this manual.
808 FAA ORDER No. JO 7110.65U, supra note 66.
809 A.C. 9048C, supra note 790.
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rule listed in this subpart if the Administrator finds that
the proposed operation can be safely conducted under
the terms of that certificate of waiver.
(b) An application for a certificate of waiver under this part is
made on a form and in a manner prescribed by the Ad-
ministrator and may be submitted to any FAA office.
(c) A certificate of waiver is effective as specified in that certif-
icate of waiver.8 10
(d) Section 91.905 provides a list of regulations subject to
waiver. The majority of the regulations contained in this
report are found on this list, shown in Appendix D as
italicized.""
Section 91.905: List of Rules Subject to Waivers
Section Title
91.107 Use of Safety Belts
91.111 Operating Near Other Aircraft
91.113 Right-of-Way Rules: Except Water Operations
91.115 Right-of-Way Rules: Water Operations
91.117 Aircraft Speed
91.119 Minimum Safe Altitudes: General
91.121 Altimeter Settings
91.123 Compliance with ATC Clearances and Instruc-
tions
91.125 ATC light signals
91.126 Operating on or in the Vicinity of an Airport in
Class G Airspace
91.127 Operating on or in the Vicinity of an Airport in
Class E Airspace
91.129 Operations in Class D Airspace
91.130 Operations in Class C Airspace
91.131 Operations in Class B Airspace
91.133 Restricted and Prohibited Areas
91.135 Operations in Class A airspace
91.137 Temporary Flight Restrictions
91.141 Flight Restrictions in the Proximity of Presiden-
tial and Other Parties
91.143 Flight Limitation in the Proximity of Space Flight
Operations
91.153 VFR Flight Plan: Information Required
91.155 Basic VFR Weather Minimums
810 14 C.F.R. § 91.903 (2013).
811 Id. § 91.905.
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91.157 Special VFR Weather Minimums
91.159 VFR Cruising Altitude or Flight Level
91.169 IFR Flight Plan: Information Required
91.173 ATC Clearance and Flight Plan Required
91.175 Takeoff and Landing Under IFR
91.177 Minimum Altitudes for IFR Operations
91.179 IFR Cruising Altitude or Flight Level
91.181 Course to be Flown
91.183 IFR Radio Communications
91.185 IFR Operations: Two-Way Radio Communications Fail-
ure




91.305 Flight Test Areas
91.311 Towing: Other than Under Section 91.309
91.313(e) Restricted Category Civil Aircraft: Operating Lim-
itations
91.515 Flight Altitude Rules
91.705 Operations within the North Atlantic Minimum
Navigation Performance Specifications Airspace
91.707 Flights Between Mexico or Canada and the
United States
91.713 Operation of Civil Aircraft of Cuban Registry
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